Russia and Japan: history of relations. On the state and prospects for the development of Russian-Japanese relations at the present stage Why is the topic of Russian-Japanese relations popular?
FEDERAL STATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION
HIGHER PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
"SIBERIAN ACADEMY OF PUBLIC SERVICE"
BRANCH OF FEDERAL STATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION
HIGHER PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
"SIBERIAN ACADEMY OF PUBLIC SERVICE"
IN TOMSK
Department MANAGEMENT and ECONOMY
TEST
By discipline: Geopolitics
Subject: "Russian-Japanese relations"
Performed:Ankipovich E.V.
FULL NAME.(listener/student)
state and
municipal
control
speciality
_________921 _______
___________________
personal signature
Checked:Dyukanov Ya.G.
FULL NAME.
Ph.D., Associate Professor
branch of the Federal State Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education
SibAGS in Tomsk
academic title, position
teacher
TOMSK
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….2
1. History of relations between Russia and Japan…………………………………4
2. Russian-Japanese trade and economic relations……………6
3.Russian-Japanese cultural ties…………………………………12
4. Russia and Japan at the beginning of the 21st century …………………………………….15
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….31
List of references…………………………………......32
Introduction.
The emergence of geopolitics as a science at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. is determined not only by the logic of the development of scientific knowledge, but primarily by the need to comprehend new political realities. This science appeared at a time when the world as a whole was divided between the main opposing centers of power. The new division of the world is essentially a “redivision of what has already been divided,” i.e., a transition from one “owner” to another, and not from mismanagement to the “owner.” The redivisions of the world have led to a significant increase in the level of conflict in the world. This circumstance prompted scientific research aimed at improving the methods of struggle between the main geopolitical forces on the world stage. At the end of the 20th century. It was once again confirmed that the economic factor is one of the leading factors in the geopolitical balance of forces.
The current position of Japan and its political role in the world do not at all correspond to the achieved economic power of the Land of the Rising Sun. At the end of the 20th century. the political conditions imposed on Japan by the United States after its defeat in the 1941-1945 war significantly limit its freedom to develop its own domestic and foreign policies and to choose a geopolitical path. This also applies to the geostrategic relations of the Land of the Rising Sun with its closest neighbors, including Russia.
One of the founders of geopolitics, Karl Haushofer, classified Japan as an “island country with a continental type of thinking.” The German scientist believed that Japan was the complete opposite of another island state - England. There were many reasons for such a contrast. England has always fenced itself off from Europe and opposed itself to it. Japan, on the contrary, maintained close ties with Asia, mostly with Asian China, with Korea, and owes almost everything to the continent - from writing to tools and production. In spiritual life, this connection is also not difficult to trace: the ancient sacred texts “Kojiki” (written down in 712) and “Nihon Shoki” - the focus of the Japanese tradition - are largely borrowed from Chinese, Korean, as well as Indian and Malaysian spiritual wealth.
Of course, this borrowing was enriched and adapted to the peculiarities of national identity, reworked by it and as a result acquired an original essence. And the Japanese, not without reason, consider their country the birthplace of the sacred, the “land of spirits,” the Land of the Rising Sun, “the land of spiritual abundance.” For them, Japan is a symbolic ontological belt. The philosophical views of the Japanese are characterized by self-absorption, extreme concentration, and a meditative orientation. This “philosophy of life”, based on one of the movements of Buddhism - “Zen” - shaped the style of thinking, the pattern of life of the Japanese. Household items, everyday affairs (tea ceremony, the art of bonsai - growing mini-trees - a tradition that came from China in the 6th century, etc.) have become an effective form of meditation, bearing a vivid imprint of the sacred, emphasizing the idea of merging man with nature, with the spirit of the Earth, with the Cosmos.
History of relations between Russia and Japan.
Russian-Japanese relations have a history of more than three hundred years. The first information about the Kuril Islands was reported in 1697 by the Russian explorer V.V. Atlasov. In 1854, Japan, which had previously been a closed country, was opened by M. Perry to Europeans. Already in 1855, the first Russian-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship was concluded. This treaty defined the maritime border, and the Japanese government opened the ports of Shimoda, Hakodate, and Nagasaki to Russian ships. In 1895, an agreement was concluded on mutual freedom of trade and navigation and most favored nation treatment for subjects of one country on the territory of another.
Relations between Russia and Japan were positive until the Russo-Japanese War. In 1904, the war was started by Japan, was of an imperialist nature and was fought for dominance in Northeast China and Korea. As a result of the Treaty of Portsmouth on September 5, 1905, Russia recognized Korea as Japan's sphere of influence and ceded South Sakhalin to it.
On September 1, 1939, the Second World War began. During almost its entire period (September 1939–August 1945), Japan and the Soviet Union were not at war. The fact is that in April 1941, a Neutrality Pact was concluded between both countries with a validity period of 5 years.
On February 11, 1945, the heads of government of the three allied powers met in Yalta: J.V. Stalin (USSR), F.D. Roosevelt (USA) and W. Churchill. As a result of the Yalta Conference (Crimean Conference), the USSR agreed, under certain conditions, to enter the war against Japan. According to the terms of the Yalta Conference, the USSR ceded the so-called northern territories.
On August 9, 1945, three days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and on the same day of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan, whose defeat was no longer in doubt. A week later, on August 14, Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and capitulated to the Allied powers.
After the end of the war, the entire territory of Japan was occupied by Allied forces. As a result of negotiations between the allies, the territory of Japan proper was subject to occupation by US troops, Taiwan by Chinese troops, and Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands by Soviet troops. As for the Kuril Islands, Soviet troops occupied the island of Shumshu on August 18, and then on August 27, having advanced to the island of Urup, the southern end of the Kuril ridge, they turned back from this island. But, having learned about the absence of American troops in the Northern Territories, in the period before September 3, they occupied Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai ridge, which are the ancestral territories of Japan. The occupation of the Northern Territories was a military occupation, completely bloodless after hostilities, and therefore subject to termination as a result of a territorial settlement under a peace treaty. J.V. Stalin, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated February 2, 1946, included the areas under occupation in the territory of his country. In the period 194749, the Soviet Union forcibly evicted the Japanese living on Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai ridge (before the war, more than 17 thousand Japanese lived on these islands) and began to populate the occupied areas with Soviet citizens.
In 1956, negotiations were held between the Soviet Union and Japan, which, however, did not lead to an agreement: the Japanese side stated that Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai ridge were Japanese territory and demanded their return, and the Soviet side agreed to return only Shikotan and Habomai.
As a result, Japan and the USSR, instead of a peace treaty, signed a Joint Declaration, which provided for an end to the state of war and the restoration of diplomatic relations. The parties pledged to continue negotiations on concluding a peace treaty and on the return of the Habomai ridge and Shikotan Island after the conclusion of a peace treaty. The problem of Habomai and Shikotan as part of the territorial issue between Japan and the USSR was resolved in principle by the Japanese-Soviet Joint Declaration. Consequently, the problem of Iturup and Kunashir remains, which must be resolved at the peace treaty negotiations.
After the conclusion of the Joint Declaration, negotiations on a peace treaty were periodically held between Japan and the USSR, but no real result was obtained. In particular, under totalitarianism, the USSR for a long time took a tough position, which boiled down to the fact that the territorial issue did not exist.
Russian-Japanese trade and economic relations.
Trade and economic ties between Russia and Japan occupy a prominent place in the overall complex of bilateral relations. In recent years, the role of economic interaction between the two countries has increased significantly.
During the visit of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin to Japan in September 2000, the “Program for deepening cooperation in the trade and economic field between the Russian Federation and Japan” was signed, and in January 2003, during the visit to Moscow of Prime Minister Dz .Koizumi adopted the “Russian-Japanese Action Plan”, in which cooperation in trade, economic and scientific-technical fields is considered a strategic priority in the development of bilateral relations.
On November 20-22, 2005, the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin made an official visit to Japan. An important place during the negotiations was occupied by the discussion of issues of further strengthening bilateral cooperation in the trade, economic, scientific and technical fields. Of the 18 documents signed during the visit, 12 relate to expanding cooperation in the field of economic interaction. Among them are the “Protocol on the completion of negotiations on trade and services within the framework of the process of Russia’s accession to the WTO”, “Main directions of long-term cooperation in the field of energy”, “Program for the development of cooperation in the field of information technology and communications”, agreements and memorandums on the provision of Japanese The Bank for International Cooperation provided credit lines to the largest Russian banks (Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank, Vnesheconombank) and a number of others.
On February 27-28, 2007, the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation M.E. Fradkov took an official visit to Japan, during which a number of documents were adopted aimed at developing trade and economic cooperation, including the “Program of Action of the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia and the METC of Japan on expansion of trade and investment cooperation." On February 28, 2007, the II Russian-Japanese Investment Forum was held, during which a special speech by M.E. Fradkov took place.
On April 25-26, 2008, Japanese Prime Minister Y. Fukuda visited Russia, during which meetings were held with the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin and the elected President of the Russian Federation D.A. Medvedev.
On February 18, 2009, a working meeting between the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry A. Medvedev and the Prime Minister of Japan T. Aso took place on Sakhalin, timed to coincide with the launch of Russia's first liquefied natural gas plant in the village. Prigorodnoye (Sakhalin-2 project). Japanese companies act in this project as strategic investors, suppliers of complete equipment and technologies, as well as the main consumers of Russian energy.
On May 11-13, 2009, the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin paid a working visit to Japan. During the visit, the entire range of issues of Russian-Japanese interaction in the trade and economic field (energy, transport, peaceful use of nuclear energy, ecology and energy saving, ICT, agriculture and fisheries, law enforcement and customs activities, regional economic relations) was comprehensively discussed.
During the visit, a number of agreements and memorandums were signed
on the further development of bilateral relations in the field of economic interaction: at the intergovernmental level - agreements on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy; on cooperation and mutual assistance in customs matters; memorandums of cooperation in the field of improving energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources and on the basis for further cooperation in the field of preventing illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing of marine living resources. At the level of business circles - memorandums of understanding between the State Corporation Vnesheconombank (VEB) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), as well as between VEB and the Japan Export and Investment Insurance Agency (NEXI); on the construction of a plant for the production of ammonia, urea and methanol in the city of Mendeleevsk (VEB, the Ammonia company, the government of Tatarstan - the Japanese companies Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Sojitsu); on the main areas of cooperation between the Irkutsk Oil Company and the Japan National Oil, Gas and Metals Corporation; on the construction of the Nizhnebureyskaya hydroelectric power station (JSC RusHydro - Mitsui company) and on the construction of the Far Eastern wind power plant (JSC RusHydro - JPower company).
During the visit of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin to Japan On May 12, 2009, the Russian-Japanese Economic Forum was held in Tokyo, which was organized by the Russian Ministry of Economic Development jointly with the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and the Russian-Japanese Committee for Economic Cooperation. On the Japanese side, the preparation and holding of the forum was provided by the Federation of Economic Organizations "Nippon Keidanren" and the Japanese-Russian Committee for Economic Cooperation.
More than 500 representatives from both sides took part in the forum. The Japanese and Russian participants included representatives of the management of the largest companies and banks, state corporations, entrepreneurs' unions, as well as executive authorities supervising the foreign economic bloc and bilateral investment cooperation. During the event, a wide exchange of views took place on the prospects for the development of bilateral trade and economic relations in the context of the financial and economic crisis and in the “post-crisis” period.
On September 23, 2009, within the framework of the regular session of the UN General Assembly, as well as on November 14, 2009 at the meeting of heads of state and government of the APEC forum in Singapore and on April 12, 2010 during the International Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, meetings of the President Federation D.A. Medvedev with Japanese Prime Minister Yu. Hatoyama (appointed to his post following the elections in September 2009), during which a wide range of issues of bilateral cooperation were considered both in the political sphere and in the economy: in trade, in the field of high technologies, as well as prospects for the development of industrial cooperation.
After the resignation of Yu. Hatoyama in June 2010, the post of Prime Minister of Japan was taken by N. Kan.
During the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Trade of the APEC Forum in Singapore on November 12, 2009, a conversation was held between the Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation E.S. Nabiullina with the Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry of Japan M. Naoshima, during which issues of development of bilateral economic relations and interaction within APEC were discussed.
June 5-6, 2010 Minister E.S. Nabiullina took part in the meeting of trade ministers of the participating economies of the APEC forum in Sapporo, Japan.
Within the framework of the forum, a bilateral meeting was held between Minister E. S. Nabiullina and the Chairman of the Japanese APEC 2010 Organizing Committee T. Hikihara.
An important role in the development of bilateral economic cooperation is played by the activities of the Russian-Japanese Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Affairs (IPC), established in 1994, at whose meetings the entire range of current issues and prospects for the development of bilateral economic relations are considered. October 21, 2008 in Tokyo The VIII meeting of the Russian-Japanese Intergovernmental Commission (V.B. Khristenko - H. Nakasone) was held, during which the most pressing issues of bilateral economic interaction were discussed.
There are two working bodies within the IGC: the Sub-Commission on Trade and Investment (PTI) and the Sub-Commission on Interregional Cooperation (ICP).
On December 27, 2009 in Moscow and April 27, 2010 in Tokyo, meetings were held between the co-chairs of the IGC V.B. Khristenko and K. Okada. As a result of the meeting on December 27, 2009, since 2010, the status of PTI has been increased to the level of deputy ministers, its Russian part was headed by Deputy Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation A.A. Slepnev, Japanese - Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan Y. Otabe. During the meeting on April 27, 2010, it was agreed to hold the IX meeting of the IGC in the fall of 2010 in Vladivostok.
On September 17, 2010, a partial reorganization of the Cabinet of Ministers of Japan was carried out, as a result of which S. Maehara was appointed head of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (he is the co-chairman of the Japanese part of the IGC), and A. Ohata was appointed Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
On March 30, 2010, the 5th meeting of the PTI was held in Tokyo, on June 8 - a meeting of the deputy co-chairs of the PTI, on September 1, 2010 in Moscow - the 6th meeting of the PTI.
On September 29, 2008, the 2nd meeting of the PMS took place in Tokyo, held in a new format (at the level of Deputy Ministers of the Russian Ministry of Regional Development and the Japanese Foreign Ministry).
During the VII meeting of the IPC, which took place in Tokyo on April 22, 2005, the launch of a new body for bilateral economic interaction - the Russian-Japanese Trade and Investment Promotion Organization (RIAOSTI) - was announced.
Along with the consistent strengthening of official contacts, mutual ties at the business level were further developed, primarily within the framework of the Russian-Japanese and Japanese-Russian Committees for Economic Cooperation (RJACE-YARKEC), created, respectively, under the RSPP and Nippon Keidanren (Japanese Federation economic organizations). The IX joint meeting of the committees was timed to coincide with the Russian Ministry of Economic Development in St. Petersburg in September 2008, the III Russian-Japanese Investment Forum, the X joint meeting - at the Russian-Japanese Economic Forum in Tokyo in May 2009. June 8, 2010 in Moscow The 11th joint meeting of the committees was held.
An important role in bilateral contacts at the business level belongs to the Japan Association for Trade with Russia and the Newly Independent States (ROTOBO) and the Japan Foreign Trade Promotion Organization (JETRO), which regularly organize various seminars and symposiums aimed at familiarizing Japanese business circles with opportunities to establish and strengthen trade and investment interaction with Russia and its individual regions, send specialized missions of interested representatives of Japanese business to Russia, which helps to expand the number of participants in bilateral economic relations. In June 2009, a visit of a Japanese private-government delegation (over 70 people) under the auspices of ROTOBO and METP of Japan to the Far Eastern Federal District took place, during which the Japanese side was familiarized in detail with the progress of preparatory work for the APEC summit scheduled for September 2012 in Vladivostok, as well as the progress of the project for the construction of an oil terminal in Kozmino Bay. On June 1-4, 2010, the next visit of the ROTOBO delegation to Russia took place, as a result of which a memorandum of cooperation was signed between the administration of the Chelyabinsk region and ROTOBO.
Currently, Japan is one of Russia’s most important trading partners in the Asian region, ranking 3rd in terms of trade turnover. In 2003 - 2008 trade and economic ties with Japan demonstrated stable positive dynamics. According to the Federal Customs Service, trade turnover between Russia and Japan in 2008 amounted to $29 billion (+42.3%), incl. exports of Russian goods – 10.4 billion dollars (+36.2%), imports – 18.6 billion dollars (+45.9%). Russia's share in the total volume of Japan's foreign trade in 2008 was about 1.6%, Japan's share in Russia's foreign trade turnover was 3.9%.
Since the end of 2008, the dynamics of Russian-Japanese trade turnover began to be noticeably influenced by the consequences of the global economic crisis and, first of all, by the narrowing of markets in both countries and the sharp decline in the global market for raw materials, which form the basis of Russian exports to Japan. The impact of crisis factors on Russian-Japanese trade turned out to be more significant than on our country’s foreign trade operations in general.
At the end of 2009, with a reduction in Russian foreign trade by 36.2% compared to a year earlier, the volume of trade turnover with Japan ($14.5 billion) decreased by 49.8%. For the first time in the last 7 years, Japan did not enter the top ten leading trading partners of Russia and dropped to 11th place, behind the United States, France and Poland, Japan's share in Russian trade turnover decreased to 3.1%.
At the same time, Russian exports to Japan decreased in relation to 2008 to a lesser extent (-29.7%) than in general for all foreign partners of Russia (35.5%), Japan remained in 14th place in the list of importers of Russian products (its share in Russian exports increased from 2.2% to 2.4%). Imports from Japan decreased more significantly (by 61%, while the reduction in all-Russian imports from abroad amounted to 37.3%), Japan dropped from 3rd to 7th place in the list of leading foreign exporters to the Russian market (its share in Russian imports decreased from 7.0% to 4.3%). This dynamics contributed to the equalization of the balance in mutual trade, which in recent years was characterized by a significant negative balance.
Based on the results of the first half of 2010, positive dynamics are observed in foreign trade between Russia and Japan. Trade turnover increased by 42.1% compared to the same period in 2009. Japan’s share in Russian trade turnover amounted to 3.4%, while Japan rose from 11th to 7th place in the list of leading exporters (share in Russian imports - 4.1%) and from 14th to 11th place in the list of leading foreign importers of Russian products (share in Russian exports - 3.0%). In terms of trade turnover for January-June 2010 - $9.52 billion - Japan still ranks 11th in the list of Russia's trading partners.
Russian-Japanese cultural relations.
The best way to improve relations between different countries is to develop cultural ties. The rich history of cultural ties between Japan and Russia allows us to hope that this cultural baggage will help bring something new to the relations between our countries in the future.
In Japan, the younger generation is showing less and less interest in fiction. But the older and middle-aged intelligentsia still love the novels of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy almost as much as the works of Japanese writers. It can be argued that the Japanese people love Russian literature more than the peoples of Europe and America. In the last two years, there has been a real boom in Japan around the newly published translation of The Brothers Karamazov. This novel, published in 640 thousand copies, became the most popular bestseller of foreign literature in Japan. Such success indicates the return of the Japanese desire for Russian literature.
In the 1920s A Japanese theater toured Russia for the first time, which became a real sensation for the Russian intelligentsia. Representatives of the performing arts, which were based on Western European and Russian realism, were amazed by the completely different, original style of Japanese theater. Sergei Eisenstein was deeply influenced by kabuki theater, borrowing much from Japanese fine art and Japanese theater. Moreover, he, widely known in Japan for the films “Battleship Potemkin” and “Ivan the Terrible,” decided to deeply understand Japanese culture, for which he began to study the Japanese language and haiku poetry.
Alexey Novikov-Priboy (1877–1944), a participant in the Russian-Japanese War of 1904–1905, who was in Japanese captivity, published the famous novel “Tsushima” in 1933 (this novel was translated into Japanese under the title “Death of the Baltic squadron"), for which he received the Stalin Prize.
In the 1960s Akira Kurosawa's films also had a significant influence on Russians. In particular, one of the most prominent film figures of the 20th century, Andrei Tarkovsky, was strongly influenced by Kurosawa.
The shortest haiku poems in the world are also well known in Russia. In recent years, the St. Petersburg publishing house "Hyperion" in the series "Library of Japanese Classical Literature" and "Collected Works of Japanese Classical Literature" has published, one after another, many works of Japanese literature, including ancient ones, translated into Russian.
The ties between Japan and Russia are deep in other humanitarian areas as well. In Russia they are showing interest in the Japanese art of ikebana and the tea ceremony. Recently, the game of Go and the art of bonsai have become popular. As for sports, since the 60s. last century in Russia there was a boom in Japanese judo wrestling, and since the 1980s. - Japanese martial art karate.
The musical tastes of the Japanese and Russians are very close. Russian classical music of such great composers as Tchaikovsky and Shostakovich is popular in Japan. Many music lovers in Japan admire Chaliapin's bass, the performing skills of pianist Richter, violinist Oistrakh, and cellist Rostropovich. When the Bolshoi or Mariinsky Theaters tour in Japan, the auditoriums are always crowded. The same can be said about circus performances. In Japan they love Mikhalkov's films, and there are also big fans of Tarkovsky's films.
In addition, the middle and older generation of Japan knows quite well such Russian songs as “Black Eyes”, “Dubinushka”, “Katyusha”, “Troika”, etc. When meeting, the Japanese and Russians often sing Russian folk songs. It often turns out that the Japanese know these songs better than the Russians. The mood of Russian songs and their melody are extremely attractive to the Japanese.
Great Russian scientists, for example, the creator of the periodic table of elements, Mendeleev, and the founder of astronautics, Tsiolkovsky, are also well known to the Japanese. So we can rightfully say that such close relations in the field of culture have been established between the Japanese and Russians that it is difficult to overestimate them.
In January 2010, a new Orthodox church, the Church of the Epiphany, was consecrated in the Japanese city of Nagoya. The temple was built in record time. A snow-white church in the Suzdal style, 11 meters high, rose in the middle of a residential area typical of the Japanese province in just six months. Believers from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine collected money for its construction. Orthodoxy came to Japan 150 years ago in the person of a Russian missionary, who in the world was called Ivan Kasatkin, and after his death, Equal-to-the-Apostles Saint Nicholas of Japan. Father Nikolai translated the Bible into Japanese, founded a seminary in Japan and built a temple. After his death, he was canonized. Saint Nicholas of Japan went to the Land of the Rising Sun at the call of the first Russian consul in Japan, Joseph Goshkevich. When an expedition to the shores of Japan was formed in St. Petersburg in 1852, Goshkevich was seconded to its chief, Vice Admiral Putyatin, as a dragoman ( dragoman), i.e. translator and advisor.
Full contact between Russia and Japan at the cultural level is a direct path to establishing trust and mutual understanding. If we take a long-term perspective, such contacts will help resolve difficult issues in Russian-Japanese relations and will become a significant contribution to their genuine normalization.
Russia and Japan at the beginning of the 21st century.
In modern Russian-Japanese relations, two periods can be roughly distinguished: Yeltsin’s (90s of the twentieth century) and Putin’s (2000 – present). Of the “Yeltsin package” of Russian-Japanese documents, the following stood out in importance: the Tokyo Declaration of October 13, 1993, the results of the “meetings without ties” between B. Yeltsin and R. Hashimoto in Krasnoyarsk (1997) and Kawana (1998), Moscow Declaration of November 13, 1998. The signed documents contained formally correct words about the need to develop relations, move towards signing a peace treaty, resolving a territorial dispute on the basis of mutual interests, etc. An important point was the recognition by the Russian side of the need to “return” to the Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956 as a kind of basis for further discussion of difficult territorial issues . At the same time, the principle of “parallelism” was fixed - separate movement along the political “track” and along the “path” of economic cooperation. The principle of “not mixing politics and economics,” however, was not observed. The “Kuril Knot” was and is the epicenter of the struggle and the main obstacle to progress towards a bilateral peace treaty. The Yeltsin-Hashimoto plan was supposed to bring the two states to a new level of economic and investment (on the Japanese side) cooperation, but this did not happen.
The Japanese fell into a trap that they actually built for themselves. The fact is that around 1997-1998. they had the strong impression that Russia, step by step, was making strategic concessions to Japan on the main, territorial issue - that is, the transfer of all four islands. It is possible that the “trigger” of this trend was the results of informal meetings in Krasnoyarsk and the decision to conclude a peace treaty between the two countries by 2000 on the basis of the Tokyo Declaration of 1993. Under these conditions, two false stereotypes developed among the Japanese political elite: 1) 2000 g. will bring them a “gift” in the form of a treaty and return the “northern territories” (four islands); 2) there is a certain personal, “secret” strategy of President Boris Yeltsin for the transfer of the islands, which differs from the line of his apparatus, the Foreign Ministry, and other branches of government. And no matter what Russian diplomats in Moscow said to the Japanese about the impossibility of resolving the territorial issue according to the scheme “four islands under Japanese sovereignty, and then a peace treaty,” the latter smiled mysteriously and offered to live until 2000.
Where did the Japanese get such illusions? Perhaps they were associated with the general internal and external weakness of Russia at that time. It is also possible that the Japanese viewed the supposedly impending Russian concession as Moscow’s inevitable payment for Japanese support when Russia joined the G8 as a permanent member. However, most likely, the situation was much simpler: “friend Ryu” misunderstood “friend Boris” during intensive informal meetings near Krasnoyarsk.
As is known, the words of the first Russian president, spoken in an emotional or informal setting, should not always be taken literally. Russians know this well. But the Japanese were unaware of our early post-Soviet experience and the power of Yeltsin’s charisma. Apparently, both R. Hashimoto and I. Mori, who replaced him, took some of our president’s words literally, and Japanese political and information circles interpreted them even more harshly. This is how the “myth” appeared about the return of all the Kuril Islands by Russia in 2000 and a certain “secret” line of President Boris Yeltsin. In the north of Japan in Nemuro in 1998, a huge panel was even erected with the inscription “2000 is the year of the return of the northern territories.” B. Yeltsin's entourage tried to give the year 2000 a different meaning - as the year the work on the Treaty began, and not as the date of the transfer of the four islands to Japan.
Naturally, at the beginning of his presidency, V. Putin had to, in a sense, disavow unnecessary promises, destroy false stereotypes and unreasonable expectations of the Japanese side. V. Putin’s tough but fair argument, which was not directly voiced in official meetings, but was constantly implied, was as follows: 1) Russia “should not” give anything to Japan; 2) The Yalta agreements are unshakable and are not subject to revision. Before his visit to Japan in September 2000, V. Putin made a stop on Sakhalin, where at one of the press conferences he noted that this was not about transferring the Kuril Islands to Japan, but rather about discussing this problem. The signed “Irkutsk Statement” between Putin and Mori can be assessed as a tactical victory for the Russian President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before this, Japan did not want to hear about a “return” to the 1956 model, but in Irkutsk, Prime Minister I. Mori agreed to include the Soviet-Japanese declaration of 1956 as “the basic legal document for starting the process of negotiations on concluding a peace treaty” .
The new Japanese Prime Minister D. Koizumi, unlike his predecessor, wanted to get “everything at once” from V. Putin. The emphasis also changed - the Japanese side again began to talk about all four islands in the context of a mandatory condition for moving towards a peace treaty. The action plan was completed by V. Putin’s visit to Japan in November 2005. Preparations for this visit took place in an atmosphere of the birth of new moods and expectations both in Russia and in Japan.
In Russia by this time, if we take the data of sociological surveys, in particular VTsIOM, a rather pragmatic approach of the population to cooperation with this country had developed. Japan was associated with high-quality audio and video equipment (48%) and cars (36%). At the same time, a significant number of respondents (54%) saw and see in modern Japan an example of economic success that Russia could learn from. In general, the ratio of positive (friend, partner) and negative (rival, enemy) assessments on the eve of the visit was 61 to 18. At the same time, the overwhelming majority (73%) believed that it was time to stop discussing the territorial issue and leave the islands for Russia. The number of supporters of territorial dialogue with Japan was only 14%. Moreover, as noted by the director of VTsIOM D. Polikanov, there were 2-4 times more supporters of giving the disputed islands or part of them to the Japanese under certain conditions in the mid-1990s than at the beginning of the 21st century. In other words, the Russian position on the territorial issue has become much tougher . Russia has become stronger and more self-confident. Money and stability appeared, and the consciousness of one’s own strength and self-sufficiency increased. For most Russians, it is now much more important to preserve the authority of the state, since any territorial concession is considered both within the country and abroad as a sign of weakness and political failure. It is obvious that some ambiguity around the Kuril Islands, which existed during the Yeltsin period, was practically eliminated under V. Putin.
In Japan, on the contrary, among part of the political and expert elite and in society in 2005–2006. a hostility developed against V. Putin, who allegedly disavowed all the good wishes and intentions of B. Yeltsin, nullifying the desire of the first Russian president to “return all the islands” to Japan and sign a peace treaty with it. Thus, a leading expert on Russian-Japanese relations, Professor Hiroshi Kimura, commenting on V. Putin’s statement on September 27, 2005 to the Japanese media that the four islands are under the sovereignty of Russia and this is enshrined in international law as a result of the Second World War, called them "monstrous". “We cannot ignore such a statement,” the Japanese professor emphasized, because “... it contradicts the spirit and approach of former President Yeltsin, who really wanted to follow this agreement.” . The opinion that V. Putin is “destroying” a certain basis of Russian-Japanese relations that formed in the 1990s was and in many ways remains widespread in Japan among various social groups and segments of the population.
During the negotiations between V. Putin and D. Koizumi, the topic of the Kuril Islands and the prospects for signing a peace treaty was touched upon. The parties limited themselves to general declarations that did not change the essence of their positions. More interesting was the economic block, including the signing of a package of economic agreements. Japan confirmed its agreement to Russia's accession to the WTO, an agreement was signed on easing the bilateral visa regime, on areas of long-term energy cooperation, and on the joint fight against terrorism. The parties agreed on cooperation in the exploration and development of oil fields, its transportation and processing, especially on the Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 projects. The issue of Russian oil supplies was and remains one of the central issues in the negotiations. V. Putin and D. Koizumi agreed that by 2008 the pipeline should reach a Russian Pacific port, and from there oil would be delivered by tankers to Japan. China will receive its share of oil from this pipe, and Japan will receive its share.
Japan, taking advantage of past miscalculations of the USSR and then Yeltsin’s Russia, is striving to revise the results of World War II. The campaign for the return of the Kuril Islands is once again gaining momentum ahead of the upcoming Russian-Japanese negotiations at the G8 summit in July. But the true history associated with the Kuril Islands leaves no doubt about the legal ownership of the islands by the Russian state. Isn't it time to dot the i's? Russia has no reason to make territorial concessions to Japan, and our willingness to discuss this issue is perceived in Tokyo as weakness and only whets the appetites of new samurai.
Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan expressed satisfaction that Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara, at negotiations in Moscow with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov, reaffirmed the unchanged position of Japan on the territorial issue. “The negotiations took place in a rather difficult atmosphere, but I believe that Minister Maehara did his best and confidently conducted the discussion. The foundations (of our position), which are that historically the northern territories belong to Japan, have not wavered at all,” the Prime Minister is quoted as saying RIA News". Let us recall that during the past negotiations, the head of Japanese diplomacy, Seiji Maehara, again emphasized that his country considers the islands to be its “original territory,” promising, however, to conduct further dialogue on this issue without emotion. Until now, Tokyo's reaction to any steps taken by the Russian authorities in this region has been rather hysterical. Thus, commenting on Dmitry Medvedev’s November visit to Kunashir on the occasion of the country’s celebration of the so-called Northern Territories Day, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan described it as a manifestation of “inadmissible rudeness.” As a result, the Japanese leadership expressed categorical protest against the possibility of another visit by the Russian President to the Kuril Islands. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, after a meeting with his Japanese counterpart, said that negotiating a peace treaty with Japan is futile as long as Tokyo takes radical approaches to this issue. In particular, Russia proposed that its neighbors create a joint commission historians to find a compromise on the problem of the Kuril Islands. However, Japan abandoned this idea. The Russian Foreign Ministry also called on Japan to abandon negative emotions. On Saturday, the head of the Russian Presidential Administration Sergei Naryshkin also met with Seiji Maeharu. At it, the Japanese side was made to understand that Russia will not change its position either, and the head of state and other officials have both visited and will continue to visit regions of the country, including the Kuril Islands. “Of course, both the president and other Russian officials have visited and will continue to visit the regions of Russia, including the Kuril Islands - this is part of large-scale work in the interests of the socio-economic development of the territories, improving the standard of living of citizens, and ensuring the security of the state,” they noted. press service, reports RIA News". As for the statements of Japanese official representatives in connection with Medvedev’s trip to the Kuril Islands in November 2010, as the head of the presidential administration noted, such a position “only led to the fact that continued discussion of the territorial problem loses its meaning.” “At the same time, the Russian side remains committed to discussing the topic of a peace treaty - without preconditions and unilateral historical connections,” the press service said. On Thursday, Japanese Cabinet Secretary-General Yukio Edano said that Japan intends to monitor the Russian military presence in the South Kuril Islands. This reaction followed Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's statement that Moscow would make every effort to maintain a strategic presence in the Kuril Islands. According to the president, modern weapons should be placed on the islands. A member of the Presidium of the Public Council under the Russian Ministry of Defense, Igor Korotchenko, later suggested that to ensure security on the Kuril Islands it is necessary to install the latest air defense systems there, create an air base with a developed airfield network and replenish the Pacific Fleet with ships and missile boats. On Wednesday evening, it became known from a source in the Ministry of Defense that the first two Mistral-class helicopter carriers will be used in the Pacific Fleet, including to protect the Southern Kuril Islands. As the newspaper VZGLYAD reported, on Monday, representatives of one of the Japanese far-right organizations, during events in honor of the Day of the Northern Territories, calling for the return of the islands of the South Kuril ridge, over which Japan is arguing with Russia, desecrated the Russian flag at the Russian Embassy in Tokyo. Later, the Kremlin reacted sharply to anti-Russian statements and the burning of the Russian flag in Tokyo. On Tuesday, the Russian Foreign Ministry pointed out to the Minister-Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, Ide, that the anti-Russian actions committed by Japanese nationalist elements in Tokyo on February 7 were unacceptable. Later on Tuesday, Japanese media reported that an envelope containing a rifle bullet and a letter demanding the “return of the northern territories” had been delivered to the Russian Embassy in Tokyo. Representatives of the embassy contacted the police, and an investigation into this fact is underway.
Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara made tough new statements about the four disputed Kuril Islands claimed by Tokyo before flying to Moscow for talks with his Russian counterpart. This message was published by NHK.
According to Seiji Maehara, the Southern Kuril Islands are Japanese territory under international law, and Russia has no reason to “occupy” someone else’s territory.
The Japanese minister said that Tokyo's position will remain firm, no matter how often Russian leaders come to the Kuril Islands, or the degree of buildup of the Russian military presence in the South Kuril Islands.
At the same time, Seiji Maehara does not deny the importance of relations with Russia. According to him, both countries must quickly resolve the territorial dispute in order to further develop mutually beneficial cooperation in an atmosphere of complete trust.
Let us recall that Tokyo believes that the islands of Iturup, Habomai, Kunashir and Shikotan, included in the USSR during World War II, are the “northern territories” of Japan, while Moscow defends the position that the southern part of the Kuril Islands is an integral part of the Russian Federation.
A peace treaty following the Second World War has still not been concluded between Russia and Japan.
It would be useful for Japanese applicants for the Kuril Islands to be reminded of facts from the past.
The Russian state reached the Kuril Islands at the end of the 17th - beginning of the 18th centuries, immediately after Kamchatka was annexed to Russia by Vladimir Atlasov in 1697. From here the development of the islands began, which went from north to south. The first cartographic description of the Kuril Islands, including their southern part, including information about Iturup and Kunashir, was made in 1711–1713 based on the results of the expedition of I. Kozyrevsky.
Then our compatriots appeared in the southern Kuril Islands during the Spanberg expedition in 1739–1740. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the island of Shikotan has a different name - Spanberg Island. Already in 1776–1779, Cossacks from the detachment of centurion Ivan Cherny collected “yasak tax,” that is, a state tax, from the Ainu, the indigenous population of the islands of Iturup and Kunashir. This circumstance is worth paying special attention to. Firstly, it shows that there were no Japanese on the islands at that time. Secondly, paying the state tax was a sign that the islands belonged to Russia.
Later, Catherine II, by a special decree of April 30, 1779, would exempt the Ainu (or, as they are called in the document, “furry Kurilians”) from paying tax. The decree directly states that the population of the islands has accepted Russian citizenship. This was also confirmed by subsequent decrees of 1786 and 1799.
Even then, diplomats of the Russian Empire were of the opinion that the Kuril Islands belonged indisputably to Russia, asking Empress Catherine II to announce this to other powers. It was the Russians who compiled the world's first map of the southern Kuril Islands. They also gave their own names to the islands, which, unfortunately, appear today even in the Russian media under Japanese names. Thus, the Habomai islands were called the “Flat Islands.” In the Atlas for public schools of 1780, all the islands of the Kuril ridge were designated as an integral part of the Russian Empire. They are designated in the same status in the main official publication of that time - the Atlas of the Russian Empire. Thus, the historical priority in the discovery, development, and legal consolidation of ownership of the Kuril Islands belongs to Russia.
The penetration of the Japanese into the southern Kuril Islands began much later - only in 1802. This circumstance is recognized even by the US State Department. Japan, by a special decree of shogun Tokugawa Iemitsu, established a regime of isolation from the outside world in 1639, which lasted until the mid-19th century. The Japanese authorities, of their own free will, preserved themselves within their medieval borders. Under penalty of death, it was forbidden to build sea vessels and travel from Japan to other countries.
Only the temporary weakening of Russia in the context of the intrigues of the European powers that led to the Crimean War allowed Japan to impose the Shimoda Treaty on Trade and Borders of January 25, 1855. In accordance with Article 2 of this document, the border was drawn between the islands of Urup and Iturup. Sakhalin Island remained an undelimited possession of Russia and Japan. It was the status of Sakhalin that indirectly influenced relations between countries regarding the Kuril Islands. Japan's refusal from Sakhalin under the Treaty of April 25, 1875, signed in St. Petersburg, was compensated by the cession of 18 Kuril Islands from Urup to Shumshu. On May 27, 1895, Russia and Japan concluded a Treaty on Trade and Navigation, according to which the Shimoda Treaty lost force, and the agreement of 1875 remained in effect.
After the Russo-Japanese War, according to the Portsmouth Peace Treaty of August 23, 1905, the part of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel was torn away from Russia. However, it is necessary to pay attention to one important circumstance: in the same treaty, on the initiative of Japan itself, it was stated (Article 12 and Appendix to Treaty No. 10) that all previous Russian-Japanese treaties and agreements were annulled. Thus, the Treaty of 1875, which defined the border, also lost force. Based on this, the constant references of modern Japanese diplomacy to the favorable terms of the treaties of 1855 and 1875 for Tokyo are in fact unlawful, since these agreements lost their legal force back in 1905.
The revolution in Russia was perceived by the Japanese authorities as another unique chance to profit at the expense of a neighboring country. The troops of Imperial Japan took part in the intervention against Russia in 1918–1925 (the landing in Vladivostok was landed in April 1918) and remained in Primorye longer than the troops of other interventionist countries. Japan captured and held Northern Sakhalin until mid-1925. More than 70 thousand Japanese troops took part in the aggression. The damage from the Japanese intervention amounted to more than 100 million rubles in gold in Primorye, and over 10 million rubles in gold in Northern Sakhalin.
With its aggression, Japan actually buried the terms of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, although later the Bolsheviks preferred to turn a blind eye to this in the Convention on the Basic Principles of Relations between the USSR and Japan of January 20, 1925.
Samurai will more than once choose the path of aggression over peace and good neighborliness. On November 25, 1936, in Berlin, the governments of the “Great Japanese Empire” and Nazi Germany will sign a document known in Russian literature as the Anti-Comintern Pact. It contained as an annex a secret agreement, in the first article of which the parties pledged “... not to take any measures that could help alleviate the situation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” The Japanese diligently fulfilled these obligations: in 1938–1939, Japan would attack the USSR at Khasan and Khalkin-Gol. The Tokyo International Military Tribunal for the Far East in 1948 qualified these actions as “an aggressive war carried out by the Japanese.”
However, in relation to the southern Kuril Islands, the most important and fundamental is the indisputable fact that Japan was an aggressor country in World War II. Documents from the Japanese Foreign Ministry from that time have been preserved, from which it is clear that Tokyo diplomats were very cynical about international law. Tokyo did not at all think about fulfilling the provisions of the Neutrality Pact concluded on April 5, 1941 between the USSR and Japan. Thus, in a statement by Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka to the head of the German Foreign Ministry, Ribbentrop, it was said: “No Japanese prime minister or foreign minister will be able to force Japan to remain neutral if a conflict arises between Germany and the USSR. In this case, Japan will be forced, naturally, to attack Russia on the side of Germany. No Neutrality Pact will help here.” The same Matsuoka called at a meeting at the headquarters of the Japanese Emperor on June 27, 1941 to “move to the North and reach Irkutsk.”
Japan's compliance with the Neutrality Pact cost our people enormous sacrifices, because the USSR was forced to maintain a powerful military group in the Far East (up to 28% of the Red Army personnel were concentrated there and on the southern borders, where there was also a threat posed by German agents in Iran) , while these troops were extremely necessary in the battles with Nazi Germany.
Unlike the Shimoda and Portsmouth treaties, the documents signed by the allies in the war against fascist Germany and militaristic Japan retain legal force to this day. In particular, already in the Cairo Declaration of the USA, Great Britain and China of November 27, 1943, to which the USSR joined on August 8, 1945, it was determined that the goal of the Allies is to expel Japan from the territories “which it captured by force and as a result of its greed." The Yalta Agreement on Far East issues of February 11, 1945 included a clause on “the transfer of the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union and the return of the southern part of Sakhalin Island to it.” The text directly stated that these demands would be unconditionally satisfied after the Allied victory over Japan, and this was about all the Kuril Islands, that is, the southern Kuril Islands.
In accordance with the Yalta agreements, Moscow, fulfilling its obligations to its allies, on April 5, 1945, adopted a government Declaration on the denunciation of the Neutrality Pact with Japan.
The land of the rising sun, which pursued an aggressive course, was defeated. On September 2, 1945, Japan signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender, according to which it pledged to implement the Potsdam Declaration of the Allied Powers of July 26, 1945, which, in particular, provided: “The terms of the Cairo Declaration will be fulfilled and Japanese sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and those smaller islands that we indicate." Stalin’s address to the Soviet people on September 2, 1945 said: “Today Japan admitted itself defeated and signed an act of unconditional surrender. This means that Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands will go to the Soviet Union and from now on they will serve not as a means of separating the Soviet Union from the ocean and as a base for a Japanese attack on our Far East, but as a means of direct communication between the Soviet Union and the ocean and the base of our country’s defense from Japanese aggression ". It is noteworthy that the Japanese acknowledged these harsh realities during this period. For example, in Imperial Rescript No. 651 of November 22, 1945, the Kuril Islands are listed as areas that are not “the territory of Japan proper.”
On February 2, 1946, a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was issued, according to which all land with its subsoil and waters on the territory of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was declared the state property of the Soviet Union. Depriving Japan of the Kuril Islands was a measure of punishment for the aggressor country. At that time, Japanese politicians understood this very well and did not even mention claims to the Kuril Islands, for example, during the Tokyo Tribunal against war criminals.
Japan also does not have the right to refer to the Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan of April 13, 1941. Japan violated this pact by not remaining neutral. It helped Nazi Germany with supplies of strategic raw materials, repeatedly violated the air and land borders of the USSR, organized provocations with the help of the more than million-strong Kwantung Army deployed at the Soviet borders, captured and sank Soviet ships. The fact of Japan's violation of the Neutrality Pact was recognized in the text of the verdict of the Tokyo Military Tribunal. Meanwhile, international law (in particular, Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) says: “A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of its parties entitles the other party to invoke this breach as grounds for termination of the treaty or suspension of the treaty.” Soviet troops legally and quite fairly and legally occupied South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands during military operations against the aggressor country.
Modern Japanese politicians often motivate their claims to the “northern territories” by the fact that a peace treaty was never concluded between the USSR and Japan after the Second World War, which would have summed up its final results. Indeed, such a document does not exist. The International Peace Conference, which discussed the American-British draft peace treaty with Japan, was held at the initiative of the United States in 1951 in San Francisco. The Soviet Union did not put its signature on this treaty. Moscow was not satisfied, in particular, that this document (adopted already during the Cold War) did not contain in its text guarantees against the restoration of Japanese militarism, did not provide for the withdrawal of occupation forces from Japan, and also for a number of other reasons. As a result, a number of other states, including China and India, did not sign the agreement.
Although the issue of the Kuril Islands was not the main stumbling block at the conference in San Francisco, the representative of the USSR - First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Gromyko actively tried to improve the text of the peace treaty in this part, which he later called “separate”. The Soviet delegation proposed the following wording of paragraph “c” of Article 2: “Japan recognizes the full sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics over the southern part of Sakhalin Island with all the adjacent islands and the Kuril Islands and renounces all rights, title and claims to these territories.”
The Americans and British, who set the tone at the conference in San Francisco, did not particularly try to prevent the transfer of all of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands from Japan to the USSR. In particular, the British embassy wrote in its memorandum to the US State Department: “...Japan must cede southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union.” Even such a well-known anti-Soviet as US Secretary of State A. Dulles stated: “Japan officially ratifies the provisions of the Potsdam terms of surrender relating to territories, provisions that - including with regard to Japan - actually came into force six years ago.”
As a result, the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan of September 8, 1951 contained provisions sufficient to determine the ownership of the Kuril Islands by the USSR. The already mentioned paragraph “c” of Article 2 reads as follows: “Japan renounces all rights, title and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands over which Japan acquired sovereignty under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905 of the year".
Two circumstances are noteworthy. Firstly, at the same time Japan renounced territorial claims to other regions - from its conquests in Korea, from the island of Formosa (present-day Taiwan), from the Pescadores, Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands. That is, the current renewal of Japan’s territorial claims to Russia may logically lead to a redrawing of the political map of other regions of this part of the world. Secondly, the clear fixation in the San Francisco Treaty of the renunciation of all legal grounds deprives Japanese diplomacy of the opportunity to speculate on history, emphasizing those agreements with Russia that were beneficial to it in this matter, and, conversely, consigning to oblivion those in which the issue of ownership of the Kuril Islands was decided in favor of Russia.
Paragraph “a” of Article 8 of the San Francisco Treaty is fundamentally important. It reads: “Japan recognizes the full force and effect of all treaties concluded by the Allied Powers, now or in the future, to terminate the state of war begun on September 1, 1939, as well as any other agreements of the Allied Powers concluded for the restoration of peace or in connection with the restoration of peace ". Thus, Tokyo pledged to implement the Yalta and Potsdam agreements.
Neither when signing nor when ratifying the San Francisco Peace Treaty did Japan make any reservations, thereby agreeing to an absolute and complete renunciation of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin. Moreover, Japanese Prime Minister S. Yoshida on September 5, 1951, speaking at a conference in San Francisco, said: “The Japanese delegation gladly accepts this fair and generous treaty.” It is characteristic that at a hearing in the Japanese Parliament, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was discussed, the head of the treaty department of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, K. Nishimura, said: “Since Japan had to renounce sovereignty over the Kuril Islands, it lost the right to vote on the final decision on the issue of their ownership.” .
The San Francisco Peace Treaty was a multilateral, not a bilateral, act. Therefore, the absence of the USSR’s signature on it in no way means that Japan’s obligations regarding the transfer of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands are not valid. The border demarcation, although not formalized at the bilateral level, was legally considered a resolved issue.
The position of the USSR was clearly expressed in the acts it signed, on which the San Francisco Peace Treaty was based. It has no legal significance that the text of the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not say in whose favor Japan was renouncing specific territories. The treaty summed up the results of the war and punished the losing aggressor country. Naturally, such a country was also deprived of the right to determine who would own this or that territory.
The references of today's leaders of Japan to the fact that the San Francisco Peace Treaty supposedly refers only to the Northern Kuril Islands, and the disputed territories - the islands of Shikotan, Iturup, Kunashir and the Habomai ridge - are also unfounded. Nowhere in the text of the treaty is there even a hint of such an understanding: the Kuril Islands are considered in their entirety.
Finally, the current UN Charter, in its 107th article, states the following rule: “This Charter shall in no way invalidate actions taken or authorized as a result of the Second World War by the governments responsible for such actions in relation to any state , which during the Second World War was an enemy of any of the states that signed this Charter, and also does not interfere with such actions."
Thus, regardless of how today we evaluate the USSR’s refusal to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty (from the point of view of the author of this article, it was a political miscalculation), legally there should be no doubt about the ownership of the Kuril Islands specifically to Russia.
Four years after the San Francisco Peace Conference, the USSR and Japan expressed their readiness to begin bilateral negotiations with the aim of developing a bilateral peace treaty. A Japanese government delegation headed by Prime Minister I. Hatoyama arrived in Moscow. It was not possible to conclude an agreement, in particular, because Japan had already put forward territorial claims against the USSR. Therefore, on October 19, 1956, only the well-known Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration on the Normalization of Relations was adopted.
There are many myths regarding this document that are actively exploited both in Japan and in Russia. Let's start with the fact that this declaration testified to Moscow's intentions to establish productive cooperation with Tokyo. Article 1 stated: “The state of war between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan shall cease on the date of entry into force of this Declaration, and peace and good neighborly friendly relations shall be restored between them.” The Declaration was ratified by both the USSR and Japan, and the instruments of ratification were exchanged on December 12, 1956. Therefore, the still common judgments of some ignorant politicians, experts and journalists that Russia is still at war with Japan are only an expression of incompetence or a deliberate distortion of the truth. Paragraph 4 of the Declaration contained the promise: “The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will support Japan’s request for admission to the United Nations.” Paragraph 6 of the Declaration went in the same direction: “The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics renounces all reparations and claims against Japan.”
The most mentioned article 9 of the Declaration, which indeed provided for the consent of the USSR, “meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state,” to the transfer of the islands of Shikotan and Habomai, nevertheless clearly stipulated this with the condition that their actual transfer would take place only after the conclusion of a peace treaty between Russia and Japan. By the way, by signing this Declaration, Japan also legally recognized the islands of Shikotan and Habomai as Soviet territory.
From a legal point of view, the USSR's intention to transfer part of the southern Kuril Islands to Japan, firstly, was not an unconditional obligation that had to be fulfilled in any case. Secondly, this intention was nothing more than a gesture of goodwill of the USSR, which was ready to give up part of its own, and not at all Japanese, territory in the name of good relations with a neighboring country. From our point of view, this position was erroneous, since this friendly gesture was misjudged by the Japanese. Tokyo took it as an opportunity to make even greater territorial claims to Moscow. This practice existed before 1956, and it is observed, as shown at the beginning of the article, to this day. The territory of Russia should not be the subject of diplomatic bargaining. There is no legal or moral justification for this. Such “gifts” have always backfired on Moscow; it is enough to recall the reckless decision to transfer Crimea from the RSFSR to Ukraine, which took place around the same time.
Since Japan never fulfilled the terms of the Declaration and concluded a security treaty with the United States in 1960 directed against the USSR and China, the Soviet Union was forced to make a statement conditioning the transfer of the islands on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Japanese territory. A memorandum from the Soviet government dated January 27, 1960 stated: “Due to the fact that this agreement (meaning the agreement between Japan and the United States. - A.K.) actually deprives Japan of independence and foreign troops located in Japan as a result of its surrender will continue to stay on Japanese territory, a new situation is emerging in which it is impossible to fulfill the promise of the Soviet government to transfer to Japan the islands of Habomai and Shikotan (Shikotana - A.K.)". In response, the Japanese government also sent its own memo dated February 5, 1960, revealing its true intentions. This document stated: “Our country will relentlessly seek the return to us of not only the Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island, but also other ancestral Japanese territories.”
Meanwhile, the actions of the USSR government, correcting its own oversight related to the 1956 Declaration, were fully consistent with the norms of international law. Thus, Articles 44 and 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provide that a contract may not be performed or may be delayed in full or in part if, after its conclusion, circumstances arise that significantly change the original conditions from which the parties proceeded when concluding it. . It was Japan’s anti-Soviet actions, expressed in a unilateral change and revision of the original terms of the Declaration, that became these circumstances. In this sense, the provisions of Article 9 of the Declaration from the point of view of international law can be considered invalid. And it's better to do it now. We cannot once again repeat the mistakes of our predecessors. As the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement on May 7, 1988 regarding Japanese territorial claims: “The Soviet Union has a large territory, but we have no extra land.”
One should not make a tragedy out of the fact that there is currently no peace treaty between Japan and Russia. No one is stopping us from cooperating even without a peace treaty. By the way, Russia also does not have a peace treaty with Germany.
It remains to add that Japan actually recognizes the current border on the Kuril Islands, since it has signed a number of agreements, in particular on fishing on June 10, 1963 and on August 25, 1981.
Article 4 of the Russian Constitution states that “The Russian Federation ensures the integrity and inviolability of its territory.” Now there is no reason for territorial concessions to Japan. Any options that would mean Russia’s renunciation of its sovereignty over the southern Kuril Islands should be unacceptable to us.
Conclusion.
In recent years, relations between Russia and Japan have been moving towards the search for mutually beneficial and mutually acceptable solutions. It is very important that the main unresolved issue between the countries has moved from the category of eternal confrontation between the parties to the rank of constructive negotiations.
In general, we can say that Russia and Japan have created strong prerequisites for establishing partnerships. This can be considered a major achievement for both countries, given the fact that for a very long period after the Second World War, relations between them were characterized by a high degree of alienation, suspicion, mistrust and confrontation.
I would like to hope that in the future Russian-Japanese relations will move in a positive direction, towards mutual cooperation, mutual benefit and maintaining strong partnerships.
List of used literature.
1. http://wwweconomy.gov.ru
2. http://www nbenegroup.com Vladislav Polskikh
3. Help. On September 8, 1951, a peace treaty was concluded in San Francisco between Japan and the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, according to which Japan renounced all rights to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands (the USSR did not sign the treaty). On October 19, 1956, the USSR and Japan adopted a joint declaration that ended the state of war and restored diplomatic relations between our countries. At the same time, the declaration recorded the consent of the USSR to the transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan after the signing of the peace treaty. On January 19, 1960, Japan extended the security treaty with the United States, signed on September 8, 1951, and on January 27, 1960, the USSR stated that since this US-Japanese agreement was directed against the USSR, the Soviet government would disavow the issue of transferring the two Kuril Islands ridges of Japan.
4. Irkutsk statement of the President of the Russian Federation and the Prime Minister of Japan // Embassy of Japan in Russia. Bulletin No. 37. April 2001 (http://www.ru.emb-japan.go.jp/NEWS/BULLETIN/)
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8. http://www. internovosti.ru Natalia Romanova 02/10/2011
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17. Minutes of the Portsmouth Peace Conference and the text of the Treaty between Russia and Japan, concluded in Portsmouth on August 23 (September 5), 1905. St. Petersburg. 1906. pp. 102-103.
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21. Raginsky M.Yu. Militarists in the dock. Based on materials from the Tokyo and Khabarovsk trials. M., 1985. P. 157.
22. Raginsky M.Yu., Rosenblit S.Ya. International trial of the main Japanese criminals. M.-L., 1950. P. 255.
23. From the transcript of the meeting of the coordination committee of the government and the imperial headquarters // Koshkin A.A. The collapse of the “ripe persimmon” strategy. M., 1989. P. 218.
24. Collection of current treaties, agreements and conventions concluded by the USSR with foreign states. Issue XI. M., 1955. P. 106.
25. Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War. M., 1947. T. 3. P. 111-112.
26. Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War. M., 1947. T. 3. P. 480-481.
27. Collection of current treaties, agreements and conventions concluded by the USSR with foreign states. Issue XI. M., 1955. S. 104-106.
29. Quote from the book: Russian Pacific epic. Khabarovsk. 1979. P. 585.
30. Gazette of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 1946. No. 5.
31. Collection of the most important documents on international law. Part 1. M., 1996. pp. 320-351.
34. Allison G., Kimura H., Sarkisov K. From the Cold War to trilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. M., 1993. P. 144.
35. Joint collection of documents on the history of territorial demarcation between Russia and Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 1992. P. 32.
36. Collection of documents and materials on Japan (1951-1954). M., 1954. S. 89-104.
37. Joint collection of documents on the history of territorial demarcation between Russia and Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 1992. P. 37.
38. Quote from the book: Cherevko K.E. Japan on the Far Eastern borders of Russia and the USSR (XVII-XX centuries). M., 1987. P. 97.
39. Charter of the United Nations. M., 1992. P. 34.
40. Collection of current treaties, agreements and conventions concluded by the USSR with foreign states. Vol. XVII-XVIII. M., pp. 257-260.
42. Joint collection of documents on the history of territorial demarcation between Russia and Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 1992. P. 47.
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Russian-Japanese relations
By the end of the 20th century, Russian-Japanese relations reached the highest level in their entire history and continued to actively develop in the first 9 years of the 21st century. This became possible because with the collapse of the USSR and the beginning of reforms in Russia, the fundamental reason for the military-political and ideological confrontation with Japan, which in previous years was associated with global confrontation in the international arena, disappeared. The development of bilateral relations corresponded to the national interests of both Russia and Japan.
Thus, improved relations with Russia allowed Japan to receive Moscow’s support on the issue of UN reform and expansion of the Security Council by including Japan in it. And Russia’s improved relations with Japan allowed it to remove Tokyo’s objections or receive its support for joining as a full partner in the global - G8, IMF, WTO - and regional - APEC - institutions of interaction and cooperation. Trade and economic cooperation also turned out to be beneficial for both parties, the most striking examples of which were the implementation of the Sakhalin-1 project and the start of work on the Sakhalin-2 project, the construction and commissioning of a liquefied gas plant on Sakhalin, the start of construction of the Eastern Siberia pipeline - The Pacific Ocean, the construction of assembly plants for the Toyota and Nissan automobile companies in the western part of the Russian Federation, the signing of agreements in 2009 on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and peaceful nuclear research, as well as peaceful space exploration.
The experience of lengthy negotiations with the Japanese side on the issue of concluding a peace treaty, and essentially on the settlement of territorial demarcation, since the joint declaration of 1956 serves as a peace treaty between the two countries, with the exception of the unrealized 9th “territorial article”, indicates that in the foreseeable future it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. The differences between the parties are not just significant, but fundamental. Not only the Japanese ruling circles, but also the public are overwhelmingly inclined to consider the position of returning the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup, “illegally seized from Japan after the Second World War, to be justified, fair and not subject to compromise.”
For any Japanese head of government, politician, or diplomat, deviation from this official position is fraught with the loss of a political career and public ostracism. At the same time, in Japan there is a fairly influential group of politicians, representatives of the business community, scientists, and journalists who understand, from the point of view of Japanese national interests, the need to get rid of rigid ties to American policy, to confront China, and to establish constructive, diverse relations with Russia. They pin special hopes for improving bilateral relations and finding a solution to the territorial problem with the election of V.V. Putin for the post of President of the Russian Federation. They are opposed by supporters of a “principled position” on the territorial issue, among whom are the leaders of the Russian direction in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Russian studies scholars known for their critical attitude towards Russia, as well as conservative-nationalist media (the Sankei-Fuji group).
They proceed from the fact that Russia’s new approaches to the territorial problem under President V.V. Putin should not expect that, at best, the proposal to discuss Article 9 of the 1956 Joint Declaration will be repeated. At the same time, proposals are being made that the Russian side may raise the issue of transferring the islands of Habomai and Shikotan for the use of Japan while maintaining Russian sovereignty over them.
This repeats the reaction in Japan to what was said by President V.V. Putin in March 2001 in Irkutsk proposed to begin discussing Article 9 of the 1956 Joint Declaration, which led to the consolidation of the Japanese position of “simultaneous return of four islands” and to the punishment of politicians and diplomats who advocated holding negotiations using the “two plus two” formula. However, in contrast to the situation more than ten years ago, the current picture is as follows. The number of supporters of the realistic approach is growing, they are quite active, receiving support in the press (newspapers Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri, Nihon-keizai), among the scientific community, and business circles. An opinion is increasingly being expressed about the futility of defending the position in favor of obtaining four islands, especially at the same time. There is an understanding that for Japan the only reasonable and, moreover, the best way to solve the problem of the islands lies through deepening cooperation with Russia in the economic and security spheres.
At the same time, it is proposed to determine new guidelines for Japanese diplomacy, taking into account the relative weakening of the United States, the rise of China, the growing influence of Asian states, the creation by Russia of the Eurasian Union and, on its basis, Moscow’s movement to the East. One of the main guidelines of this diplomacy should be the creation of “multiple relations” with Russia and assistance in its advancement in the Asia-Pacific region.
As a result, it will be possible to count on a more favorable compromise with Russia on the territorial issue. In other words, an environment should be created in which it will be easier and more justified for the Russian side to make a concession on the territorial issue.
Currently, the Government of the Russian Federation sets a priority state task for the development of the Far East and Eastern Siberia, striving for their integration into the Asia-Pacific region (APR), which in recent years has been rapidly moving along the path of economic growth. Japan, which is one of the largest economies in the world and Russia’s closest neighbor in the region, can help solve this problem. Economic cooperation between the Russian Federation and Japan is becoming increasingly stronger. The production facilities of such Japanese companies as Toyota, Nissan, Komatsu, Isuzu, Suzuki, and Mitsubishi are located in Russia. A long-term partnership has developed between both countries in the oil and gas sector. Thus, in the Sakhalin region, the Mitsui company participates in the Sakhalin-2 project for the extraction and production of liquefied natural gas, which is already exported to Japan and other countries. Both countries actively cooperate in the field of logistics, as well as in the field of logging and wood processing.
At the same time, the volume of exports of Russian unprocessed wood to the Japanese market decreased, with a noticeable increase in the export of processed products. Russia and Japan have great potential for the further development of Russian-Japanese economic relations. This concerns cooperation in five areas of economic modernization, presented in 2010 by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and approved by Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan.
These include energy efficiency and energy saving, nuclear technologies, space technologies, medical technologies, and strategic information technologies.
As Naoto Kan stated, Japanese technology and capital will become an important element in the joint development of the two countries, including for the purpose of modernizing Russia.
At a meeting of the Russian-Japanese commission on scientific and technical cooperation, held in March of this year, the interaction plan for 2010-2012. projects related to these five areas have already been included.
The main directions of Russian foreign policy towards Japan include cooperation in the field of energy. In June 2010, a round table was held at the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, in which representatives of government bodies, enterprises of the fuel and energy complex, and financial organizations of Russia and Japan took part. During the event, possible areas of cooperation in the coal industry were discussed. The priorities of interaction are the joint development of coal resources located in Eastern Siberia (Elegest coal deposit in Tuva), improvement of transport infrastructure for the supply of high-quality coal from Russia to Japan by rail and sea, cooperation in the production and supply of equipment used in the coal industry . At the same time, the Russian side emphasized the need to develop cooperation in the field of increasing energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources, which will allow us to jointly develop effective energy saving measures in coal mines and opencast mines.
Japanese companies are assisting in the construction of a bridge to Russky Island in Vladivostok, where the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum will be held in 2012. Here, cooperation between the Japanese corporation Mitsui and the Russian company RusHydro on the construction of the Far Eastern wind power plant can be further developed and produce positive results. Thus, in Russia the Japanese experience in the use of alternative energy sources can be used to great effect. The prospects for cooperation in the space field were discussed by representatives of the Russian Ministry of Communications and the Japanese company Sumitomo during a meeting held at the end of September this year. A number of issues were agreed upon on technology transfer, design and development of payloads for new modern communications satellites within the framework of projects implemented by the federal organization Space Communications. As a result of the event, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed, according to which the transfer of technology will include the provision of recommendations for the training of specialists.
Recently, there has been an intensification of Russian-Japanese trade and economic relations in the agricultural sector. Thus, at the end of September 2010, the II Russian-Japanese Congress on Agriculture was held, dedicated to the development of cooperation between the two countries in the agro-industrial sector.
Japan, having limited territories, sets an example of how, with a lack of agricultural land, one can achieve self-sufficiency in food.
Japanese technologies can be very useful for Russia, which has free land and is making efforts to increase agricultural production. The Russian government, for its part, began to support Russian food exporters.
At the same time, conditions are being created in the Far East for the export of Russian wheat to Japan and further to Southeast Asia. The issue of creating a joint educational center to study Japanese experience, introduce Japanese technologies, and train Russian specialists to work on agricultural machinery supplied from Japan is also being discussed. In addition, promising areas for cooperation in the field of agribusiness for both parties could be, for example, the joint production of special film for greenhouses, the creation of an agricultural park in the Stupinsky district of the Moscow region, where the best technologies could be presented, etc.
Cooperation is developing between the All-Russian public organization of small and medium-sized businesses "Support of Russia" and the heads of associations for the support and development of small and medium-sized businesses and the governors of Japanese prefectures.
Thus, in September 2010, the International Innovation Conference "Small and Medium Businesses in the Asia-Pacific Region. Integration Based on Innovation" was held in a video conference format.
Thus, from all of the above it follows that economic cooperation between Russia and Japan continues to actively develop and expand. And successful joint cooperation is the key to success in other areas of interaction, including political, in which the two countries currently have some disagreements.
Conclusions political East Asian diplomacy
It is in Russia's national interests to maintain friendly relations with Japan at the highest possible level.
In the Japanese political elite, despite the instability of the domestic political situation and the presence of certain anti-Russian sentiments, primarily related to the territorial problem, in general there is a consensus in favor of developing relations with Russia in all sectors. Opportunities for building fairly advanced, diverse, constructive relations with Japan exist.
This was also proven by the practice of Russian relations with Tokyo in the late 90s of the last century and the beginning of this century.
At that time, Japan, among the G7 countries, occupied the most favorable position towards Russia (fighting terrorism in the Caucasus, human rights, providing economic assistance after the default, connecting Russia to APEC, etc.).
Realizing such opportunities will require constant, persistent, proactive and persistent work with the Japanese political elite, business circles, and the public.
It is necessary to have a clearly thought-out strategy, to act comprehensively, taking into account all interrelated factors. In the political sphere, it is very important to establish and regularly maintain contacts and dialogue not only at the highest level and through foreign affairs agencies, but also with the entire spectrum of the Japanese political elite.
By consistently increasing bilateral ties and increasing the level of interaction, both Moscow and Tokyo are able to strengthen their positions both in general in the Asia-Pacific region and in relations with their main partners - the United States and China.
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On September 2 and 3, 2016, within the framework of the International Economic Forum (IEF), held in Vladivostok, a meeting of the leaders of Russia and Japan took place. During negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, agreements were reached on issues of cooperation between the two countries. This meeting was an important stage, opening up prospects for cooperation between Russia and Japan in the economic and defense spheres, as well as in resolving foreign policy issues.
One of the key issues in relations between Russia and Japan is the ownership of the four Kuril Islands: Habomai, Shikotan, Iturup and Kunashir. The Russian side is adamant in its position on preserving these islands, but Japan is trying to find new approaches to obtain the “Northern Territories”. Despite the seeming impossibility of compromise on this issue, negotiations continue. Japan insists on concluding a Peace Treaty, which implies the transfer of the islands to the Japanese side.
Russia is also interested in solving this problem, but from a different point of view. Before the meeting with Shinzo Abe, President Putin said that it is necessary to resolve the problem on mutually beneficial terms, and any progress on the issue of the “Northern Territories” is possible only by building close, trusting relationships. The Russian President cited the case of China as an example. Territorial disputes between Russia and China were resolved as a result of close cooperation in various fields. Thus, in this situation, further consideration of territorial disputes between Russia and Japan may be an impetus for deepening cooperation.
Prime Minister Abe has begun to take decisive steps in this direction. During his May visit to Sochi, he proposed a plan for cooperation between the two countries in eight areas: energy, industry, agriculture, urban environment, cooperation of small and medium-sized businesses, high technology, and humanitarian exchanges. These actions on the part of Japan are aimed at possible progress in signing a peace treaty and transfer of the islands. One should also not ignore the personal ambitions of Prime Minister Abe, who is trying with all his might to accept this historic agreement during his term in office. Abe Shinzo is also making attempts to maintain his authority among the ruling elite and the population. According to newspaper polls Mainichi, about 60% of respondents expressed confidence in resolving the issue of the Northern Territories. Moreover, not only the Japanese political elite, but also Japanese investors have a purely economic interest in the Russian market. A number of large-scale projects for the development of the Far East are beneficial for both parties. For example, President Abe proposed jointly developing Vladivostok as an open port, making it a gateway from the Pacific Ocean to Eurasia.
Another factor creating the need to build closer relations with Russia is China’s claim to regional dominance. Japan is trying to shift the flow of resources in its favor by weakening China. It can offer safer cooperation, since there is no danger from Japan of settling the border areas. Therefore, Japan is looking to Russia for a protector in case of aggression from China. Japan is also trying to free itself from American influence by building more trusting relations with Russia. To achieve this, defense cooperation is key. Although Japan is not yet ready to completely abandon US tutelage, the Government is gradually taking legislative steps to create a combat-ready army. For example, in 2016, a law was passed giving the Japan Self-Defense Forces the right to conduct military operations outside Japanese territory. The current Minister of Defense of Japan is Tomomi Inada, who has repeatedly spoken out in favor of the development of nuclear weapons.
For Russia, the benefits derived from cooperation with Japan also go beyond economics. Japan can become a very important geopolitical partner for Russia for two reasons. Firstly, Japan is one of the most economically developed countries in the world. Moreover, Japan has a fairly powerful and combat-ready army. In the ranking of the armed forces of the world, published on the website globalfirepower.com, Japan ranks seventh. And although Japan does not have nuclear weapons, high technology, primarily in nuclear energy, and developed infrastructure will make it possible, if necessary, to create nuclear weapons within a few months. Secondly, a diplomatic shift towards Eurasia will weaken Russia’s main geopolitical rival, the United States.
Japan is in the position of a junior partner in relation to the United States, which weakens Japan in the international arena. For a country with such military and economic potential, a semi-independent position is not only unprofitable, but also humiliating. In addition, the United States can no longer ensure Japan's security in the Pacific region. Left alone in the face of the threat of a rising China, which claims primacy in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan is forced to look for new ways to ensure its security. In addition, Japan itself does not give up its ambitions as a leading player in the Asia-Pacific region. Unlike the United States, Russia can offer partnerships in which both Japan and Russia will be on the same level. However, for now there can be no talk of transferring the islands, since one of the factors complicating the solution of the Kuril problem is Japan's current position in relation to the United States. Transferring the islands to Japan means de facto transferring the islands to the United States.
As for the results of the negotiations at the MEF, first of all, progress was made in the implementation of Abe’s plan for cooperation in eight directions. The results of the negotiations regarding the peace treaty and the islands are contradictory. Contrary statements by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman Yasuhisa Kawamura indicate that mutual understanding on the issue has not yet been reached. The Russian Foreign Minister announced an agreement between the two parties regarding joint economic activities on the four islands of the Kuril chain. However, the official representative of the Japanese Foreign Ministry denied this information.
Now is the time for Japan to begin its independent path in the international arena. While the United States is busy with elections, Japan and Russia can build trust and alliance. We need to act now. Abe Shinzo has 2 years to put his plan into action and create a solid foundation for the further development of cooperation between the two countries. I believe that culturally Japan is closer to Russia than to the United States. The founder of the German school of geopolitics, Karl Haushofer, who in the 20th century proposed the creation of the Eurasian Continental bloc “Berlin - Moscow - Tokyo” to counter the Atlanticist bloc of Britain and the USA, argued that, despite its island location, Japan is a continental power in terms of values and culture.
To create such a powerful alliance, possible internal and external threats must also be taken into account. Various far-right nationalist organizations and Western supporters may oppose rapprochement with Russia. However, Abe Shinzo is currently able to cope with internal pressure, as he has become one of the most influential prime ministers in recent times, as evidenced by his long stay in power. In addition, Abe himself belongs to a nationalist organization Nippon Kaigi. The possibility of a threat from the West depends on the outcome of the upcoming US elections. But despite this, rapprochement is proceeding at an accelerated pace; this can be evidenced by the agreements between the Russian and Japanese leaders on two meetings: in November at the APEC summit in Peru and on December 15 in the Japanese prefecture of Yamaguchi, which is of particular importance, since this is the birthplace of Shinzo Abe. By this time, progress will be visible in solving joint problems in various areas of cooperation between the two countries.
Nikita Bondarenko
By the beginning of the 21st century, Russian-Japanese relations had reached their highest level in history. These relations are actively developing in three areas: political, including issues of concluding a peace treaty; economic, where priority is given to trade and economic cooperation; in the field of international cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral basis, as well as in other practical areas. The Concept of Russian Foreign Policy, approved on June 28, 2000 by President V.V. Putin, states that “the Russian Federation stands for the sustainable development of relations with Japan, for achieving genuine good neighborliness that meets the national interests of both countries.” Relevance of the topic
The era of the Russian Empire First contacts By the middle of the 17th century, Russia, having already annexed most of Siberia, reached the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk. The first meeting of the Russians with one of the shipwrecked Japanese named Denbei dates back to this time, that is, around 1701, Russia learned about the existence of such a country as Japan. Denbey was taken to Moscow and received an audience with Peter I, after which in 1705 Peter ordered the opening of a Japanese language school in St. Petersburg, and Denbey to be appointed its teacher. After this, expeditions were organized at the state level to search for a sea route to Japan, and in 1739 the ships of Spanberg and Walton approached the shores of the provinces of Rikuzen and Awa. The silver coins received by the population from the Russians were delivered to the bakufu, which in turn turned to the Dutch living in Japan for advice. They reported on the place where these coins were minted, and thus Japan also learned about the existence of the country “Orosia” (Russia) to the north of it.
Treaty of Shimoda Treaty of Shimoda between Russia and Japan or Treaty of Shimoda (Japanese Nichi-ro washin jo: yaku?, “Japanese-Russian Treaty of Friendship”) the first diplomatic agreement between Russia and Japan. It was signed by Vice Admiral E.V. Putyatin and Toshiakira Kawaji on February 7, 1855. It consisted of 9 articles. The main idea of the treaty was to establish “permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan.” For Russians in Japan, essentially consular jurisdiction was introduced. Kuril Islands north of the island. Iturup was declared the possession of Russia, and Sakhalin continued to remain as a joint, indivisible possession of the two countries. The ports of Shimoda, Hakodate, and Nagasaki were also open to Russian ships. Russia received most favored nation treatment in trade and the right to open consulates in the specified ports. The provision on joint ownership of Sakhalin was more beneficial for Russia, which continued the active colonization of Sakhalin (Japan at that time did not have such an opportunity due to the lack of a fleet). Later, Japan began to intensively populate the territory of the island and the issue about it began to become increasingly acute and controversial. The contradictions between the parties were resolved in 1875 with the signing of the St. Petersburg Treaty, according to which Russia ceded all the Kuril Islands to Japan in exchange for full ownership of Sakhalin. Since 1981, the date of signing of the Shimoda Treaty has been celebrated in Japan as “Northern Territories Day.”
Treaty of St. Petersburg Treaty of St. Petersburg 1875 (Japanese: Karafuto-Chishima Kōkan Jōyaku?) agreement between Russia and Japan, concluded on April 25 (May 7), 1875 in St. Petersburg. Under the treaty, Japan agreed to transfer Sakhalin, previously jointly owned, into Russian ownership in exchange for all 18 Kuril Islands. The treaty changed the provisions of the Shimoda Treaty of 1855, according to which Sakhalin was jointly owned by the two countries. The treaty remained in force until 1905, when the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was signed following the Russo-Japanese War.
Russo-Japanese War Treaty of Portsmouth Peace Treaty of Portsmouth (Japanese by: tsumasu jo: yaku?) an agreement between the Russian Empire and Japan that ended the Russo-Japanese War. Signed on August 23 (September 5), 1905 in Portsmouth, USA. On the Russian side, the agreement was signed by S. Yu. Witte and R. R. Rosen, on the Japanese side by Komura Jutaro and Takahira Kogoro. The Portsmouth Peace Treaty terminated: the Treaty of Union between the Russian Empire and China (1896), which provided for a military alliance between Russia and China against Japan in the event of the latter’s aggression, and the Russo-Chinese Convention of 1898, which gave Russia lease rights to the Liaodong Peninsula (and Port Arthur in particular).
Treaty of Portsmouth Peace Negotiations in Portsmouth (1905) from left to right: from the Russian side (far part of the table) Planson, Nabokov, In Itte, Rosen, Korostovets; from the Japanese side (near part of the table) Adachi (German), Ochiai, Komura (English), Takah ira (English), Sato.NabokovItte RosenKorostovets Adatinem.Ochiai KomuraEnglish.Takah ira English.Sato
The Portsmouth Peace Treaty consisted of 15 articles. According to the agreement, Russia recognized Korea as a sphere of Japanese influence, ceded to Japan lease rights to the Liaodong Peninsula with Port Arthur and Dalniy, part of the South Moscow Railway from Port Arthur to Kuanchengzi, and agreed in Article 12 to conclude a convention on fishing along the Russian shores of the Japanese, Okhotsk and Bering Seas seas. According to Article 9 of this treaty, Russia ceded southern Sakhalin to Japan. The treaty secured only the commercial use of Manchurian roads by both parties. Contents of the agreement
The terms of the treaty were much closer to the Russian than to the Japanese peace program, so in Japan this peace treaty was met with outright dissatisfaction. The European powers and the United States were pleased with the conclusion of the treaty. France, in connection with the German threat, sought to involve Russia in resolving the Moroccan crisis. Great Britain, after the weakening of Russia's position in the Far East, considered it as a possible ally against Germany. After the conclusion of the Bjork Treaty of 1905, Germany hoped to use Russia for its own purposes. The United States believed that it had achieved its goal of stopping Russia's advance in the Far East, and at the same time maintaining Russia as a counterweight to Japan. When Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations were established in 1925, the Soviet government recognized the Portsmouth Peace Treaty with the proviso that “the USSR does not bear political responsibility for it.” After the defeat of Japan in World War II and its surrender on September 2, 1945, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty became invalid. Positions of interested parties after the conclusion of the contract
In conclusion, it should be noted that there were several important prerequisites for the sharp turn in relations between the two countries. First of all, this is a general change in the policy of England, caused by the aggravation of Anglo-German relations and entailing a turn towards Russia. Secondly, Russia’s refusal to pursue an active policy in Manchuria and Japan’s desire to establish itself not only in Korea, but also in southern Manchuria. Thirdly, these are the mutual interests of Japan and Russia in China, related to the Chinese Eastern Railway and the foreign policies of other powers towards China. In the summer of 1907, in addition to the Russian-Japanese treaty, Japanese-French and Russian-English treaties were signed, which actually created a new political situation in Asia and Europe. This became the basis of the alliance between England, France and Russia, as a result of which Russia overcame numerous problems in relations with Japan. Their bilateral relations acquired a solid basis, creating the preconditions for further rapprochement. Results
Foreign military intervention in Russia () military intervention of the countries of the Entente and the Quadruple Alliance in the Civil War in Russia (). In total, 14 states took part in the intervention. Background Immediately after the October Revolution, during which the Bolsheviks came to power, the “Decree on Peace” was announced and, as a result of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty concluded between the Leninist government and Germany, Soviet Russia withdrew from the First World War. On December 3, 1917, a special conference was held with the participation of the United States, England, France and their allied countries, at which it was decided to delimit zones of interest in the territories of the former Russian Empire and establish contacts with national democratic governments. The Caucasus and Cossack regions were designated as England's zone of influence. France Ukraine and Crimea. On January 1, 1918, Japan brought its warships into the port of Vladivostok under the pretext of protecting its subjects. Attempts by the Soviet government to normalize Soviet-Japanese relations remained unsuccessful due to Japanese hostility. Japanese intervention in the Far East
The intelligence department of the General Staff of the Supreme Ruler, in a summary of information dated March 21, 1919, reported on the motives of Japan's foreign policy, as a lack in the country of minerals and raw materials necessary for industry and the desire to conquer strong markets, prompting Japan to territorial seizures in countries rich in raw materials and with a low level of industrial development (China, Russian Far East, etc.). Having agreed to take part in the fight against the Bolsheviks, Japan sent troops and rushed to capture Siberia, intensively buying large plots of land, houses, mines, industrial enterprises and opening bank branches to subsidize their enterprises. In order to unhindered the seizure of the Russian Far East, Japan began to support the separatist sentiments of the Cossack atamans. On April 1, 1919, intelligence officers of the Supreme Ruler reported that “the fight against Bolshevism is a good pretext for the presence of Japanese troops on foreign territory, and the support of the atamans allows Japan to exploit raw materials.” Historian Ph.D. N. S. Kirmel writes with reference to the RGVA that one of the ways for Japan to gain a dominant position was to conduct pan-Asian propaganda “Asia for Asians” and the desire to dismember Russia to create in the future “an Asian union under the Japanese flag.” The failures of the armies of the Supreme Ruler in 1919 had a strong influence on further Japanese policy regarding the Russian question: on August 13, 1919, the resident of the military-statistical department of the Amur Military District reported that “the question of recognition of the Omsk government is currently in connection with the successes of the Bolsheviks and the fragile The position of the Kolchak regime ceased to be a subject of discussion. Japan's policy towards Russia will change. Japan must take care of how to deal with Bolshevism coming to the East
Nikolaev incident Nikolaev incident (Japanese nikou jiken) an armed conflict between red partisans, white guards and units of the Japanese army, which occurred in 1920 in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. In September 1918, Nikolaevsk was occupied by Japanese troops during the Entente intervention in the Far East. At the beginning of 1920, in addition to the Russian population and white detachments (about 300 people), a garrison of 350 people from the 14th Infantry Division of the Imperial Japanese Army under the command of Major Ishikawa was stationed in the city and about 450 Japanese civilians lived. In January 1920, the city was besieged by a large red partisan detachment of 4,000 men under the command of the anarchist Yakov Tryapitsyn. On February 24, the Japanese concluded a truce with the partisans, according to which the partisans could enter the city.
Consequences The Red Army Headquarters redeployed the Fomin-Vostokov ski detachment to Sakhalin, which had previously played a key role in the encirclement of Nikolaevsk. Soviet power was also proclaimed on Sakhalin. The Japanese government used the Nikolaev incident to justify the further occupation of Sakhalin, justifying it by the need to protect the Japanese living on Sakhalin from what happened in Nikolaevsk. Sakhalin was occupied by the Japanese on April 22, 1920. The issue of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the northern part of Sakhalin was resolved as a result of negotiations that began in 1924 and ended with the signing of the Soviet-Japanese convention in 1925. Most of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur is burned. The city, long considered one of the most beautiful in the Far East, actually has to be rebuilt from scratch.
The Beijing Treaty of 1925 (Soviet-Japanese Convention of 1925 on the Basic Principles of Relations) is an agreement between Japan and the USSR on the establishment of diplomatic relations, signed in 1925 in Beijing. History After the October Revolution, Japan actively participated in international intervention in the Russian Far East. Attempts by the Soviet government to normalize Soviet-Japanese relations remained unsuccessful due to Japanese hostility. And with the defeat of the Entente intervention in the European part of Russia over the years and the strengthening of the international positions of Soviet Russia, Japan continued to evade recognition of the USSR. This policy of Japan led to the fact that on February 13, 1924, the Soviet authorities sent a notification to the Japanese consul in Vladivostok, the essence of which was that the position of the Japanese consul from that moment would cease to be recognized by the Soviet side as official, and he himself would be considered as a private person. Relationships in 20 - 40 years
Meanwhile, the convention enshrined the agreement of the parties that all treaties, agreements and conventions concluded by Russia and Japan before November 7, 1917, excluding the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, should be revised. The parties agreed to begin revising the Russian-Japanese fishing convention signed in 1907. The USSR government agreed to grant Japanese citizens, companies and associations concessions for the exploitation of natural raw materials throughout the USSR. Details of the terms of the concession contracts were given in Protocol “B” attached to the Soviet-Japanese convention. In general, the Beijing Treaty of 1925 contained a number of significant concessions in favor of Japan, which the Soviet side made in order to establish diplomatic relations and thus stabilize the situation in the Russian Far East, since Japan’s recognition of Soviet Russia not least led to the termination (or, according to at least, complicating) the provision by the Japanese side until this moment of active support for anti-Soviet White Guard forces in the Far East outside the USSR.
The Khasan Battles were a series of clashes in 1938 between the Imperial Japanese Army and the Red Army over disputes over the ownership of the territory near Lake Khasan and the Tumannaya River. In Japan, these events are called the “Incident at Zhanggufeng Heights” (Japanese: Chokoho: jiken?). In 1932, Japanese troops completed the occupation of Manchuria, on whose territory the puppet state of Manchukuo was created. Soon after this, the situation on the border line became more complicated. The section occupied by the Posyetsky border detachment was no exception. In February 1934, five Japanese soldiers crossed the border line; in a clash with border guards, one of the violators was killed, and four were wounded and detained. On March 22, 1934, while trying to conduct reconnaissance at the Emelyantsev outpost site, an officer and a soldier of the Japanese army were shot dead. Khasan battles
Consequences of the conflict In total, from 1936 to the beginning of the Hassan Events in July 1938, Japanese and Manchurian forces committed 231 border violations, in 35 cases they resulted in major military clashes. Of this number, in the period from the beginning of 1938 to the start of the fighting at Lake Khasan, 124 cases of border violations by land and 40 cases of aircraft intrusion into airspace were committed.
The Battles of Khalkhin Gol (Mongolian Khalkhin golyn dain, Japanese Nomon-khan jiken) an armed conflict that lasted from spring to autumn 1939 near the Khalkhin Gol River in Mongolia near the border with Manchuria (Manchukuo), between the USSR and Japan. The final battle took place in late August and ended with the complete defeat of the 6th Separate Army of Japan. The truce between the USSR and Japan was concluded on September 15. In foreign historiography, in particular in American and Japanese, the term “Khalkin Gol” is used only to name the river, and the military conflict itself is called the local “Incident at Nomon Khan”. "Nomon Khan" is the name of one of the mountains in this area of the Manchu-Mongolian border. Battles at Khalkhin Gol
Background to the conflict In 1932, the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops ended. The puppet state of Manchukuo was created in the occupied territory. The conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia (the old border ran a kilometer to the east). One of the reasons for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the Halun-Arshan Ganchzhur railway being built by the Japanese in this area. In 1935, clashes began on the Mongol-Manchurian border. In the summer of the same year, negotiations began between representatives of Mongolia and Manchukuo on border demarcation. By the fall, negotiations had reached a dead end. On March 12, 1936, the “Protocol on Mutual Assistance” was signed between the USSR and the MPR. Since 1937, in accordance with this protocol, units of the Red Army were deployed on the territory of Mongolia. In 1938, a two-week conflict had already occurred between Soviet and Japanese troops near Lake Khasan, which ended in victory for the USSR.
Results It is generally accepted that the USSR’s victory at Khalkhin Gol played a certain role in Japan’s non-aggression against the USSR. A remarkable fact is that when German troops stood near Moscow in December 1941, Hitler demanded [source not specified 119 days] Japan to attack the USSR in the Far East. It was the defeat at Khalkhin Gol, as many historians believe, that played a major role in the abandonment of plans to attack the USSR in favor of an attack on the United States. The fighting on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic coincided with negotiations between Japanese Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita (English)Russian. with the British Ambassador in Tokyo Robert Craigie. In July 1939, an agreement was concluded between England and Japan, according to which Great Britain recognized the Japanese seizures in China (thus providing diplomatic support for aggression against the Mongolian People's Republic and its ally the USSR). At the same time, the US government extended the previously canceled trade agreement with Japan for six months, and then completely restored it. As part of the agreement, Japan purchased trucks for the Kwantung Army, machine tools for aircraft factories for $3 million, strategic materials (including steel and iron scrap, gasoline and petroleum products), etc.
Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan is a Soviet-Japanese agreement on mutual neutrality, signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941, two years after the border conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River. The USSR was denounced on April 5, 1945. Signing of a neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan. The Neutrality Pact (Japanese, nisso chu: ritsu jo: yaku) was signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941. On the Soviet side, the treaty was signed by Molotov, and on the Japanese side by Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka (Japanese). Ratified on April 25, 1941. The treaty was concluded for 5 years from the date of ratification: from April 25, 1941 to April 25, 1946 and was automatically extended until the pact was accompanied by a communiqué and letters of exchange. Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan
Chronology of the conflict On April 13, 1941, a neutrality pact was concluded between the USSR and Japan. It was accompanied by an agreement on minor economic concessions on the part of Japan, which were ignored by it.[source not specified 498 days] November 25, 1941 Japan extended the Anti-Comintern Pact. December 1, 1943 Tehran Conference. The Allies are outlining the contours of the post-war structure of the Asia-Pacific region. February 1945 Yalta Conference. The allies agree on the post-war structure of the world, including the Asia-Pacific region. The USSR takes upon itself an unofficial commitment to enter the war with Japan no later than 3 months after the defeat of Germany. April 5, 1945 USSR denunciation of the neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan. May 15, 1945 Japan annuls all treaties and alliance with Germany due to its surrender. June 1945 Japan begins preparations to repel the landing on the Japanese Islands. On July 12, 1945, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow appeals to the USSR with a request for mediation in peace negotiations. On July 13, he was informed that an answer could not be given due to the departure of Stalin and Molotov to Potsdam. On July 26, 1945, at the Potsdam Conference, the United States formally formulated the terms of Japan's surrender. Japan refuses to accept them. August 6 US nuclear attack on Japan. On August 8, the USSR informed the Japanese ambassador of joining the Potsdam Declaration and declared war on Japan. On August 9, at dawn, the USSR began military operations in Manchuria. On the morning of August 9, the second US nuclear strike on Japan. On August 10, 1945, Japan officially declares its readiness to accept the Potsdam terms of surrender with the caveat regarding the preservation of the structure of imperial power in the country. On August 11, the United States rejects the Japanese amendment, insisting on the formula of the Potsdam Conference. On August 14, Japan officially accepts the terms of unconditional surrender and informs the allies about it. September 2, signing of the Japanese Surrender Act.
Thus, the Soviet-Japanese war had enormous political and military significance. So on August 9, at an emergency meeting of the Supreme Council for the Management of the War, Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki said: “The entry of the Soviet Union into the war this morning puts us completely in a hopeless situation and makes it impossible to continue the war further.” The Soviet Army defeated the strong Kwantung Army of Japan. The Soviet Union, having entered the war with the Japanese Empire and making a significant contribution to its defeat, accelerated the end of World War II. American leaders and historians have repeatedly stated that without the USSR's entry into the war, it would have continued for at least another year and would have cost an additional several million human lives. The commander-in-chief of the American armed forces in the Pacific, General MacArthur, believed that “Victory over Japan can be guaranteed only if the Japanese ground forces are defeated.” US Secretary of State E. Stettinius stated the following: On the eve of the Crimea Conference, the American chiefs of staff convinced Roosevelt, that Japan can capitulate only in 1947 or later, and its defeat could cost America a million soldiers. Dwight Eisenhower stated in his memoirs that he addressed President Truman: “I told him that since available information indicated the imminent collapse of Japan, I categorically objected to the entry of the Red Army into this war.” Results
The surrender of the Empire of Japan (Japanese, Nihon no kofuku) marked the end of World War II, in particular the Pacific War and the Soviet-Japanese War. On August 10, 1945, Japan officially announced its readiness to accept the Potsdam terms of surrender with the reservation regarding the preservation of the structure of imperial power in the country. On August 11, the United States rejected the Japanese amendment, insisting on the formula of the Potsdam Conference; As a result, on August 14, Japan officially accepted the terms of surrender and informed the allies about it. The formal surrender was signed on September 2, 1945 at 9:02 am Tokyo time on board the American battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. On behalf of Japan, the act of surrender was signed by Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu and Chief of the General Staff Yoshijiro Umezu. On behalf of the Allied Powers, the act was signed first by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General of the Army (USA) Douglas MacArthur, and then by other representatives, in particular, Admiral Chester Nimitz from the USA, Bruce Fraser from Great Britain, and Lieutenant General K. N. Derevyanko from the USSR.
As a result of the war, the USSR actually returned to its territory the territories lost by the Russian Empire in 1905 following the Peace of Portsmouth (southern Sakhalin and, temporarily, Kwantung with Port Arthur and Dalny), as well as the main group of the Kuril Islands previously ceded to Japan in 1875 and the southern part of the Kuril Islands assigned to Japan by the Treaty of Shimoda in 1855. Problems of post-war relations
San Francisco Peace Treaty The San Francisco Peace Treaty between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and Japan was signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951. The treaty officially ended World War II and established the procedure for paying reparations to the allies and compensation to countries affected by Japanese aggression. Representatives of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland who participated in the conference refused to sign it. The head of the Soviet delegation, A. A. Gromyko, emphasized that representatives of the PRC were not invited to the conference, and the text of the agreement did not stipulate China’s territorial rights to Taiwan, the Pescadores and Paracel Islands, as well as the sovereignty of the USSR over South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.
Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration The Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956 was signed on October 19, 1956 in Moscow, and entered into force on December 12, 1956. On January 19, 1960, Japan signed the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Guarantees” with the United States, according to which the Japanese authorities allowed the Americans to use military bases on their territory for the next 10 years and maintain ground, air and naval forces there. On January 27, 1960, the USSR government announced that since this agreement was directed against the USSR and the PRC, the Soviet government refused to consider the issue of transferring the islands to Japan, since this would lead to an expansion of the territory used by American troops.
The Problem of Ownership of the Southern Kuril Islands The Problem of Ownership of the Southern Kuril Islands (Japanese: Hoppo: ryo:do mondai?, “Problem of the Northern Territories”) is a territorial dispute between Japan and Russia, which has been unresolved since the end of World War II. After the war, all the Kuril Islands came under the administrative control of the USSR, but a number of the southern islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai group of islands are disputed by Japan. The problem of ownership of the southern Kuril Islands is the main obstacle to the complete settlement of Russian-Japanese relations and the signing of a peace treaty.
Political development of the Kuril issue After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation inherited Soviet-Japanese relations. As before, the main problem standing in the way of the full development of relations between both sides remains the dispute over the ownership of the Kuril Islands, which is preventing the signing of a peace treaty. The government of Boris Yeltsin, which came to power in 1991, continued to take a strong position regarding Russian sovereignty over all of the Kuril Islands and rejected their return to Japan. Despite some technical and financial assistance from Japan, a member of the G7, relations between the two countries remained at a low level. In September 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin postponed his planned visit to Japan and did not make it until October 1993. He did not make any new proposals, but confirmed Russia's readiness to follow the Soviet proposal of 1956 to transfer Shikotan Island and the Habomai group to Japan in exchange for signing a peace treaty. Yeltsin also apologized to Japan for the mistreatment of Japanese prisoners of war after the end of World War II. In March 1994, Japanese Foreign Minister Hata Tsutomu visited Moscow and met with his Russian counterpart Andrei Kozyrev.
On November 1, 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited the Kuril Islands, which caused sharp criticism from the Japanese government. Medvedev became the first Russian president to visit one of the Kuril Islands. Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan expressed dissatisfaction with Medvedev's visit. The head of the Japanese Cabinet Secretariat, Yoshito Sengoku, said that Japan will closely monitor the actions and comments of the Russian side in connection with this unwanted visit. He said it is important for Japan to know exactly what kind of comments are allowed by the Russian side, and then decide how to behave in this situation.
At the same time, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov sharply criticized the Japanese side's reaction to President Medvedev's visit, calling it unacceptable. Sergei Lavrov also emphasized that these islands are Russian territory. On November 2, Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara announced that the head of the Japanese mission in Russia would “temporarily” return to Tokyo to receive further information about the Russian president’s visit to the Kuril Islands. At the same time, the planned meeting between Dmitry Medvedev and Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, which was supposed to take place on November 13-14, was not cancelled. Also on November 2, information appeared that President Dmitry Medvedev would make a return visit to the Kuril Islands. When visiting Honolulu in November 2011, the Russian President, referring to Russian-Japanese relations, said that “Japan does not need to react so sharply to the visit of the Kuril Islands by the Russian authorities, they are visiting their territories.”
Joint economic projects 1) The Japanese companies Mitsui and Mitsubishi, together with Gazprom and the Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell, are participating in the Sakhalin-2 project, during which the Lunskoye and Piltun-Astokhskoye fields are being developed in the Sea of Okhotsk. 2) In May 2011, the Russian company Rosneft announced its intention to create two joint Japanese-Russian ventures. One of which will develop the Magadan-1, Magadan-2 and Magadan-3 areas on the shelf of the Sea of Okhotsk, and the second will conduct geological exploration in Eastern Siberia. 3) In June 2011, it became known that Russia was offering Japan to jointly develop oil and gas fields located in the Kuril Islands area.
Help from the Russian Federation On March 13 at 18:40, an Il-76 plane of the Ministry of Emergency Situations with 50 rescuers on board and equipment took off from the Ramenskoye airfield near Moscow. These are specialists from one of the best units of the ministry, the Centrospas detachment, and the operational group. In the near future, a Mi-26 helicopter from Khabarovsk will arrive in the city of Fukushima, which will deliver 25 rescuers from the Far Eastern regional search and rescue team. On March 14, the head of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, Sergei Shoigu, announced at a meeting of the operational headquarters that “the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations continues to build up its forces to provide assistance to Japan and expects to double the number of rescuers who will work in the disaster zone.” According to the Ministry of Emergency Situations, at 16:00 from the Ramenskoye airfield near Moscow, an Il-76 Ministry of Emergency Situations plane took off for Japan, carrying about 50 specialists from the Center for Special Risk Operations “Leader”, as well as special emergency rescue equipment. In addition, together with specialists from the Ministry of Emergency Situations, two experts from the Rosatom corporation flew on the same special flight. These two specialists flew to Japan to assist their Japanese colleagues and to ensure that Rosatom received continuous information about the situation at emergency units at the Japanese Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant. The plane will make an intermediate landing in Krasnoyarsk, where it will pick up 25 rescuers from the Siberian regional center of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. A group of Siberian rescuers is equipped with equipment and equipment for dismantling man-made debris, as well as for chemical and radiation reconnaissance. They are ready to operate autonomously for two weeks. Cooperation between Russia and Japan after the earthquake of March 11, 2011
Information Directorate of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation: “Thus, the total group of rescuers of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations in Japan will be about 180 people.” On March 16 at 00:00, a Russian Emergencies Ministry Il-76 plane with a cargo of humanitarian aid took off for Japan. On board there are 8,600 blankets weighing more than 17 tons. At 06:15, an An-74 plane of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations took off from Khabarovsk airport to Japan, which will deliver 25 rescuers from the Far Eastern regional search and rescue team to Tokyo. The group of Russian rescuers in Japan consists of 161 people. This is one of the largest foreign rescue teams currently assisting this country. The management of the Luzhniki Olympic complex made a donation to Japan in the amount of one million rubles. On March 15, the Russian Orthodox Church announced a collection of donations to help those affected by the natural disaster in Japan. The total amount of donations transferred to Japan as of April 7 amounted to 240 thousand 500 US dollars. The total amount of funds collected by the Church is more than 10 million rubles.
Conclusion After the appearance of a new state on the world stage - the Russian Federation - it could be assumed that its appearance in the eyes of the Japanese would not be as negative as its predecessor - the Soviet Union. However, this assumption turned out to be wrong. Instead of the communist USSR, democratic Russia came, but its image in Japan is significantly inferior to the image of the USSR in the late 80s and early 90s. With the appearance of Russia on the world stage, Japan not only had unresolved issues, but also new ones. It is necessary to develop relations between the two countries, for this it is necessary to convince the Russian and Japanese populations that this meets their national interests.
The Asia-Pacific region is undergoing great changes. Significant changes are also taking place in Russia itself. Russia is a great power spread over most of Asia, but in politics it still remains largely biased towards Europe. In my opinion, Russia needs to more actively develop relations with eastern countries, since Russia, in my opinion, is more of an eastern country than a western one. For Russia, peace in the Asia-Pacific region and the development of economic cooperation with Asian countries are a concept of equal importance to the Western direction of policy. The wind of new times is blowing in Asia. Only through the joint efforts of neighbors in the region, including Russia, can it be directed towards strengthening security and stability. The development of partnership between the two countries is extremely necessary. I consider building relations within the framework of cooperation a priority task for both countries and I hope that relations between Russia and Japan will be more dynamic in the future.
1. Molodyakov V. The image of Japan in Europe and Russia in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. M.: Tokyo Russian-Japanese diplomatic relations (years): Cat. doc.: (Based on materials from the Arch. foreign policy of the Russian Empire) / Comp. Chiharu Inaba. Tokyo.: Science, Ushakovsky S. A Brief History of Japan Slavinsky B.N. Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan: diplomatic history, Mr. Slavinsky B., “USSR and Japan on the road to war: diplomatic history,”. Japan today. M., Rodionov A. Russia Japan: problems of development of trade and economic cooperation in new conditions // Foreign trade Ivanova G. Russians in Japan XIX - early XX centuries: several portraits. M., Wikipedia. Free encyclopedia. 9. In the interests of genuine mutual understanding//Japan and Russia, Russian Far East: economic review./Ed. P. A. Minnakira. M.: Ekopros, List of used literature.
