Where was the border with Finland until 1939. Soviet-Finnish (Winter) War: an “unfamous” conflict
1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, in Finland known as the Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.
Its reason was the desire of the Soviet leadership to move the Finnish border away from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in order to strengthen the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR, and the refusal of the Finnish side to do this. The Soviet government asked to lease parts of the Hanko Peninsula and some islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for a larger area of Soviet territory in Karelia, with the subsequent conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement.
From the very beginning of the war, the superiority of forces was on the side of the USSR. The Soviet command concentrated 21 rifle divisions, one tank corps, three separate tank brigades (a total of 425 thousand people, about 1.6 thousand guns, 1,476 tanks and about 1,200 aircraft) near the border with Finland. To support ground forces, it was planned to attract about 500 aircraft and more than 200 ships of the Northern and Baltic fleets. 40% of Soviet forces were deployed on the Karelian Isthmus.
The group of Finnish troops had about 300 thousand people, 768 guns, 26 tanks, 114 aircraft and 14 warships. The Finnish command concentrated 42% of its forces on the Karelian Isthmus, deploying the Isthmus Army there. The remaining troops covered separate directions from the Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga.
The main line of defense of Finland was the “Mannerheim Line” - unique, impregnable fortifications. The main architect of Mannerheim's line was nature itself. Its flanks rested on the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The shore of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale area on the shore of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120- and 152-mm coastal guns were created.
The "Mannerheim Line" had a front width of 135 kilometers, a depth of up to 95 kilometers and consisted of a support strip (depth 15-60 kilometers), a main strip (depth 7-10 kilometers), a second strip 2-15 kilometers from the main one, and rear (Vyborg) defense line. Over two thousand long-term fire structures (DOS) and wood-earth fire structures (DZOS) were erected, which were united into strong points of 2-3 DOS and 3-5 DZOS in each, and the latter - into resistance nodes (3-4 strong points point). The main line of defense consisted of 25 resistance units, numbering 280 DOS and 800 DZOS. Strong points were defended by permanent garrisons (from a company to a battalion in each). In the gaps between the strong points and the nodes of resistance there were positions for field troops. Strongholds and positions of field troops were covered by anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. In the support zone alone, 220 kilometers of wire barriers in 15-45 rows, 200 kilometers of forest debris, 80 kilometers of granite gouges up to 12 rows, anti-tank ditches, scarps (anti-tank walls) and numerous minefields were created.
All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches and underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for long-term independent combat.
On November 30, 1939, after a lengthy artillery preparation, Soviet troops crossed the border with Finland and began an offensive on the front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland. In 10-13 days, in separate directions they overcame the zone of operational obstacles and reached the main strip of the “Mannerheim Line”. Unsuccessful attempts to break through it continued for more than two weeks.
At the end of December, the Soviet command decided to stop further offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and begin systematic preparations for breaking through the Mannerheim Line.
The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus. The troops received reinforcements. As a result, Soviet troops deployed against Finland numbered more than 1.3 million people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3.5 thousand guns, and three thousand aircraft. By the beginning of February 1940, the Finnish side had 600 thousand people, 600 guns and 350 aircraft.
On February 11, 1940, the assault on the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus resumed - the troops of the North-Western Front, after 2-3 hours of artillery preparation, went on the offensive.
Having broken through two lines of defense, Soviet troops reached the third on February 28. They broke the enemy's resistance, forced him to begin a retreat along the entire front and, developing an offensive, enveloped the Vyborg group of Finnish troops from the northeast, captured most of Vyborg, crossed the Vyborg Bay, bypassed the Vyborg fortified area from the northwest, and cut the highway to Helsinki.
The fall of the Mannerheim Line and the defeat of the main group of Finnish troops put the enemy in a difficult situation. Under these conditions, Finland turned to the Soviet government asking for peace.
On the night of March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which Finland ceded about a tenth of its territory to the USSR and pledged not to participate in coalitions hostile to the USSR. On March 13, hostilities ceased.
In accordance with the agreement, the border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved away from Leningrad by 120-130 kilometers. The entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, and part of the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas went to the Soviet Union. The Hanko Peninsula and the maritime territory around it were leased to the USSR for 30 years. This improved the position of the Baltic Fleet.
As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the main strategic goal pursued by the Soviet leadership was achieved - to secure the northwestern border. However, the international position of the Soviet Union worsened: it was expelled from the League of Nations, relations with England and France worsened, and an anti-Soviet campaign unfolded in the West.
The losses of Soviet troops in the war were: irrevocable - about 130 thousand people, sanitary - about 265 thousand people. Irreversible losses of Finnish troops are about 23 thousand people, sanitary losses are over 43 thousand people.
(Additional
Main events of the Soviet-Finnish war 11/30/1939 - 3/13/1940:
|
USSR Finland |
Beginning of negotiations on concluding a mutual assistance agreement |
|
|
Finland |
General mobilization announced |
|
|
The formation of the 1st Corps of the Finnish People's Army (originally the 106th Mountain Division), which was staffed by Finns and Karelians, began. By November 26, the corps numbered 13,405 people. The corps did not participate in hostilities |
||
|
USSR Finland |
Negotiations were interrupted and the Finnish delegation left Moscow |
|
|
The Soviet government addressed the Finnish government with an official note, which reported that as a result of artillery shelling, allegedly carried out from Finnish territory in the area of the border village of Mainila, four Red Army soldiers were killed and eight were wounded |
||
|
Announcement of denunciation of the Non-Aggression Treaty with Finland |
||
|
Severance of diplomatic relations with Finland |
||
|
Soviet troops received orders to cross the Soviet-Finnish border and begin hostilities |
||
|
Troops of the Leningrad Military District (commander commander of the 2nd rank K. A. Meretskov, member of the Military Council A. A. Zhdanov): |
||
|
7A attacked on the Karelian Isthmus (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 separate tank brigades, 13 artillery regiments; commander 2nd rank army commander V.F. Yakovlev, and from December 9 - 2nd rank army commander Meretskov) |
||
|
8A (4 rifle divisions; division commander I. N. Khabarov, since January - 2nd rank army commander G. M. Stern) - north of Lake Ladoga in the Petrozavodsk direction |
||
|
9A (3rd infantry division; commander corps commander M.P. Dukhanov, from mid-December - corps commander V.I. Chuikov) - in central and northern Karelia |
||
|
14A (2nd infantry division; division commander V.A. Frolov) advanced into the Arctic |
||
|
The port of Petsamo has been taken in the Murmansk direction |
||
|
In the town of Terijoki, the so-called “People's Government” was formed from Finnish communists, headed by Otto Kuusinen |
||
|
The Soviet government signed a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with the government of the “Finnish Democratic Republic” Kuusinen and refused any contacts with the legitimate government of Finland led by Risto Ryti |
||
|
Troops 7A overcame the operational zone of barriers 25-65 km deep and reached the front edge of the main defense line of the Mannerheim Line. |
||
|
USSR expelled from the League of Nations |
||
|
The advance of the 44th Infantry Division from the Vazhenvara area along the road to Suomussalmi with the aim of providing assistance to the 163rd Division encircled by the Finns. Parts of the division, greatly extended along the road, were repeatedly surrounded by Finns during January 3-7. On January 7, the division's advance was stopped, and its main forces were surrounded. Division commander, brigade commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar I.T. Pakhomenko and Chief of Staff A.I. Volkov, instead of organizing defense and withdrawing troops from encirclement, fled themselves, abandoning their troops. At the same time, Vinogradov gave the order to leave the encirclement, abandoning the equipment, which led to the abandonment of 37 tanks, 79 guns, 280 machine guns, 150 cars, all radio stations, and the entire convoy on the battlefield. Most of the fighters died, 700 people escaped encirclement, 1200 surrendered. For cowardice, Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov were shot in front of the division line |
||
|
The 7th Army is divided into 7A and 13A (commander corps commander V.D. Grendal, from March 2 - corps commander F.A. Parusinov), which were reinforced with troops |
||
|
The government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland |
||
|
Stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus |
||
|
The Finnish attack on units of the 7th Army was repulsed |
||
|
On the Karelian Isthmus, the North-Western Front was formed (commander 1st rank army commander S.K. Timoshenko, member of the Military Council Zhdanov) consisting of 24 rifle divisions, a tank corps, 5 separate tank brigades, 21 artillery regiments, 23 air regiments: |
||
|
A new 15A was formed from units of the 8th Army (commander of the 2nd rank army commander M.P. Kovalev) |
||
|
After the artillery barrage, the Red Army began to break through the main line of Finnish defense on the Karelian Isthmus |
||
|
The Summa fortified junction was taken |
||
|
Finland |
Commander of the Karelian Isthmus troops in the Finnish army, Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman is suspended. Major General A.E. was appointed in his place. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps |
|
|
Units 7A reached the second line of defense |
||
|
7A and 13A began an offensive in the zone from Lake Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay |
||
|
A bridgehead on the western shore of the Vyborg Bay was captured |
||
|
Finland |
The Finns opened the floodgates of the Saimaa Canal, flooding the area northeast of Viipuri (Vyborg) |
|
|
The 50th Corps cut the Vyborg-Antrea railway |
||
|
USSR Finland |
Arrival of the Finnish delegation in Moscow |
|
|
USSR Finland |
Conclusion of a peace treaty in Moscow. The Karelian Isthmus, the cities of Vyborg, Sortavala, Kuolajärvi, islands in the Gulf of Finland, and part of the Rybachy Peninsula in the Arctic went to the USSR. Lake Ladoga was completely within the borders of the USSR. The USSR leased part of the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there. The Petsamo region, captured by the Red Army at the beginning of the war, has been returned to Finland. (The border established by this treaty is close to the border under the Treaty of Nystad with Sweden in 1721) |
|
|
USSR Finland |
Storming of Vyborg by units of the Red Army. Cessation of hostilities |
The group of Soviet troops consisted of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th Army north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th Army in northern and central Karelia, and the 14th Army in Petsamo.
Soviet tank BT-5
Soviet tank T-28
The advance of the 7th Army on the Karelian Isthmus was opposed by the Army of the Isthmus (Kannaksen armeija) under the command of Hugo Esterman.
For the Soviet troops, these battles became the most difficult and bloody. The Soviet command had only “sketchy intelligence information about the concrete strips of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.” As a result, the allocated forces to break through the “Mannerheim Line” turned out to be completely insufficient. The troops turned out to be completely unprepared to overcome the line of bunkers and bunkers. In particular, there was little large-caliber artillery needed to destroy bunkers. By December 12, units of the 7th Army were able to overcome only the line support zone and reach the front edge of the main defense line, but the planned breakthrough of the line on the move failed due to clearly insufficient forces and poor organization of the offensive. On December 12, the Finnish army carried out one of its most successful operations at Lake Tolvajärvi.
Until the end of December, attempts at a breakthrough continued, but were unsuccessful.
The 8th Army advanced 80 km. It was opposed by the IV Army Corps (IV armeija kunta), commanded by Juho Heiskanen.
Juho Heiskanen
Some of the Soviet troops were surrounded. After heavy fighting they had to retreat.
The advance of the 9th and 14th armies was opposed by the Northern Finland task force (Pohjois-Suomen Ryhm?) under the command of Major General Viljo Einar Tuompo. Its area of responsibility was a 400-mile stretch of territory from Petsamo to Kuhmo. The 9th Army launched an offensive from White Sea Karelia. It penetrated the enemy defenses at 35-45 km, but was stopped. The 14th Army, attacking the Petsamo area, achieved the greatest success. Interacting with the Northern Fleet, the troops of the 14th Army were able to capture the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, and the city of Petsamo (now Pechenga). Thus, they closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.
Front kitchen
Some researchers and memoirists try to explain Soviet failures also by the weather: severe frosts (up to -40°C) and deep snow up to 2 m. However, both meteorological observation data and other documents refute this: until December 20, 1939, On the Karelian Isthmus, temperatures ranged from +2 to -7°C. Then until the New Year the temperature did not drop below 23°C. Frosts of up to 40°C began in the second half of January, when there was a lull at the front. Moreover, these frosts hindered not only the attackers, but also the defenders, as Mannerheim also wrote about. There was also no deep snow before January 1940. Thus, operational reports of Soviet divisions dated December 15, 1939 indicate a depth of snow cover of 10-15 cm. Moreover, successful offensive operations in February took place in more severe weather conditions.
Destroyed Soviet T-26 tank
T-26
An unpleasant surprise was also the massive use of Molotov cocktails by the Finns against Soviet tanks, later nicknamed the “Molotov cocktail.” During the 3 months of the war, the Finnish industry produced over half a million bottles.
Molotov cocktail from the Winter War
During the war, Soviet troops were the first to use radar stations (RUS-1) in combat conditions to detect enemy aircraft.
Radar "RUS-1"
Mannerheim Line
The Mannerheim Line (Finnish: Mannerheim-linja) is a complex of defensive structures on the Finnish part of the Karelian Isthmus, created in 1920-1930 to deter a possible offensive attack from the USSR. The length of the line was about 135 km, the depth was about 90 km. Named after Marshal Karl Mannerheim, on whose orders plans for the defense of the Karelian Isthmus were developed back in 1918. On his initiative, the largest structures of the complex were created.
Name
The name “Mannerheim Line” appeared after the creation of the complex, at the beginning of the winter Soviet-Finnish War in December 1939, when Finnish troops began a stubborn defense. Shortly before this, in the fall, a group of foreign journalists arrived to get acquainted with the fortification work. At that time, much was written about the French Maginot Line and the German Siegfried Line. The son of Mannerheim's former adjutant Jorma Galen-Kallela, who accompanied the foreigners, came up with the name "Mannerheim Line". After the start of the Winter War, this name appeared in those newspapers whose representatives inspected the structures.
History of creation
Preparations for the construction of the line began immediately after Finland gained independence in 1918, and construction itself continued intermittently until the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish War in 1939.
The first line plan was developed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Rappe in 1918.
Work on the defense plan was continued by the German colonel Baron von Brandenstein. It was approved in August. In October 1918, the Finnish government allocated 300,000 marks for construction work. The work was carried out by German and Finnish sappers (one battalion) and Russian prisoners of war. With the departure of the German army, the work was significantly reduced and everything was reduced to the work of the Finnish combat engineer training battalion.
In October 1919, a new plan for the defensive line was developed. It was led by the Chief of the General Staff, Major General Oskar Enckel. The main design work was carried out by a member of the French military commission, Major J. Gros-Coissy.
According to this plan, in 1920 - 1924, 168 concrete and reinforced concrete structures were built, of which 114 were machine gun, 6 artillery and one mixed. Then there was a three-year break and the question of resuming work was raised only in 1927.
The new plan was developed by V. Karikoski. However, the work itself began only in 1930. They reached their greatest scale in 1932, when six double-embrasure bunkers were built under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Fabritius.
Fortifications
The main defensive line consisted of an elongated system of defense nodes, each of which included several wood-earth field fortifications (DZOT) and long-term stone-concrete structures, as well as anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. The defense nodes themselves were placed extremely unevenly on the main defensive line: the gaps between individual resistance nodes sometimes reached 6-8 km. Each defense node had its own index, which usually began with the first letters of the nearby settlement. If you count from the shore of the Gulf of Finland, then the designations of the nodes will follow in this order:
Bunker diagram:
“N” – Khumaljoki [now Ermilovo] “K” – Kolkkala [now Malyshevo] “N” – Nyayukki [no existence]
“Ko” - Kolmikeeyalya [no noun] “Well” - Hyulkeyalya [no noun] “Ka” - Karkhula [now Dyatlovo]
“Sk” - Summakylä [non-creature] "La" - Lyahde [non-creature] "A" - Eyuräpää (Leipäsuo)
"Mi" - Muolaankylä [now Gribnoye] "Ma" - Sikniemi [no existential] "Ma" - Mälkelä [now Zverevo]
"La" - Lauttaniemi [no noun] "No" - Noisniemi [now Mys] "Ki" - Kiviniemi [now Losevo]
"Sa" - Sakkola [now Gromovo] "Ke" - Kelya [now Portovoye] "Tai" - Taipale (now Solovyovo)
Dot SJ-5, covering the road to Vyborg. (2009)
Dot SK16
Thus, 18 defense nodes of varying degrees of power were built on the main defensive line. The fortification system also included a rear defensive line that covered the approach to Vyborg. It included 10 defense units:
"R" - Rempetti [now Key] "Nr" - Nyarya [now defunct] "Kai" - Kaipiala [non-existent]
“Nu” - Nuoraa [now Sokolinskoye] "Kak" - Kakkola [now Sokolinskoye] "Le" - Leviainen [no existential]
"A.-Sa" - Ala-Syainie [now Cherkasovo] "Y.-Sa" - Yulya-Syainie [now V.-Cherkasovo]
“Not” - Heinjoki [now Veshchevo] "Ly" - Lyyukylä [now Ozernoye]
Dot Ink5
The resistance center was defended by one or two rifle battalions, reinforced with artillery. Along the front the node occupied 3-4.5 kilometers and in depth 1.5-2 kilometers. It consisted of 4-6 strong points, each strong point had 3-5 long-term firing points, mainly machine gun and artillery, which made up the skeleton of the defense.
Each permanent structure was surrounded by trenches, which also filled the gaps between resistance nodes. The trenches in most cases consisted of a communication trench with forward machine gun nests and rifle cells for one to three riflemen.
The rifle cells were covered with armored shields with visors and firing loops. This protected the shooter's head from shrapnel fire. The flanks of the line abutted the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The shore of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale area on the shore of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120-mm and 152-mm coastal guns were created.
The basis for the fortifications was the terrain: the entire territory of the Karelian Isthmus is covered by large forests, dozens of small and medium-sized lakes and streams. Lakes and rivers have swampy or rocky steep banks. In the forests there are rocky ridges and numerous large boulders everywhere. The Belgian General Badu wrote: “Nowhere in the world were natural conditions as favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia.”
Reinforced concrete structures of the “Mannerheim Line” are divided into buildings of the first generation (1920-1937) and second generation (1938-1939).
A group of Red Army soldiers inspects an armored cap at a Finnish bunker
The first generation bunkers were small, one-story, with one to three machine guns, and did not have shelters for the garrison or internal equipment. The thickness of the reinforced concrete walls reached 2 m, the horizontal coating - 1.75-2 m. Subsequently, these pillboxes were strengthened: the walls were thickened, armor plates were installed on the embrasures.
The Finnish press dubbed the second generation pillboxes “million-dollar” or million-dollar pillboxes, since the cost of each of them exceeded a million Finnish marks. A total of 7 such pillboxes were built. The initiator of their construction was Baron Mannerheim, who returned to politics in 1937, and obtained additional allocations from the country’s parliament. One of the most modern and heavily fortified bunkers were the Sj4 "Poppius", which had embrasures for flanking fire in the western casemate, and the Sj5 "Millionaire", with embrasures for flanking fire in both casemates. Both bunkers swept through the entire ravine with flanking fire, covering each other's front with machine guns. Flanking fire bunkers were called casemate “Le Bourget”, named after the French engineer who developed it, and became widespread already during the First World War. Some bunkers in the Hottinen area, for example Sk5, Sk6, were converted into flanking fire casemates, while the front embrasure was bricked up. The bunkers of the flanking fire were well camouflaged with stones and snow, which made them difficult to detect; in addition, it was almost impossible to penetrate the casemate with artillery from the front. “Million-dollar” pillboxes were large modern reinforced concrete structures with 4-6 embrasures, of which one or two were guns, mainly of flanking action. The usual armament of the pillboxes were Russian 76-mm guns of the 1900 model on Durlyakher casemate mountings and 37-mm Bofors anti-tank guns of the 1936 model on casemate installations. Less common were 76-mm mountain guns of the 1904 model on pedestal mounts.
The weaknesses of Finnish long-term structures are as follows: inferior quality of concrete in first-term buildings, oversaturation of concrete with flexible reinforcement, and lack of rigid reinforcement in first-term buildings.
The strengths of the pillboxes lay in the large number of fire embrasures that shot through the near and immediate approaches and flanking the approaches to neighboring reinforced concrete points, as well as in the tactically correct location of structures on the ground, in their careful camouflage, and in the rich filling of gaps.
Destroyed bunker
Engineering barriers
The main types of anti-personnel obstacles were wire nets and mines. The Finns installed slingshots that were somewhat different from the Soviet slingshots or the Bruno spiral. These anti-personnel obstacles were complemented by anti-tank ones. The gouges were usually placed in four rows, two meters apart, in a checkerboard pattern. The rows of stones were sometimes reinforced with wire fences, and in other cases with ditches and scarps. Thus, anti-tank obstacles turned into anti-personnel obstacles at the same time. The most powerful obstacles were at height 65.5 at pillbox No. 006 and on Khotinen at pillboxes No. 45, 35 and 40, which were the main ones in the defense system of the Mezhdubolotny and Summsky resistance centers. At pillbox No. 006, the wire network reached 45 rows, of which the first 42 rows were on metal stakes 60 centimeters high, embedded in concrete. The gouges in this place had 12 rows of stones and were located in the middle of the wire. To blow up the hole, it was necessary to go through 18 rows of wire under three or four layers of fire and 100-150 meters from the front edge of the enemy’s defense. In some cases, the area between bunkers and pillboxes was occupied by residential buildings. They were usually located on the outskirts of a populated area and were made of granite, and the thickness of the walls reached 1 meter or more. If necessary, the Finns turned such houses into defensive fortifications. Finnish sappers managed to erect about 136 km of anti-tank obstacles and about 330 km of wire barriers along the main defense line. In practice, when in the first phase of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War the Red Army came close to the fortifications of the main defensive line and began to attempt to break through it, it turned out that the above principles, developed before the war based on the results of tests of anti-tank barriers for survivability using those then in service The Finnish army of several dozen outdated Renault light tanks turned out to be incompetent in the face of the power of the Soviet tank mass. In addition to the fact that the gouges moved from their place under the pressure of medium T-28 tanks, detachments of Soviet sappers often blew up the gouges with explosive charges, thereby creating passages for armored vehicles in them. But the most serious drawback, undoubtedly, was a good overview of the lines of anti-tank ditches from distant enemy artillery positions, especially in open and flat areas of the terrain, such as, for example, in the area of the defense center "Sj" (Summa-yarvi), where it was 11.02. 1940 The main defensive line was broken through. As a result of repeated artillery shelling, the hollows were destroyed and there were more and more passages in them.
Between the granite anti-tank gouges there were rows of barbed wire (2010) Rubble of stones, barbed wire and in the distance an SJ-5 pillbox covering the road to Vyborg (winter 1940).
Terijoki government
On December 1, 1939, a message was published in the Pravda newspaper stating that the so-called “People's Government” had been formed in Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen. In historical literature, Kuusinen’s government is usually called “Terijoki”, since after the outbreak of the war it was located in the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk). This government was officially recognized by the USSR.
On December 2, negotiations took place in Moscow between the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, headed by Otto Kuusinen, and the Soviet government, headed by V. M. Molotov, at which a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was signed. Stalin, Voroshilov and Zhdanov also took part in the negotiations.
The main provisions of this agreement corresponded to the requirements that the USSR had previously presented to Finnish representatives (transfer of territories on the Karelian Isthmus, sale of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, lease of Hanko). In exchange, the transfer of significant territories in Soviet Karelia and monetary compensation to Finland was provided. The USSR also pledged to support the Finnish People's Army with weapons, assistance in training specialists, etc. The agreement was concluded for a period of 25 years, and if one year before the expiration of the agreement, neither party declared its termination, it was automatically extended for another for 25 years. The agreement came into force from the moment it was signed by the parties, and ratification was planned “as soon as possible in the capital of Finland - the city of Helsinki.”
In the following days, Molotov met with official representatives of Sweden and the United States, at which recognition of the People's Government of Finland was announced.
It was announced that the previous government of Finland had fled and therefore no longer governed the country. The USSR declared at the League of Nations that from now on it would negotiate only with the new government.
RECEPTION Comrade MOLOTOV OF THE SWEDISH ENVIRONMENT OF VINTER
Accepted Comrade Molotov on December 4, the Swedish envoy Mr. Winter announced the desire of the so-called “Finnish government” to begin new negotiations on an agreement with the Soviet Union. Comrade Molotov explained to Mr. Winter that the Soviet government did not recognize the so-called “Finnish government,” which had already left Helsinki and headed in an unknown direction, and therefore there could now be no question of any negotiations with this “government.” The Soviet government recognizes only the people's government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, has concluded an agreement of mutual assistance and friendship with it, and this is a reliable basis for the development of peaceful and favorable relations between the USSR and Finland.
V. Molotov signs an agreement between the USSR and the Terijoki government. Standing: A. Zhdanov, K. Voroshilov, I. Stalin, O. Kuusinen
The “People's Government” was formed in the USSR from Finnish communists. The leadership of the Soviet Union believed that using in propaganda the fact of the creation of a “people's government” and the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement with it, indicating friendship and alliance with the USSR while maintaining the independence of Finland, would influence the Finnish population, increasing the disintegration in the army and in the rear.
Finnish People's Army
On November 11, 1939, the formation of the first corps of the “Finnish People's Army” (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division), called “Ingria”, began, which was staffed by Finns and Karelians who served in the troops of the Leningrad Military District.
By November 26, there were 13,405 people in the corps, and in February 1940 - 25 thousand military personnel who wore their national uniform (made of khaki cloth and similar to the Finnish uniform of the 1927 model; claims that it was a captured uniform of the Polish army , are erroneous - only part of the overcoats were used from it).
This “people’s” army was supposed to replace the occupation units of the Red Army in Finland and become the military support of the “people’s” government. “Finns” in confederate uniforms held a parade in Leningrad. Kuusinen announced that they would be given the honor of hoisting the red flag over the presidential palace in Helsinki. In the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a draft instruction was prepared “Where to begin the political and organizational work of communists (note: the word “communists” is crossed out by Zhdanov) in areas liberated from white power,” which indicated practical measures to create Popular Front in occupied Finnish territory. In December 1939, this instruction was used in work with the population of Finnish Karelia, but the withdrawal of Soviet troops led to the curtailment of these activities.
Despite the fact that the Finnish People's Army was not supposed to participate in hostilities, from the end of December 1939, FNA units began to be widely used to carry out combat missions. Throughout January 1940, scouts from the 5th and 6th regiments of the 3rd SD FNA carried out special sabotage missions in the 8th Army sector: they destroyed ammunition depots in the rear of Finnish troops, blew up railway bridges, and mined roads. FNA units took part in the battles for Lunkulansaari and the capture of Vyborg.
When it became clear that the war was dragging on and the Finnish people did not support the new government, Kuusinen's government faded into the shadows and was no longer mentioned in the official press. When Soviet-Finnish consultations on concluding peace began in January, it was no longer mentioned. Since January 25, the government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland.
Leaflet for volunteers - Karelians and Finns citizens of the USSR
Foreign volunteers
Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, detachments and groups of volunteers from around the world began to arrive in Finland. The most significant number of volunteers came from Sweden, Denmark and Norway (Swedish Volunteer Corps), as well as Hungary. However, among the volunteers there were also citizens of many other countries, including England and the USA, as well as a small number of Russian White volunteers from the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS). The latter were used as officers of the “Russian People's Detachments”, formed by the Finns from among the captured Red Army soldiers. But since the work on forming such detachments was started late, already at the end of the war, before the end of hostilities only one of them (numbering 35-40 people) managed to take part in the hostilities.
Preparing for the offensive
The course of hostilities revealed serious gaps in the organization of command and control and supply of troops, poor preparedness of command staff, and the lack of specific skills among the troops necessary to wage war in winter in Finland. By the end of December it became clear that fruitless attempts to continue the offensive would lead nowhere. There was relative calm at the front. Throughout January and early February, troops were strengthened, material supplies were replenished, and units and formations were reorganized. Units of skiers were created, methods of overcoming mined areas and obstacles, methods of combating defensive structures were developed, and personnel were trained. To storm the “Mannerheim Line”, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and member of the Leningrad Military District Military Council Zhdanov.
Timoshenko Semyon Konstaetinovich Zhdanov Andrey Alexandrovich
The front included the 7th and 13th armies. In the border areas, a huge amount of work was carried out on the hasty construction and re-equipment of communication routes for uninterrupted supply of the active army. The total number of personnel was increased to 760.5 thousand people.
To destroy the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line, the first echelon divisions were assigned destruction artillery groups (AD) consisting of from one to six divisions in the main directions. In total, these groups had 14 divisions, which had 81 guns with calibers of 203, 234, 280 mm.
203 mm howitzer "B-4" mod. 1931
Karelian Isthmus. Combat map. December 1939 "Black Line" - Mannerheim Line
During this period, the Finnish side also continued to replenish troops and supply them with weapons coming from the allies. In total, during the war, 350 aircraft, 500 guns, more than 6 thousand machine guns, about 100 thousand rifles, 650 thousand hand grenades, 2.5 million shells and 160 million cartridges were delivered to Finland [source not specified 198 days]. About 11.5 thousand foreign volunteers, mostly from Scandinavian countries, fought on the Finnish side.
Finnish autonomous ski squads armed with machine guns
Finnish assault rifle M-31 “Suomi“:
TTD "Suomi" M-31 Lahti
|
Cartridge used |
9x19 Parabellum |
|
Sighting line length |
|
|
Barrel length |
|
|
Weight without cartridges |
|
|
Empty/loaded weight of 20-round box magazine |
|
|
Empty/loaded weight of 36-round box magazine |
|
|
Empty/loaded weight of 50-round box magazine |
|
|
Empty/loaded weight of 40-round disc magazine |
|
|
Empty/loaded weight of 71-round disc magazine |
|
|
Rate of fire |
700-800 rpm |
|
Initial bullet speed |
|
|
Sighting range |
500 meters |
|
Magazine capacity |
20, 36, 50 rounds (box) 40, 71 (disc) |
At the same time, fighting continued in Karelia. The formations of the 8th and 9th armies, operating along roads in continuous forests, suffered heavy losses. If in some places the achieved lines were held, in others the troops retreated, in some places even to the border line. The Finns widely used guerrilla warfare tactics: small autonomous detachments of skiers armed with machine guns attacked troops moving along the roads, mainly in the dark, and after the attacks they went into the forest where bases were established. Snipers caused heavy losses. According to the strong opinion of the Red Army soldiers (however, refuted by many sources, including Finnish ones), the greatest danger was posed by “cuckoo” snipers who fired from the trees. The Red Army formations that broke through were constantly surrounded and forced their way back, often abandoning their equipment and weapons.
The Battle of Suomussalmi, in particular, the history of the 44th Division of the 9th Army, became widely known. From December 14, the division advanced from the Vazhenvara area along the road to Suomussalmi to help the 163rd Division surrounded by Finnish troops. The advance of the troops was completely unorganized. Parts of the division, greatly extended along the road, were repeatedly surrounded by Finns during January 3-7. As a result, on January 7, the division's advance was stopped, and its main forces were surrounded. The situation was not hopeless, since the division had a significant technical advantage over the Finns, but the division commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar Pakhomenko and chief of staff Volkov, instead of organizing defense and withdrawing troops from the encirclement, fled themselves, abandoning the troops. At the same time, Vinogradov gave the order to leave the encirclement, abandoning the equipment, which led to the abandonment on the battlefield of 37 tanks, more than three hundred machine guns, several thousand rifles, up to 150 vehicles, all radio stations, the entire convoy and horse train. More than a thousand of the personnel who escaped the encirclement were wounded or frostbitten; some of the wounded were captured because they were not taken out when they fled. Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov were sentenced to death by a military tribunal and shot publicly in front of the division line.
On the Karelian Isthmus the front stabilized by December 26. Soviet troops began careful preparations for breaking through the main fortifications of the Mannerheim Line and conducted reconnaissance of the defense line. At this time, the Finns unsuccessfully tried to disrupt the preparations for a new offensive with counterattacks. So, on December 28, the Finns attacked the central units of the 7th Army, but were repulsed with heavy losses. On January 3, 1940, off the northern tip of the island of Gotland (Sweden), with 50 crew members, the Soviet submarine S-2 sank (probably hit a mine) under the command of Lieutenant Commander I. A. Sokolov. S-2 was the only RKKF ship lost by the USSR.
Crew of the submarine "S-2"
Based on the Directive of the Headquarters of the Main Military Council of the Red Army No. 01447 of January 30, 1940, the entire remaining Finnish population was subject to eviction from the territory occupied by Soviet troops. By the end of February, 2080 people were evicted from the areas of Finland occupied by the Red Army in the combat zone of the 8th, 9th, 15th armies, of which: men - 402, women - 583, children under 16 years old - 1095. All resettled Finnish citizens were placed in three villages of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: in the Intervillage of the Pryazhinsky district, in the village of Kovgora-Goymae of the Kondopozhsky district, in the village of Kintezma of the Kalevalsky district. They lived in barracks and were required to work in the forest at logging sites. They were allowed to return to Finland only in June 1940, after the end of the war.
February offensive of the Red Army
On February 1, 1940, the Red Army, having brought up reinforcements, resumed its offensive on the Karelian Isthmus across the entire width of the front of the 2nd Army Corps. The main blow was delivered in the direction of Summa. Artillery preparation also began. From that day on, every day for several days the troops of the North-Western Front under the command of S. Timoshenko rained down 12 thousand shells on the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line. The Finns answered rarely, but accurately. Therefore, Soviet artillerymen had to abandon the most effective direct fire and fire from closed positions and mainly across areas, since target reconnaissance and adjustment were poorly established. Five divisions of the 7th and 13th armies carried out a private offensive, but were unable to achieve success.
On February 6, the attack on the Summa strip began. In the following days, the offensive front expanded both to the west and to the east.
On February 9, the commander of the troops of the North-Western Front, Army Commander of the first rank S. Timoshenko, sent directive No. 04606 to the troops. According to it, on February 11, after powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the North-Western Front should go on the offensive.
On February 11, after ten days of artillery preparation, the general offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla, created in October 1939, acted together with the ground units of the North-Western Front.
Since the attacks of Soviet troops on the Summa region were unsuccessful, the main attack was moved east, to the direction of Lyakhde. At this point, the defending side suffered huge losses from artillery bombardment and Soviet troops managed to break through the defense.
During three days of intense battles, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the “Mannerheim Line”, introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop their success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, as there was a threat of encirclement.
On February 18, the Finns closed the Saimaa Canal with the Kivikoski dam and the next day the water began to rise in Kärstilänjärvi.
By February 21, the 7th Army reached the second defense line, and the 13th Army reached the main defense line north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with coastal detachments of sailors of the Baltic Fleet, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front began an offensive in the zone from Lake Vuoksa to the Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops retreated.
At the final stage of the operation, the 13th Army advanced in the direction of Antrea (modern Kamennogorsk), the 7th Army - towards Vyborg. The Finns put up fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat.
(To be continued)
“Still, the state border was 17-20 kilometers from St. Petersburg - this, in general, was quite a big threat for a city of five million. I think that the Bolsheviks of that time were trying to correct the historical mistakes that they made in 1917,” he said Putin
Artillery of the Red Army
Russian President Vladimir Putin believes that the Soviet Union, having started a war with Finland in 1939, tried to correct the miscalculations made during the revolution, and calls for honoring the memory of the fallen Soviet soldiers, since they fulfilled their duty.
The conversation about the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 began at a meeting of the president with members of the recreated Military Historical Society and search teams. One of the conversation participants suggested creating memorials to “mark the deaths of these people who died for our country in one way or another.”
“These words are superfluous. One way or another, you shouldn’t say that. These are people who performed military duty,” Putin objected to him.
The head of state said that he did not intend to assess whether the Soviet leadership acted correctly or incorrectly in 1939 from a political point of view. However, then he returned to the events of those years.
"With the most cursory analysis, we can conclude that, after all, the state border (with Finland) was 17-20 kilometers from St. Petersburg - this, in general, was quite a big threat for a city of five million. I think that the Bolsheviks of that time They tried to correct the historical mistakes that they made in 1917 after they took advantage of armed support from the Finnish armed forces, which were then part of the Russian army and, as we know, largely influenced the outcome of the October Uprising and the coup. They came to their senses - the border was close. They could no longer reach an agreement and went to this war,” Putin said.
According to him, the first months of this war were “bloody and ineffective on our part.” "Then everything fell into place. After several months of ineffective battles, quite bloody, we reorganized ourselves and began to act differently. We concentrated significant forces and resources. It became clear that this war could not be won by the forces of the Leningrad Military District alone, and they began to act according to -to another. And the other side already felt the full power of the Russian, Soviet state at that time,” he added.
On this map, the border between the USSR and Finland before the war is indicated in red (only 20 km from Leningrad), the Mannerheim Line is indicated in blue, and the border between the USSR and Finland after the war (150 km from Leningrad) is indicated in green. It is easy to understand, looking at this map, that this is what saved Leningrad during the Great Patriotic War. If the border had been closer, as before the Soviet-Finnish war, the city would hardly have been able to be held...
This map shows that in addition to the Finnish territory in the Leningrad region, areas in the region of northern Karelia and the Rybachy Peninsula, as well as part of the islands of the Gulf of Finland and the Hanko region were transferred to the USSR.
However, at the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army troops again launched an attack on Finland, which refused to voluntarily transfer one of its regions to the control of the USSR. This offensive further increased the territory of the USSR in the Finnish direction.
Losses of the parties in 1939-40.
Finland
* Killed - 48.3 thousand people.
* Injured - 45 thousand people.
* Captured - approx. 1000 people
Thus, the total irretrievable losses in the Finnish troops during the war were 49 thousand people. out of 265 thousand participating, that is, about 18%. There is no information on those who died from wounds, so we will assume that all 45 thousand wounded survived.
USSR
* Killed and died from wounds during the stages of sanitary evacuation - 65384
* Died in hospitals from wounds and illnesses - 15921
*Missing - 14043
* Wounded, shell-shocked, burned - 186584
Thus, the total irretrievable losses in the Soviet troops during the war were 95 thousand people. out of 425 thousand participants, that is, about 22%.
About 15% of the irretrievable losses were losses from frostbite, that is, such losses do not apply to combat losses, and this is almost 15 thousand people.
Material prepared by Anatoly Babushkin,
After the Civil War of 1918-1922, the USSR received rather unsuccessful borders and poorly adapted for life. Thus, it was completely ignored that Ukrainians and Belarusians were separated by the state border line between the Soviet Union and Poland. Another of these “inconveniences” was the close location of the border with Finland to the northern capital of the country - Leningrad.
During the events preceding the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union received a number of territories that made it possible to significantly move the border to the west. In the north, this attempt to move the border encountered some resistance, which became known as the Soviet-Finnish, or Winter, War.
Historical overview and origins of the conflict
Finland as a state appeared relatively recently - on December 6, 1917, against the backdrop of the collapsing Russian state. At the same time, the state received all the territories of the Grand Duchy of Finland along with Petsamo (Pechenga), Sortavala and the territories on the Karelian Isthmus. Relations with the southern neighbor also did not work out from the very beginning: the civil war died down in Finland, in which anti-communist forces won, so there was clearly no sympathy for the USSR, which supported the Reds.
However, in the second half of the 20s - the first half of the 30s, relations between the Soviet Union and Finland stabilized, being neither friendly nor hostile. Defense spending in Finland declined steadily during the 1920s, reaching its peak in 1930. However, the arrival of Carl Gustav Mannerheim as Minister of War changed the situation somewhat. Mannerheim immediately set a course for rearming the Finnish army and preparing it for possible battles with the Soviet Union. Initially, the line of fortifications, at that time called the Enckel Line, was inspected. The condition of its fortifications was unsatisfactory, so the re-equipment of the line began, as well as the construction of new defensive contours.
At the same time, the Finnish government took vigorous steps to avoid conflict with the USSR. In 1932, a non-aggression pact was concluded, which was to expire in 1945.
Events of 1938-1939 and causes of conflict
By the second half of the 30s of the 20th century, the situation in Europe was gradually heating up. Hitler's anti-Soviet statements forced the Soviet leadership to take a closer look at neighboring countries that could become Germany's allies in a possible war with the USSR. Finland's position, of course, did not make it a strategically important bridgehead, since the local nature of the terrain inevitably turned military operations into a series of small battles, not to mention the impossibility of supplying huge masses of troops. However, Finland's close position to Leningrad could still turn it into an important ally.
It was these factors that forced the Soviet government in April-August 1938 to begin negotiations with Finland regarding guarantees of its non-alignment with the anti-Soviet bloc. However, in addition, the Soviet leadership also demanded that a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland be provided for Soviet military bases, which was unacceptable for the then Finnish government. As a result, the negotiations ended without results.
In March-April 1939, new Soviet-Finnish negotiations took place, at which the Soviet leadership demanded the lease of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland. The Finnish government was forced to reject these demands, as it feared the “Sovietization” of the country.
The situation began to rapidly escalate when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed on August 23, 1939, a secret addendum to which indicated that Finland was included in the sphere of interests of the USSR. However, although the Finnish government had no information regarding the secret protocol, this agreement made it seriously think about the future prospects of the country and relations with Germany and the Soviet Union.
Already in October 1939, the Soviet government put forward new proposals for Finland. They provided for the movement of the Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus 90 km to the north. In return, Finland was supposed to receive approximately twice the territory in Karelia, which would significantly secure Leningrad. A number of historians also express the opinion that the Soviet leadership was interested in, if not Sovietizing Finland in 1939, then at least depriving it of protection in the form of a line of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, which was already called the “Mannerheim Line.” This version is very consistent, since subsequent events, as well as the development by the Soviet General Staff in 1940 of a plan for a new war against Finland, indirectly point to exactly this. Thus, the defense of Leningrad was most likely just a pretext for turning Finland into a convenient Soviet springboard, like, for example, the Baltic countries.
However, the Finnish leadership rejected Soviet demands and began to prepare for war. The Soviet Union was also preparing for war. In total, by mid-November 1939, 4 armies were deployed against Finland, consisting of 24 divisions with a total number of 425 thousand people, 2300 tanks and 2500 aircraft. Finland had only 14 divisions with a total strength of approximately 270 thousand people, 30 tanks and 270 aircraft.
In order to avoid provocations, the Finnish army received an order in the second half of November to withdraw from the state border on the Karelian Isthmus. However, on November 26, 1939, an incident occurred for which both sides blame each other. Soviet territory was shelled, resulting in several soldiers killed and wounded. This incident occurred in the area of the village of Maynila, from which it got its name. Clouds have gathered between the USSR and Finland. Two days later, on November 28, the Soviet Union denounced the non-aggression pact with Finland, and two days later, Soviet troops received orders to cross the border.
Beginning of the war (November 1939 - January 1940)
On November 30, 1939, Soviet troops went on the offensive in several directions. At the same time, the fighting immediately became fierce.
On the Karelian Isthmus, where the 7th Army was advancing, Soviet troops managed to capture the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk) on December 1, at the cost of heavy losses. Here the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic was announced, led by Otto Kuusinen, a prominent figure in the Comintern. It was with this new “government” of Finland that the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations. At the same time, in the first ten days of December, the 7th Army managed to quickly capture the forefield and ran into the first echelon of the Mannerheim line. Here the Soviet troops suffered heavy losses, and their advance practically stopped for a long time.
North of Lake Ladoga, in the direction of Sortavala, the 8th Soviet Army was advancing. As a result of the first days of fighting, she managed to advance 80 kilometers in a fairly short period of time. However, the Finnish troops opposing it were able to carry out a lightning operation, the purpose of which was to encircle part of the Soviet forces. The fact that the Red Army was very closely tied to the roads also played into the hands of the Finns, which allowed the Finnish troops to quickly cut off its communications. As a result, the 8th Army, having suffered serious losses, was forced to retreat, but until the end of the war it held part of Finnish territory.
The least successful were the actions of the Red Army in central Karelia, where the 9th Army was advancing. The army's task was to conduct an offensive in the direction of the city of Oulu, with the goal of “cutting” Finland in half and thereby disorganizing Finnish troops in the north of the country. On December 7, the forces of the 163rd Infantry Division occupied the small Finnish village of Suomussalmi. However, Finnish troops, having superior mobility and knowledge of the terrain, immediately surrounded the division. As a result, Soviet troops were forced to take up a perimeter defense and repel surprise attacks by Finnish ski squads, as well as suffer significant losses from sniper fire. The 44th Infantry Division was sent to help the encircled, which soon also found itself surrounded.
Having assessed the situation, the command of the 163rd Infantry Division decided to fight their way back. At the same time, the division suffered losses of approximately 30% of its personnel, and also abandoned almost all its equipment. After its breakthrough, the Finns managed to destroy the 44th Infantry Division and practically restore the state border in this direction, paralyzing the actions of the Red Army here. The result of this battle, called the Battle of Suomussalmi, was rich booty taken by the Finnish army, as well as an increase in the overall morale of the Finnish army. At the same time, the leadership of two divisions of the Red Army was subjected to repression.
And if the actions of the 9th Army were unsuccessful, then the troops of the 14th Soviet Army, advancing on the Rybachy Peninsula, acted most successfully. They managed to capture the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) and large nickel deposits in the area, as well as reach the Norwegian border. Thus, Finland lost access to the Barents Sea for the duration of the war.
In January 1940, the drama also played out south of Suomussalmi, where the scenario of that recent battle was broadly repeated. Here the 54th Rifle Division of the Red Army was surrounded. At the same time, the Finns did not have enough forces to destroy it, so the division was surrounded until the end of the war. A similar fate awaited the 168th Infantry Division, which was surrounded in the Sortavala area. Another division and a tank brigade were encircled in the Lemetti-Yuzhny area and, having suffered huge losses and lost almost all their materiel, finally fought their way out of the encirclement.
On the Karelian Isthmus, by the end of December, the battles to break through the Finnish fortified line had died down. This was explained by the fact that the command of the Red Army perfectly understood the futility of continuing further attempts to strike Finnish troops, which only brought serious losses with minimal results. The Finnish command, understanding the essence of the calm at the front, launched a series of attacks in order to disrupt the offensive of the Soviet troops. However, these attempts failed with heavy losses for the Finnish troops.
However, in general the situation remained not very favorable for the Red Army. Its troops were drawn into battles on foreign and poorly explored territory, in addition to unfavorable weather conditions. The Finns did not have superiority in numbers and technology, but they had streamlined and well-practiced guerrilla warfare tactics, which allowed them, operating with relatively small forces, to inflict significant losses on the advancing Soviet troops.
February offensive of the Red Army and the end of the war (February-March 1940)
On February 1, 1940, a powerful Soviet artillery preparation began on the Karelian Isthmus, which lasted 10 days. The goal of this preparation was to inflict maximum damage on the Mannerheim line and the Finnish troops and exhaust them. On February 11, the troops of the 7th and 13th armies moved forward.
Fierce fighting broke out along the entire front on the Karelian Isthmus. The main blow was delivered by Soviet troops to the settlement of Summa, which was located in the Vyborg direction. However, here, like two months ago, the Red Army again began to get bogged down in battles, so soon the direction of the main attack was changed to Lyakhda. Here Finnish troops were unable to hold back the Red Army, and their defenses were broken through, and a few days later, the first strip of the Mannerheim Line was broken. The Finnish command was forced to begin withdrawing troops.
On February 21, Soviet troops approached the second line of Finnish defense. Fierce fighting broke out here again, which, however, by the end of the month ended with the breakthrough of the Mannerheim line in several places. Thus, the Finnish defense collapsed.
At the beginning of March 1940, the Finnish army was in a critical situation. The Mannerheim Line was broken, the reserves were practically depleted, while the Red Army developed a successful offensive and had practically inexhaustible reserves. The morale of the Soviet troops was also high. At the beginning of the month, troops of the 7th Army rushed to Vyborg, the fighting for which continued until the ceasefire on March 13, 1940. This city was one of the largest in Finland, and its loss could be very painful for the country. In addition, this opened the way for Soviet troops to Helsinki, which threatened Finland with the loss of independence.
Taking all these factors into account, the Finnish government set a course for starting peace negotiations with the Soviet Union. On March 7, 1940, peace negotiations began in Moscow. As a result, it was decided to cease fire from 12 noon on March 13, 1940. The territories on the Karelian Isthmus and in Lapland (the cities of Vyborg, Sortavala and Salla) were transferred to the USSR, and the Hanko Peninsula was also leased.
Results of the Winter War
Estimates of USSR losses in the Soviet-Finnish war vary significantly and, according to the Soviet Ministry of Defense, amount to approximately 87.5 thousand people killed and died from wounds and frostbite, as well as about 40 thousand missing. 160 thousand people were injured. Finland's losses were significantly smaller - approximately 26 thousand dead and 40 thousand wounded.
As a result of the war with Finland, the Soviet Union was able to ensure the security of Leningrad, as well as strengthen its position in the Baltic. First of all, this concerns the city of Vyborg and the Hanko Peninsula, on which Soviet troops began to be based. At the same time, the Red Army gained combat experience in breaking through the enemy’s fortified line in difficult weather conditions (the air temperature in February 1940 reached -40 degrees), which no army in the world had at that time.
However, at the same time, the USSR received an enemy in the north-west, albeit not a powerful one, who already in 1941 allowed German troops into its territory and contributed to the blockade of Leningrad. As a result of Finland's intervention in June 1941 on the side of the Axis countries, the Soviet Union received an additional front with a sufficiently large length, diverting from 20 to 50 Soviet divisions in the period from 1941 to 1944.
Great Britain and France also closely followed the conflict and even had plans to attack the USSR and its Caucasian fields. At present, there is no complete data regarding the seriousness of these intentions, but it is likely that in the spring of 1940 the Soviet Union could simply “quarrel” with its future allies and even become involved in a military conflict with them.
There are also a number of versions that the war in Finland indirectly influenced the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941. Soviet troops broke through the Mannerheim Line and practically left Finland defenseless in March 1940. Any new invasion of the country by the Red Army could well be fatal for it. After the defeat of Finland, the Soviet Union would move dangerously close to the Swedish mines in Kiruna, one of Germany's few sources of metal. Such a scenario would have brought the Third Reich to the brink of disaster.
Finally, the not very successful offensive of the Red Army in December-January strengthened the belief in Germany that the Soviet troops were essentially incapable of combat and did not have a good command staff. This misconception continued to grow and reached its peak in June 1941, when the Wehrmacht attacked the USSR.
As a conclusion, we can point out that as a result of the Winter War, the Soviet Union still acquired more problems than victories, which was confirmed in the next few years.
If you have any questions, leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them
The further development of events is quite well known: “Tanks are breaking through wide clearings, planes are circling in the clouds. The low autumn sun lights the lights on bayonets.”
The story of military operations is not included in the scope of this work. On our topic, it is useful to show how slowly the harsh reality entered the heads of Finnish leaders, how they gradually came to understand the current situation and learned to look at the world without rose-colored glasses.
On December 3, a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was concluded between the Soviet Union and the Finnish Democratic Republic (6), the first article of which stated that
“The Soviet Union agrees to transfer to the Finnish Democratic Republic the areas of Soviet Karelia with a predominant Karelian population - a total of 70,000 square kilometers, with the inclusion of this territory as part of the state territory of the Finnish Democratic Republic and the establishment of the border between the USSR and the Finnish Democratic Republic, according to the attached map. As a sign of friendship and deep trust of the Finnish Democratic Republic in the USSR, meeting the wishes of the Soviet Union to strengthen the security of the USSR, and especially the city of Leningrad, the Finnish Democratic Republic agrees to some movement of the border on the Karelian Isthmus north of Leningrad, with the transfer of territory to the Soviet Union in the amount of 3,970 square kilometers, and the USSR considers itself obligated to reimburse Finland for the cost of railway sections on the territory of the Karelian Isthmus passing to the USSR in the amount of 120 million Finnish marks."
A map illustrating the proposed boundary change under this treaty is shown in Fig. 7.
Rice. 7. Proposed change of the border on the Karelian Isthmus prior to the agreement with the FDR.
This option is much wider than the first Soviet proposal; the territory proposed for transfer to the USSR is 3970 square meters. km, as opposed to 2,700 sq. km under the old Soviet proposal. But the compensation offered is absolutely fantastic and unimaginable - 70,000 sq. km, instead of the previously offered 5,500 sq. km.
Rice. 8. Estimated territorial compensation under the agreement with FDR.
This option falls somewhat out of the general context of the evolution of the idea of territorial transformation, since it arose in the negotiations of the Soviet government with the government of unrealized democratic Finland, and not with the government of real fascist Finland, but it should be cited for the sake of completeness. The leaders of the white bandit Finnish junta undoubtedly knew about this option, and it must have had some effect on their dull brains. In particular, Tanner remembered it in March and actually repeated it in his project of March 7.
In January 1940, the Prime Minister of Nazi Finland, Ryti, visited Mannerheim's headquarters, and then told his gang in Helsinki that the ever-panicking marshal had suggested that "it would make sense to increase the Finnish territorial proposals at the expense of the area southwest of the Lipola line." Sejväste.
There is undoubtedly a typo in the text of the book; it should be read “the area to the southeast” of the named line, since the statement “to the southwest” in this context does not make sense.
The meaning of this sentence is unclear. By the time of the conversation, the Soviet troops had already advanced significantly beyond this line, and one would have to be a fool like Mannerheim to admit the possibility of their withdrawal. Tanner, however, showed that he was no smarter than the marshal, since he tried to propose the same option in negotiations with Kollontai on February 5.
By this time, frightened Finnish leaders were already diligently looking for opportunities to establish contacts with the Soviet leadership. As early as January 29, 1940, a telegram from Molotov reached the Finnish government through the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm Kollontai, in which the Finns were clearly warned that by this time “the demands of the USSR are not limited to the demands presented at the negotiations in Moscow with Messrs. Tanker and Paasikivi, since since then blood was shed on both sides. This blood, which was shed contrary to our hopes and through no fault of ours, calls for expanded guarantees of the security of the borders of the USSR." It is interesting to note the stupidity of the Finns, who at that time had not yet understood what was happening, and still cherished the hope of an exchange of territories, and even brazenly and greedily wanted to receive some money from the USSR. The response to Molotov’s telegram stated that “the cession of territory can only be carried out in the form of an exchange. The government considered it obligatory to pay compensation for the property of private individuals in areas ceded to the USSR.” (1) As compensation, the Finns still licked their lips at the region of Repola and Porijärvi. They have not yet realized that their train has left, and it will not be the USSR that will pay in the future. The Finns will have to pay. Or rather, pay for your own stupidity.
On February 5, during a conversation with Kollontai, Tanner also proposed to transfer to the USSR one of the islands opposite the Estonian Paldiski, actually returning to Stalin’s old proposal, but now putting it forward on his own behalf, and boorishly forgetting to indicate the true author of the proposal.
Already on February 6, the Finns received a natural answer. By now the USSR was no longer interested in the Lipola-Seyväste line as a possible border.
This option is already more meaningful, if only because it includes Lake Sukhodolskoye, which was not previously discussed in any of the border options. The point, of course, is that Soviet troops reached this lake, and the Finns had fewer and fewer illusions about the possibility of regaining those territories that had actually already become Soviet. In general, the option shown in Fig. 7 simply approximately reflects the position of the front line by this time; naturally, the front line was not actually straight, but, as already mentioned, in the absence of more detailed landmarks, all borders here are conventionally depicted as straight lines.
On the same day, as Tanner reports, somewhat contradicting himself, Mannerheim stated the general opinion “as a result of the discussion,” and this general opinion was that on the Karelian Isthmus an additional strip of coastline between Ino and Sejväste is ten kilometers wide inland.
This option can only be considered as an addition to the old option C (Fig. 5), otherwise it is meaningless. This territory is already included in the “Suvanto-Seyväste” or “Lipola-Seyväste” options, which is why the difference in the options is shown in Fig. 9, 10 and 11 are probably explained by disagreements within the Finnish leadership. The Cabinet of Ministers proposed the “Suvanto-Seyväste” option, Tanner had approached the USSR somewhat earlier with the “Lipola-Seyväste” proposal, but the “general opinion of Ino-Seyväste” still prevailed, although this was much less than what had already been proposed to the Soviet Union. Perhaps the Finns’ inner voice was already telling them that no one would listen to them anyway, all these options would remain on paper, and therefore it was not worth the effort to coordinate them among themselves.
On February 12, a statement from the Defense Council on behalf of Tanner was published in the newspapers. It falsely, which is generally typical of the Finnish political elite in general and Tanner in particular, denied the possibility of peace negotiations, asserting that the Finnish army was waging a successful fight. Tanner assured that Finland would continue to repel all attacks, and therefore peace terms could not be dictated to it. He lied, of course, no worse than the gray Marshal Mannerheim, since on the same day at a meeting of the commission on foreign policy issues the terms of peace were discussed. There the idea was honestly voiced that peace could no longer be concluded on the terms proposed by Finland, and the issue of further concessions needed to be considered. They, oddly enough, still hoped to receive Repola and Porijärvi from the Soviet Union as compensation, which could mean a fairly honorable peace for the Finns.
However, it was on this day, February 12, that the Finns received news from the USSR that Finland would have to give up the Karelian Isthmus in its entirety, as well as the eastern coast of Lake Ladoga, not to mention Hanko.
It was only on February 12 that this demand was first made. Previously, the USSR's proposals were much more restrained. And on February 13, news of the breakthrough at Summa reached the ruling Finnish clique.
The Soviet demands were conveyed to the Finns in more detail, quite symbolically, on February 23. As minimum conditions for starting negotiations, the USSR proposed: 1) a concession to Hanko; 2) transfer of the Karelian Isthmus, including Vyborg; 3) transmission of the northeastern coast of Lake Ladoga, including Sortavala. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was ready to withdraw its troops from other territories, including Petsamo.
In addition, the Soviet Union made it clear that it did not attach any importance to the assistance offered by Western Europe. If the demands presented are not accepted now, others will be put forward later.
On February 27 in Stockholm, Tanner asked Kollontai if there was an opportunity to discuss the demands of the USSR, Kollontai answered in the negative.
The Finns still tried to bargain and play for time. The USSR demanded a clear answer on March 1. Tanner honestly writes that the entire collective mind of the Finnish leadership was aimed at giving a vague but motivated response to the Soviet Union, that is, according to Finnish custom, to stall for time and play the fool even in such critical circumstances.
On March 3, Tanner, through the Swedish government, transmitted information to the USSR. He said that Finland would immediately begin negotiations if Vyborg and Sortavala were excluded from the terms. Stupid, he still thought that someone would bargain with him.
Molotov's response to this message, also through the Swedes, arrived on March 5. As it was easy to assume, Molotov insisted on the transfer of Vyborg and Sortavala to the Soviet Union. The Soviet government expressed its readiness to wait a few more days for Finland's response. But Molotov suggested that perhaps it would be more profitable for them to negotiate and sign an agreement with Kuusinen. If the Soviet government's terms are not immediately accepted, the demands will be increased and the Soviet Union will enter into a final agreement with Kuusinen.
In historical and near-historical literature, and especially in journalism, various kinds of jesters and foolish scribblers have a habit of making fun of Kuusinen’s government, since its creation supposedly made no sense. In reality, the very possibility for Molotov to refer to this government during negotiations justifies the creation of the Kuusinen government. When the Finnish junta heard that the USSR might prefer to conclude an agreement not with it, but with Kuusinen, the junta had only two things left to do - change its pants and agree with the USSR in everything.
Moreover, since the beginning of March, Tanner personally and the Helsinki authorities in general began persistently calling Mannerheim and demanding that they quickly conclude any agreement, otherwise there would be a complete defeat. The Marshal has generally been distinguished by his alarmist sentiments since the pre-war period.
On March 7, Tanner, in a conversation with American Ambassador Schoenfeld, said that Finland was ready to cede the Hanko Peninsula and part of the Karelian Isthmus east of the Suvanto-Koivisto line to the USSR.
This option is difficult to comment on. After the USSR had already notified the Finns that they would have to cede Vyborg, the option shown in Fig. 9, no longer had the slightest chance of implementation, although the concessions it provided for exceeded the initial requirements of the USSR. Perhaps Tanner simply wanted to deceive the Americans for the sake of some of his own small geshefts, this is no longer known. It may also be that Tanner has become slightly mentally disturbed as a result of the unusual mental stress of recent months. We will consider this version of Tanner to be the ninth, although chronologically it is more likely the tenth, since it appeared after the Soviet notification of Vyborg and Sortavala.
But according to the logic of the presentation and the logic of the development of events, the tenth option will be the Soviet version of February 12. On March 11, Mannerheim also came up with an insane initiative to offer the USSR territories in Northern Finland in exchange for Hanko and the Karelian Isthmus, but even Tanner realized that this stupidity had no prospects.
It seems somewhat strange that, according to Tanner, this version of February 12 turned out to be not final, at least in the view of the Finnish leadership. The last option, that is, the eleventh, was announced at negotiations in Moscow on March 9, 1940. It seemed to Tanner that the new demands of the Soviet side were greatly expanded, since the original version dealt with the Karelian Isthmus, including Vyborg, and the northern coast of Lake Ladoga, including Sortavala. Now the border line will go much further west. It seems that the Finns believed that, according to the Soviet proposal of February 12, the border should have passed along the western outskirts of Vyborg and Sortavala (this is the proposed position of the border and can be somewhat arbitrarily called the tenth option), but in fact the USSR moved the border a little further.
At this point, the adventures of the Soviet-Finnish border can be considered over. Everyone can see the final version of the border on modern maps.
What can we say in conclusion? It is quite obvious that Stalin, like the Russian tsars in past centuries, was not at all interested in Finland as such. Finland does not represent the slightest value for Russia, except for the forest, there is nothing there anyway, and there is already enough forest in Russia.
In 1721, Peter the Great, who captured the entire territory of Finland, disdainfully threw it over to Sweden through the Peace of Nystadt. Subsequent Swedish attacks on Russia from Finnish territory, in 1741-42 and 1788-1790, showed that leaving the Finnish bridgehead in the hands of Swedish savages turned out to be an insufficiently considered decision. Alexander the First cut this Gordian knot in 1809, after another Swedish provocation, making an unexpected decision for Sweden - having captured Finland for the fourth time in a hundred years, Russia decided not to leave there again. The decision was justified from any point of view. If this territory, a stone's throw from the capital, moreover, serves as a springboard for wars against Russia over and over again, then simple security considerations require in the future to deprive the aggressor of the opportunity to gather troops on Finnish soil for wars against Russia. Actually, Finland as such was not of interest to Russia - otherwise why was it necessary to withdraw troops from there three times after victories in three previous wars?
Having accepted Finland under its protection, Russia immediately began to prepare this country for independence and create the institutions necessary for an independent state there. Russia actually created even the Finnish language as the state and literary language; previously, all official activities there were conducted only in Swedish; the highest educated class of society preferred to communicate in Swedish. Finnish, before the inclusion of Finland in Russia, was only the crude language of slaves and plebeians. The work to create a Finnish administration, Finnish society and Finnish culture was carried out by Russia so successfully that at the first opportunity, in 1918, Russia was able to painlessly throw off this Finnish burden from its neck and poison Finland into an independent existence. Unfortunately, the Finns turned out to be incapable of showing a simple human feeling of gratitude and quietly managed to seize the territory of the Karelian Isthmus from Russia.
Stalin acted completely in accordance with the logic of history. He very successfully evaded the occupation of Finland in 1940 and 1944, knowing full well that this primitive country with a wild population was of no value to the USSR; on the contrary, it would be an unwanted burden. Only a small part of Finnish territory was important as a possible springboard for an attack on the USSR.
The negotiations were long and difficult. The Finns tried their best to confuse the negotiation process, played for time, and sent delegations that did not solve anything. However, the solution was close. During the discussion, the parties almost came to a mutually acceptable decision - to transfer to the Soviet Union, for multiple territorial compensations and many millions of marks, the territory of Terijoki with its surroundings, that is, the territory of approximately the present Kurortny district, plus several islands. No matter how cynical it sounds, we can say that the Finns started the Soviet-Finnish war because of Zelenogorsk, and not at all because of Vyborg.
The Finnish leadership in 1939 did not have the intelligence to correctly assess reality. Instead of selling Zelenogorsk with enormous profit for themselves and acquiring a friendly neighbor and ally in the USSR, they decided to carry out ethnic cleansing, evict the Finnish population from the Karelian Isthmus, kill 25 thousand Finns in a hopeless war and, after a short resistance, hand over the liberated population of the Karelian Isthmus to the Soviet Union completely. And so it happened.
Sources
1. Tanner, V. Winter War. Diplomatic confrontation between the Soviet Union and Finland. 1939-1940. - M.: ZAO Tsentrpoligraf, 2003. - 349 p.
2. Mannerheim K.G. Memoirs. - M.: Vagrius, 1999.
4. There is a lot of information about these events on Karelian websites.
5. Winter War 1939–1940 in the documents of the NKVD: Based on materials from the Archive of the Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation for the city of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region. / Auto-stat. Bernev S.K., Rupasov A.I. - St. Petersburg: Lik, 2010. - 320 p.
6. Treaty of mutual assistance and friendship between the Soviet Union and the Finnish Democratic Republic // Izvestia. - 1939. - No. 279 (7049) dated December 3.
7. A. I. Kozlov. Finnish war. A view from the other side. - Riga, 1997.
