The new German army consisted of contingents from 26 states: 4 kingdoms, 5 grand duchies, 12 principalities and duchies, 3 free cities and Alsace-Lorraine.
The armies of Saxony and Württemberg had their own military ministries, general staffs, inspectorates and other structures. Even the armies of the grand duchies of Hesse and Mecklenburg retained some autonomy, although they came under the auspices of Prussia.
The second largest military contingent for the army of a united Germany was provided by Bavaria. The three Bavarian army corps operated autonomously.

A large Bavarian general staff and the Ministry of War were located in Munich, with powerful inspectorates, officer academies and non-commissioned officer schools created on the Prussian model.
Officers of the Saxon and Bavarian armies were promoted on separate lists, while Prussian and Württemberg officers could replace each other.
In the period from 1880 to 1914. The brilliantly organized General Staff by Moltke managed to transform the motley army of the united Empire into an effective military machine, well trained and prepared for the conditions of modern war.

In August 1914, the mobilized German army had the following units:
5 regiments of Prussian Foot Guards.
5 regiments of Prussian Guards Grenadiers.
1st regiment of Prussian Guards Fusiliers.
12 line grenadier regiments.
170 infantry and fusilier line regiments.
24 Bavarian infantry regiments, incl. one life regiment.
18 Jaeger and rifle battalions, including the Prussian Guards rifle battalion.
2 Prussian Guards machine gun divisions.
9 linear machine gun divisions, incl. one Saxon and one Bavarian division.

15 fortress machine gun divisions.

Colonial infantry.

10 cuirassier regiments, incl. the Prussian Guards Regiment and the Prussian Gare du Cor regiment.
2 Saxon cavalry regiments, incl. one guards regiment.
2 Bavarian heavy cavalry regiments.
28 dragoon regiments, including two Prussian guard regiments.
8 Bavarian Chevoler regiments.
21st Hussar Regiment, incl. Prussian Life Guards Regiment, 2 Life Hussar Regiments, 3 Saxon Regiments.
26 Uhlan regiments, incl. 3 Prussian Guards regiments, 3 Saxon and 2 Bavarian regiments.
13 regiments of mounted rangers.
as well as artillery, sapper, reserve, aviation, communications, medical and veterinary units.
113 reserve infantry regiments.
96 Landwehr infantry regiments.
86 reserve infantry regiments.
21 Landwehr reserve battalions.

Before mobilization began in 1914, the size of the German army was 840,000 people. By the end of 1917, the number had increased to 6,000,000, excluding soldiers in reserve units.
Instead of 217 regular infantry regiments, 113 reserve regiments and 96 Landsturm regiments by 1918. The German army already included 698 regular regiments, 114 reserve regiments and 106 Landwehr regiments, not counting the Landsturm units of the 1st and 2nd echelon.

The cavalry units formed during the war operated on foot and were considered as infantry units. By November 1918, 24 reserve corps were added to the 25 army corps, including three Bavarian corps, as well as Landwehr, Landsturm and even naval corps. There were 218.5 divisions in all army corps. Of these, three remained in Germany.

The divisions were located on the following fronts:

Western Front - 187.5

Eastern Front - 20

Southern and Balkan Front - 8

Germany - 3

In August 1914, the various states of Germany were represented in the army in the following proportions:

Prussia and small states (Brunschweig, Baden, Oldenburg, Hesse, etc.) - 78%

Bayern - 11%

Saxony - 7%

Württemberg - 4%

Thanks to an efficient recruitment system, Germany was able to field a large and well-trained army in just a few days.
In peacetime, all German men between the ages of 17 and 45 were required to undergo military service. Those who reached the age of 17 were enlisted in the Landsturm (militia), and at the age of 20 they went into active service.
Active service lasted two years (three in the cavalry and artillery). After completing his service, the young man was enrolled in the reserve for 7 years. Then he served in the Landwehr for 11 years.

While in the reserve, a man could be called up for training camp twice a year. Thus, Germany had a sufficient number of trained soldiers.
During wartime, soldiers were drafted into the active army before reaching the age of 20, and were not subject to discharge upon reaching their 45th birthday.
There was also no provision for transfer from one category to another, for example, from Landwehr to Landsturm. A person could be declared unfit for military service only due to health reasons.

In 1913, the annual conscription rate was 305,000. In reality, there were significantly more people fit for service, despite the rather strict medical selection criteria. They, as well as those who were limitedly fit for service, were enrolled in the reserve reserve.
People were listed in the reserve reserve for 12 years, during which they could be called up for training camps three times a year. Later they were transferred to the Landsturm units of the 2nd echelon. In 1914, the reserve reserve consisted of a million people aged 20 to 32 years. These people staffed the reserve divisions.

The German command drew manpower for the army from two more sources. The first was the so-called Restanten Liste, which included men fit for service who did not serve due to deferment. If a person received a legal deferment three times, he was released from military service and enrolled in the category of untrained Landsturm.
The second source was Einjahrige Freiwilligen (one-year volunteers). Usually these were highly qualified specialists who purchased uniforms and equipment at their own expense and paid for their own food.

In the army, volunteers served in positions corresponding to their civilian professions. After a year of service, volunteers received the right to enter the reserve as a graduate officer.
After completing two training sessions in the reserve ranks and passing an exam, they became reserve officers. During wartime, young men aged 17 to 20 were given the right to enter active service until they reached conscription age. They were called wartime volunteers.

A country Subordination

War Ministry

Type Motto Participation in Commanders Notable commanders

The Imperial Army was formed in 1871 with the creation of the German Empire and existed until the defeat of the German Empire in the First World War. During the Weimar Republic from March 5, 1919 to December 31, 1920, the name of the German army was “Reichswehr” (German. Vorlaefige Reihswehr). Despite the return of the name "Reichsheer" in 1921, in German-language literature the name "Reichswehr" is widely used to designate the armed forces in the period from 1918 to 1935 (until the Nazis created the army of conquest "Wehrmacht" in 1935).

Story

The states that were part of the German Empire had their own armies. Within the German Confederation, formed after the Napoleonic Wars, each state was responsible for maintaining the combat readiness of certain military units to create confederate forces in case of conflict. This confederate army was called the Federal Army (German). Bundesheer). The federal army system came into its own during several conflicts in the 19th century, such as the First Schleswig War in 1850. But by the time of the Second War of Schleswig in 1864, tensions had emerged mainly between the confederation, the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia. The end of the German Confederation was marked by the Austro-Prussian War of 1866.

After this war, a victorious and enlarged Prussia formed a new confederation, the North German Confederation, which included the states of northern Germany. The agreement that formed the North German Confederation provided for the maintenance of the Federal Army and the Federal Navy (German). Bundesmarine or German Bundeskriegsmarine). Also during this time, laws on conscription were adopted. The agreements (some later amended) involved the North German Confederation and its member states of the alliance, which were subordinate to the Prussian army during the war, and recognized Prussian control over training, doctrine and weapons.

Shortly after the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, the North German Confederation also entered into agreements on military matters with states that were not members of the confederation: Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden. Based on these agreements and the Constitution of the German Empire of 1871, the Imperial Army (German) was created. Reichsheer). Contingents of Bavarian, Saxon and Württemberg formations remained semi-autonomous, while the Prussian army assumed almost complete control over the armies of other states of the empire.

However, after 1871, the peacetime armies of these four kingdoms remained relatively independent. The terms "German army" and "Imperial army" were used in various legal documents, such as the Military Criminal Code, but otherwise the Prussian, Bavarian, Saxon and Württemberg armies maintained distinct identities. Each kingdom had its own War Ministry, Bavaria and Saxony created their own rankings for their officers, and Württemberg had different division designations from the Prussian army lists. Württemberg and Saxon units were numbered according to the Prussian system, while Bavarian units maintained their own designation (thus the 2nd Württemberg Infantry Regiment was the 120th Infantry Regiment under the Prussian system).

Command

The commander-in-chief of the Reichsheer, and to a lesser extent the Bavarian contingent, was the Kaiser. He was assisted by a war cabinet, and control was exercised through the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. The Chief of the General Staff became the Emperor's chief military adviser and the most powerful military figure in Germany. Bavaria had its own War Ministry and its own general staff, but coordinated its plans for military operations with the Prussian general staff.

The command and control system of the Prussian army was significantly transformed following the defeats suffered by Prussia during the Napoleonic Wars. Rather than relying primarily on the military skills of individual members of the German nobility, who dominated the military profession, the Prussian army introduced a series of reforms to ensure excellence in leadership, organization, and planning at all levels of command. The system of the General Staff, an institution that sought to institutionalize the superiority of the armed forces, was the main result. The system sought to identify military talent at lower levels and develop it through academic training and practical experience, breaking the army into divisions, corps and higher levels of staff up to the General Staff, seriously redesigning the composition of the army. This ensured effective planning and organizational work during peacetime and wartime. The Prussian General Staff, having proven its worth in battles in the wars of the period of German unification, subsequently became the German General Staff after the formation of the German Empire, which took into account the leading role of Prussia in the imperial army.

Organizational structure

In peacetime, the organizational structure of the Imperial German Army was based around the Army Inspectorate (German: Army Inspectorate). Armee-Inspection), army corps (German) Armeekorps), division and regiment. During wartime, the Army Inspectorate staff formed army field commands that controlled corps and subordinate units. During the First World War, a military structure called the Army Group (German) was created for command at a higher level. Heeresgroup). Each army group consisted of several field armies.

Army Inspectorate

Germany, with the exception of Bavaria, was divided into army inspectorates (German. Armee-Inspection). In 1871 there were five, and three more were added between 1913 and 1913. The Bavarian War Ministry maintained its own army, which functioned as an inspectorate of the Bavarian Kingdom. Each inspectorate was the equivalent of an army region and administered several corps.

Housings

The main organizational formation was the army corps. A corps consisted of two or more divisions and various supporting troops, and was assigned to a specific geographic area. The corps was also responsible for maintaining reserves and forming the Landwehr in the territory assigned to the corps. By 1914, twenty-one army corps areas were under Prussian jurisdiction and a further three areas were controlled by Bavarian army corps. In addition to the regional corps, there was also the Guards Corps (German. Gardecorps), which was formed by the elite guards units of Prussia. In addition to the divisions, the corps included a light infantry battalion (German. Jäger), a field artillery battalion, an engineer battalion, a telegraph battalion and a railway battalion. Some corps areas also had fortress troops and aviation units.

During wartime, the army corps became a mobile operational-tactical formation. The corps area became the rear area for the corps, responsible for training and replenishment of troops and other duties. In addition to the regular army corps, reserve corps were formed during the mobilization of 1914, which became additional fighting corps as the First World War continued.

Divisions

The main tactical formation was the division. A standard Imperial German division consisted of two infantry brigades of two regiments each, a cavalry brigade of two regiments each, and an artillery brigade of two regiments. One of the divisions in the corps area was usually also formed from the Landwehr corps area (German: Landwehrbezirk). In 1914, in addition to the Guards Corps (two Guards divisions and a Guards Cavalry division), there were 42 regular divisions in the Prussian Army (including four Saxon divisions and two Württemberg divisions), as well as six divisions of the Bavarian Army.

These divisions were mobilized in August 1914. They were reorganized, receiving engineer units and other support units from the corps and eliminating most of their cavalry to form separate cavalry units. Reserve divisions were also mobilized, Landswehr brigades were organized into divisions, and other divisions were formed from replacement (Ersatz) units. As World War I continued for a long time, additional divisions were formed. By the end of the war, 251 divisions had been formed or reorganized in the German Army.

Shelves

The regiment was the main combat unit, as well as the basis for replenishing soldiers. When a recruit arrived in a regiment, his service usually began with the reserve battalion, where he received basic training. There were three main types of regiments: infantry, cavalry and artillery. Other military specializations, such as pioneers (combat engineers) and signal troops, were organized into smaller support units. The regiments also carried on the army's traditions, in many cases stretching back to the 17th and 18th centuries. After World War I, regimental traditions were promoted in the Reichswehr and its successor, the Wehrmacht, but the chain of tradition was broken in 1945 as West German and East German troops no longer maintained the old traditions.

see also

Links

• Yu. Veremeev Combat schedule of the German army in 1901 (Russian). - unique reference material. Archived from the original on March 22, 2012. Retrieved March 25, 2010.

German armies since the year
Reichsheer Imperial Army	Reichswehr Imperial Defense	Wehrmacht Armed forces

Organization of the German Army 1888-1914.
(Deutschen Heeres)

By 1871, four German kingdoms, eighteen duchies and principalities, and three free cities were united into a single union state, called the German Empire (Deutsche Reich), also known historically as the Second Reich.
This state included:

*Kingdom of Prussia (Koenigreich Preussen);
*Kingdom of Saxony (Koenigreich Sachsen);
*Kingdom of Bavaria (Koenigreich Bayern);
*Kingdom of Württemberg (Koenigreich Wuerttemberg);

*Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin (Grossherzogtum Meklenburg-Schwerin);
*Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Strelitz (Grossherzogtum Meklenburg-Strelitz);
*Grand Duchy of Oldenburg (Grossherzogtum Oldenburg);
*Grand Duchy of Saxony-Weimar (Grossherzogtum Sachsen-Weimar);
*Grand Duchy of Baden (Grossherzogtum Baden);
*Grand Duchy of Hesse (Grossherzogtum Hessen);

*Duchy of Braunschweig (Herzogtum Braunschweig);
*Duchy of Anhalt (Herzogtum Anhalt);
*Duchy of Saxony-Meiningen (Herzogtum Sachsen-Meiningen);
*Duchy of Saxony-Coburg-Gotha (Sachsen-Koburg-Gotha);
*Duchy of Saxony-Altenburg (Herzogtum Sachsen-Altenburg);

*Principality of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen (Fuerstentum Schwarzburg-Sondershausen);
*Principality of Reuss aeltere line (Fuerstentum Reuss aeltere Linie);
*Principality of Reuss jungere Line;
*Principality of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt (Fuerstentum Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt);
*Principality of Lippe (Fuerstentum Lippe);
*Principality of Schaumburg-Lippe (Fuerstentum Schaumburg-Lippe);
*Principality of Waldeck (Fuerstentum Waldeck);

*Free Imperial City of Bremen (Freie Reichsstadt Bremen);
*Free Imperial City of Hamburg (Freie Reichsstadt Hamburg);
*Free Imperial City of Lubeck (Freie Reichsstadt Luebeck).

From the author. Actually, the process of unification of these states was not overnight. Another Agreement of February 7, 1867 united the kingdoms of Prussia and Saxony, which formed the North German Union (Norddeutschen Bunde). On November 23, 1870, Bavaria joined this union, and on November 21-25, Württemberg. Further, other above-mentioned states join the Union. The process in general was completed with the adoption of the State Constitution on April 16, 1871. This date should be considered the day of the formation of the German Empire (Deutsche Reich). More precisely - the German state.

Actually, this is how it is usually translated into Russian - empire. The word “Reich” itself in German is used, firstly, in the concept of “state” (at least at the end of the 19th century), and secondly, as the end of a compound word meaning a type of state. Something like "..stvo". For example, "Koenig reich" - Korolev quality. More precisely, “the state of the king.” And to be precise, the term “empire” is written in German Kaise rreich. Kaiser is the emperor, ...reich is the state. Together - the "state of the emperor" or empire.
At the same time, according to the Constitution, the head of the German state was the King of Prussia, who received the title of German Emperor (Deutscher Kaiser).

Unlike the Emperor of Russia, the Kaiser's rights were limited. In particular, the army was not a single military organization. It was rather a military alliance of the armies of the allied German states. The Kaiser had the right to declare war on behalf of the state only with the consent of the Federal Council (Bundesrat), which included the heads of all states included in the federation.

The process of uniting the armies of the united states into an all-German army was also not overnight. The uniting states entered into special agreements regarding their armed forces. This process ended with the Imperial Army Regulations (Reichsmilitargesetz) of May 2, 1874.

Each of these states had its own armed formations, which were part of the allied all-German army. It goes without saying that the number of military units of each state depended on its size and population. So, if Prussia gave 18 corps (out of 25), Bavaria three corps, Saxony two, Baden and Württemberg one each, then Mecklenburg-Strelitz only 1 battalion.

All this left a certain imprint on the structure of the German army and the numbering of its formations and units.

Note. The Kingdom of Prussia in the past annexed the once independent German states, which in the period under review were called “provinces”. Such provinces in the kingdom were East Prussia (until the first quarter of the 16th century, the region of the Teutonic Order, and then the Duchy of Prussia), West Prussia, Pomerania, Posen (formerly part of Poland), Neumark, Brandenburg, Thuringia, Magdeburg, Hanover, Silesia, Westphalia, Rhineland , Schleswig-Holstein, Alsace-Lorraine, Saarland and a number of other smaller ones.
Therefore, the regiments of the Kingdom of Prussia in their names reflect their affiliation with these provinces.

The regiments were officially designated as follows:
-regiment type, chief’s name, number according to a single continuous numbering. For example, "Infantry Regiment of Count Schwerin No. 14".

However, in reality, a certain confusion and inconsistency reigned in the names of the regiments, associated with the ambitions of the sovereigns and the reluctance to abandon the traditional names of the regiments.
A number of regiments were formed back in the 17th-18th centuries and sovereigns, regimental commanders, and regimental officers sought to preserve the ancient traditional names of their units. Yet this is a powerful educational tool - traditions. Respect for older generations leads to the development of a sense of personal responsibility for one’s country and one’s army.
The only thing everyone agreed on, based on the need to accurately designate a specific regiment, was a single numbering for all regiments of the German army ("....No. 122.). All infantry regiments had one line of numbers, cavalry regiments had another, artillery, sapper, transport yours.
Also, the type of regiment was more or less definitely indicated. Although all infantry regiments were essentially infantry, the following names were still retained - infantry, grenadier, fusilier, and occasionally rifle, and in the guard there were regiments of the foot guard, guards grenadier, and guards fusilier. Light infantry units were called jäger units.
In the cavalry, the main types of regiments were cuirassiers, dragoons, hussars, uhlans, and horse-jaegers. There was one regiment called the Reitar regiment, one carabinieri regiment and several regiments called the Chevalger regiments.
In artillery, regiments were usually called either field artillery regiments or foot artillery regiments. The first are regiments that were part of divisions, the second are part of corps. Naturally, the calibers of the latter’s guns are much larger.

Below is an example of the designation of an infantry regiment - Infantry Regiment of Emperor Frederick the King of Prussia (7th Württemberg) No. 125 (Infanterie-Regiment Kaiser Friedrich Koenig von Preussen (7.wuerttembergisches) No. 125)
Here we see that the 125th Infantry Regiment has the chief of the German Emperor Frederick, who is also the King of Prussia. In parentheses is indicated its name (not completely), which it had in the army of Württemberg before the kingdom entered the German Empire.

Here is an example of the designation of field artillery regiments of the 27th (2nd Württemberg) Field Artillery Brigade. Although these two regiments are completely from the same state, they are part of the same Württemberg contingent, and moreover, they are in the same brigade, but:

*King Charles Field Artillery Regiment (1st Württemberg) No. 13 (Feldartillerie-Regiment Koenig Karl (1.wuerttembergisches) Nr.13).

*3rd Württemberg Field Artillery Regiment No. 49 (3.Wuertemberisches Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr.49).

I give the names of the regiments as indicated in German sources. Such discrepancy in designations can only be explained by tradition. No logic is visible here, although attempts are felt to bring the names into a coherent system.

Bavaria stands apart, which, in its struggle for the remnants of sovereignty, completely retained the numbering of both its three corps and the regiments included in these corps. That is. the Bavarian regiments did not have all-German numbering.

This was partly due to the fact that the soldiers took the oath not to the Emperor of Germany, but to their sovereign (king, duke or prince) and it was necessary to know which state formations a particular regiment belonged to, and from which places it was replenished with personnel. Partly, so that citizens know the regiments of their state and thereby feel themselves, first of all, subjects of their sovereign, and secondly, subjects of the Emperor of Germany. And the soldiers had to see that they served not only the Emperor of Germany, but also their king.

The largest kingdoms of the empire, which retained their independence to a certain extent, were Prussia, Saxony, Württemberg and Bavaria. Moreover, Prussia was, so to speak, a state-forming center. King Wilhelm II of Prussia was also Emperor (Kaiser) of the German Federal State. Prussia sought greater centralization of the army, while Saxony and Bavaria defended their right to the remnants of sovereignty, at least in army matters. Bayern succeeded to a greater extent. So, if the regiments of other kingdoms, duchies and principalities received a single all-German regimental numbering, then Bavaria still retained its numbering of army corps and regiments.
The remaining German states found themselves in a much more dependent position. All their regiments were included in the so-called “non-Prussian contingent” of the Prussian corps.
The struggle of interests led to a rather anecdotal situation. So, if soldiers swore allegiance to their sovereigns (kings, dukes, princes) and only at the end of the oath swore to carry out the orders of the Emperor of Germany during the war, then officers, on the contrary, took an oath to the Emperor of Germany, and only solemnly promised conscientious service to their sovereign. The assignment of titles, appointments to positions, promotions - all this was the prerogative of the emperor.

On the other hand, the kingdoms of Prussia, Bavaria and Saxony each had their own ministry of war. Those. There were three military ministries in Germany.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the German Army (Oberbehelfshaber) was the Emperor of Germany and the King of Pussia (Deutscher Kaiser ung Koenig von Preussen), who in the period under review was Wilhelm II.

To manage military affairs, he had a Military and Marine Cabinet (Militaer- und Marine-Kabinet).

The executive body that was responsible for implementing the instructions emanating from the Military Cabinet and managing the daily life of the army was the War Ministry (Kriegsministerium). As mentioned above, in Germany there were three military ministries - in Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria. Each of them implemented the decisions of the Prussian military cabinet in their subordinate troops.

The management of military operations, combat training of troops, development of strategy and tactics of troops was carried out by the Great General Staff (grosse Generalstabe), located in Berlin. This headquarters can be considered a supranational organization, in other words, a federal military authority. Simply put, if in all other issues of everyday army life there could be disagreements among the states of the German Empire and something could not be done according to uniform rules and standards, then the orders of the General Staff, especially during the war, were carried out strictly, unquestioningly and according to uniform operational principles. tactical norms and rules.

The large General Staff led the corps that decided the success of battles at the strategic operational level

In peacetime, the highest operational unit of the German army was the army corps (Armeekorps). The numbering of the corps was continuous, uniform throughout the army, with the exception of the Bavarian corps. The numbers were indicated by Roman numerals. There were 25 corps in total. Of these, 1 was guards and 24 were army.

It should also be noted that in Germany at that time the corps were approximately the same as military districts in the Soviet Union and now in Russia, i.e. territorial commands.
All of Germany in military-administrative terms was divided into corps areas (Armeekorpsbezirke), which were numbered in the same way as the corps located in them. The boundaries of the corps districts coincided with the boundaries of the corresponding kingdoms and duchies. principalities At the same time, the territory of Prussia was divided into 18 corps regions, Bavaria into three, Saxony into two. Baden and Württemberg one each. Smaller states, whose regiments were simply part of the Prussian corps, were accordingly included in the corresponding corps areas,
In the corps area there were corps administrations and units assigned to them. In addition, in the corps areas there were district commands (Bezirk-Kommandos), which performed the same role as our military registration and enlistment offices. These commands were engaged in supplying recruits (recruits) to their corps.
In addition, in the corps districts there were landwehr districts (Landwehr-Bezirk), the number of which was determined by the local administrative division. The head of the landwehr district was the head of this administrative entity (village, town, city, urban district). In military terms, he was responsible for keeping records of those who were members of the Landwehr. This is described in more detail in articles about military service in Germany in 1901.

Prussia formed corps:

Guards Corps (Garde-Korps)	I Army Corps (I.Armeekorps)	II Army Corps (II.Armeekorps)
III Army Corps (III.Armeekorps)	IV Army Corps (IV.Armeekorps)	V Army Corps (V.Armeekorps)
VI Army Corps (VI.Armeekorps)	VII Army Corps (VII.Armeekorps)	VIII Army Corps (VIII.Armeekorps)
IX Army Corps (IX.Armeekorps)	X Army Corps (X.Armeekorps)	XI Army Corps (XI.Armeekorps)
XV Army Corps (XV.Armeekorps)	XVI Army Corps (XVI.Armeekorps)	XVII Army Corps (XVII.Armeekorps)
XVIII Army Corps (XVII.Armeekorps)	XX Army Corps (XX.Armeekorps)	XXI Army Corps (XXI.Armeekorps)

Saxony formed corps:

Württemberg formed the corps:

The military contingents of the states, which were small in number and could not form a corps, were collected for the most part in the Prussian IX Corps.

To manage and supervise the corps in peacetime, the large General Staff created five Army Inspections (Armee-Inspektion):
*Berlin Inspectorate - I, II, IX, X and XVII Corps,
*Dresden Inspectorate - V, VI, XII, XIX Corps,
*Hannoverian Inspection - VII, VIII, XI, XIII Corps.
*Munich Inspectorate - III, IV Corps and I, II and III Bavarian Army Corps,
*Karlsrues Inspectorate - XIV, XV, XVI corps.

The Guards Corps remained outside the Inspections. It was controlled by the Emperor's War Cabinet.

By 1914, the army corps organizationally consisted of the main command of the corps, two divisions and separate units of corps subordination, which included:
*Jaeger battalion,
*Division or regiment of foot artillery,
Telegraph Battalion
*Engineering battalion,
*Transport battalion,
*Aviation or aeronautical detachment,
*Several ammunition supply columns.

Most of the corps had an incomplete set of units subordinate to the corps. More often, only sapper and transport battalions had corps. There were only two telegraph battalions and they were distributed in companies across several corps. There were only a few corps regiments or foot artillery divisions. The author does not have exact information regarding corps air detachments or aeronautical detachments. However, according to indirect information, there were only a few air squads at the time the war began.

Of course, there were deviations in the composition of the corps. Especially in the Guards Corps. But in general, this pattern persisted. The corps consisted of about 41 thousand soldiers and officers and 14 thousand horses.

The main command of the corps (General-Kommandos des Korps) included the corps commander, who in German terminology was called the “commanding general” (kommandierenden General) and the main corps headquarters (General-Stabs des Korps), which in turn included the chief headquarters (Chef des Stabes), two officers of the General Staff (Generalstabsoffiziere), several adjutants, several officers for assignments and support staff (scribes, draftsmen, accountants, etc.).

The division was considered the main tactical unit, capable of fighting independently, since it included all three main types of troops - infantry, cavalry and artillery. Therefore, in the German army, divisions were not divided into infantry, rifle and cavalry, as was the case in Russia. The only cavalry division the Germans had was in the Guards Corps, and even then it was more likely not a combat unit, but an administrative unit. This is noticeable from the fact that this division had exactly four cavalry brigades of two regiments each. Those. two brigades for each guards infantry division.

By 1914, the division consisted of two infantry brigades (in one of the divisions there could be three brigades), one or two cavalry brigades, two or three field artillery regiments of two, sometimes three divisions in each (and in one of the regiments one division could be a howitzer or horse artillery battalion). The division had approximately 15 thousand personnel.

The division was controlled by the division commander (Divisions-Kommandeur), who had his own administrative body, which, however, did not bear the name “headquarters”. In addition to the division commander, the division's management included an officer of the General Staff, an adjutant and support staff (scribes, draftsmen, accountants, etc.). In addition, the division's management included the quartermaster (rear service), the chief divisional doctor, several military justice officials, and two priests (Catholic and Lutheran).

From the author. It is necessary to clarify the term “General Staff officer”. In the division, his main duties were those performed by the chief of staff in our army, i.e. development of combat action plans and combat orders based on the ideas and decisions of the division commander, monitoring the execution of combat orders, recording losses, submitting reports to higher headquarters.
However, in the German army there has always been a clear division between military officers and General Staff officers. If the former served in command positions all the time (starting with platoon commander and ending with corps commander), then the latter were representatives of the Great General Staff in the troops, its eyes and ears. They were initially trained as staff service specialists and were used in this capacity. Those. The staff officers were, on the one hand, subordinates of their commanders, and on the other, like controlling representatives of the higher headquarters. It was believed that this duality would always ensure the timeliness, reliability and truthfulness of the information that would be received by the high command.

I don’t know how it was in the First World War, but in the Second, this system did not at all prevent the General Staff from reporting to the Fuhrer (especially in 41-42) completely fake, infinitely inflated information about super-grand victories over the Red Army, about the huge number of prisoners and captured weapons, defeated and completely destroyed "red divisions".
Hitler, without any doubt about the veracity of the information received by the General Staff, set more and more ambitious tasks for his troops. His analytical apparatus, based on these same fake reports, drew conclusions that were completely inconsistent with the real state of affairs. The cost of this lie was tragic for the Wehrmacht.
Thus, by the beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow in December 1941, German military analysts reported to Hitler that the Russians no longer had divisions and Stalin simply had nothing and no one to create new ones from, that “there were five minutes left before the fall of Moscow.” German intelligence partially knew or guessed that Soviet strategic reserves were accumulating outside Moscow, but no one dared to report to Hitler that the Russian divisions had more than the number of the population fit for service (as it turned out, if one relied on fake reports).
Extricating themselves from a delicate situation after the defeat at the walls of Moscow, the German General Staff first came up with mythical Siberian divisions, and later (by the time of the encirclement at Stalingrad) they used the myth of Stalin’s generally incalculable human reserves.

Here is a specific example of the fakeness of the reports of the German General Staff. The 6th Cavalry Division of the 6th Cavalry Corps of the 10th Army of the Western Military District began fighting on June 22, 1941 in the city of Lomza in the westernmost part of the famous Bialystok bulge. The first time the 6th Cavalry Division, together with the corps and the army, was “destroyed” in the cauldron near Bialystok on June 28, the second time in the Minsk cauldron, and the third time as part of the “destroyed” back in the Bialystok cauldron, the 10th Army was “destroyed” surrounded by Vyazma. In total, from one cavalry division, which, by the way, fought right up to May 9, 1945, according to German reports, there were three. Those. I had to not be born three times, because my father fought in this division from the first day of the war, who ended the war in May 1945 on the Frisch-Nerung spit as part of the 11th Guards Division.

As you know, the more incredible myths are, the more tenacious they are. This myth is now being exploited with might and main by modern Russian democratic historians in their irrepressible desire to convince everyone that Stalin was a monster who shed Russian blood in rivers, tormenting the people in the name of his cannibalistic ideals, that the victory of the Red Army over Nazism was achieved solely through the merciless sending into battle Red Army soldiers in droves. And in general, they say, our whole Victory is somehow wrong and clumsy. A victory which, they say, one cannot be proud of, but which one should be ashamed of.

In reality everything was completely different. We had neither Siberian divisions that came out of thin air, nor numerical superiority (especially after only 40 to 50 million of the population remained in the occupied territories). There really was a Patriotic War, in which every citizen of the country gave all his strength to the altar of the Fatherland. There was a planned economy, which was able to make the best use of all material resources. The German people and the German economy were incapable of this.
There was indeed an excellently organized Red Army, equipped with modern weapons and trained, which, having gotten rid of our inherent sloppiness, laxity, negligence and complacency, began to win victories one after another all the way to Berlin.
British generals who visited the front in July-August 1941 came to the conclusion that the Red Army was excellently organized and fought well. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill spoke about this in his radio speech on August 24, 1941.
This is not the best time for such conclusions, but if even the British, who are not inclined to praise anyone but themselves, already saw then, in those difficult days for us, the basis for future victories, then all other statements are simply insinuations.

In order to simplify the management of the division and bring all units of one type of troops under a single command, the division was divided into two or three infantry brigades, a cavalry brigade and an artillery brigade. Each brigade included two or three regiments of the corresponding type of troops.
The brigade commander did not have his own headquarters as an operational body. He had only an adjutant and a few clerks with him.

From the author. Sometimes readers ask questions regarding the hierarchy of division of military formations into squads, platoons, companies, battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, armies. It seems to some that the “excessive” links in this chain exist only in order to “have the opportunity to create more general positions.” After all, let’s say, “The Sverdlovsk region is divided into about 60 districts and nothing, the governor can cope quite well. There are no super-districts, super-super-districts, super-super-districts.”

However, civil administrative management of territories and combat management of military formations are very different management systems. Centuries-old military management experience has proven that any commander is able to effectively control and promptly manage no more than two or three subordinates, who also have another three subordinates under their command. The formula 3-3-3... was developed by the Tatar-Mongols during the time of Genghis Khan. It was on this principle that his Horde was organized, and ultimately, centuries later, all the armies of the world came to it.
Three squads make up a platoon, three platoons a company, three companies a battalion, three battalions a regiment, three regiments a division... Of course, there are deviations from this system, but in general it is observed everywhere. Numerous attempts to create effective management systems based on other principles inevitably failed.
So the top military leadership of Germany came to the conclusion that it was impossible for a division commander to effectively control eight to twelve regiments at once (four infantry, two to four cavalry and two to four artillery). That is why an intermediate authority was introduced - brigades. The division has two infantry brigades and one cavalry brigade. Artillery regiments are assigned to brigades. Again we see the classic system - the division commander controls three brigade commanders. And each of them has its own two or three regiments.

The main permanent administrative and combat unit in the German army was the regiment. Larger formations (divisions, corps) in all cases were a combination of a certain number of regiments of the three main branches of the military (infantry, cavalry and artillery) with the addition of regiments, battalions and other combat support and logistics units.
By 1914, there were about 217 infantry regiments in the German army alone.
Each German state fielded a certain number of regiments. Large state formations (Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Baden and Württemberg) could consist of one to several corps from their regiments. The regiments of all other states of the German Empire were included in the corps belonging to Prussia.

In order to make it easier for the reader to understand this entire complex system of regiments, the author took the trouble to describe which regiments this or that state fielded. Here, for simplicity, I do not give the full names of the regiments. Yes, this is not necessary, because... in the German army there was a single continuous numbering of regiments, regardless of whether the regiment belonged to one or another state of the German Union.
The full names of all regiments will be given in the article on the combat schedule of the German army.

Prussia:
*1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th regiments of foot guards.
*Guards Grenadier Regiments Nos. 1,2,3, 4 and 5.
*Guards Fusilier Regiment.
*Guards Jaeger Battalion.
*Guards Rifle Battalion
*Training infantry battalion.
*Infantry regiments No. 13-32, 41-72, 74, 77-79, 81-85, 87,88, 97-99, 128-132, 135-138, 140,141, 142-152, 154-161, 163 -167, 171-176.
*Grenadier regiments No. 1-12.
*Fusilier regiments Nos. 33-40, 73, 80, 86.
*Jäger battalions No. 1-11.
* 3rd Battalion of Infantry Regiment No. 75, 3rd Battalion of Infantry Regiment No. 78, 1st Battalion of Infantry Regiment No. 96, 3rd Battalion of Infantry Regiment No. 153.
*Personal security regiment (cavalry).
*Guards Cuirassier Regiment.
*Guards Dragoon Regiments No. 1-2
*Guards Uhlan regiments No. 1-3
*Guards Hussar Regiment.
*Cirassier regiments No. 1-8.
*Dragoon regiments No. 1-16.
*Hussar regiments No. 1-16
*Uhlan regiments No. 1-16.
*Guards field artillery regiments No. 1-4.
*Field artillery regiments Nos. 1-11, 15-24, 26, 27, 31, 33-47, 51-59, 62, 63, 67, 69-75.
*Guards Foot Artillery Regiment.
*Foot artillery regiments No. 1-11, 15.
*Foot artillery division.
*Guards Engineer Battalion.
*Engineering battalions No. 1-11, 15-2.
*Guards Transport Battalion.
*Transport battalions No. 1-11, 15-17.
*Railway shelves No. 1-3.
*Telegraph battalions No. 1-3.
*Aeronautical detachment.
*Department of the railway brigade enterprise.
*Three training battalions of the field artillery school.
*Training battalion of the foot artillery school.
*Eight squadrons of mounted rangers.

From the author. It is difficult for today's man to discern the difference between grenadier, infantry, rifle and fusilier regiments. In fact, by the beginning of the 20th century, these were all infantry regiments of the same organization, weapons and tactics of use. The difference in names is simply tradition. The difference between infantry and grenadier regiments in the distant past (XVII-XVIII centuries) was that the grenadier regiments recruited especially physically strong soldiers who could throw primitive hand grenades far. Naturally, in hand-to-hand combat they were superior to ordinary infantry. At the same time, grenadiers were usually not strong in rifle fire. To correct this shortcoming, battalions of riflemen (fusiliers) were added to the grenadier regiments. Based on some considerations, these fusile battalions were separated from the grenadier regiments and combined into fusilier regiments. In parallel with such fusilier battalions and regiments, there were also rifle regiments, which were initially created specifically for rapid marksmanship. This is how this confusion was created. However, the situation was similar in the cavalry. Light cavalry was usually divided into hussars, lancers, and mounted rangers, and in Russia also into Cossacks, although the combat purpose, tactics and weapons were generally identical.

Bavaria(the numbering of the regiments is their own, the regiments do not have a consistent, uniform all-German numbering):
*1st Life Infantry Regiment,
*1st - 23rd infantry regiments.
*Jäger battalions No. 1-2.
*Heavy Reitar regiments No. 1-2
*Uhlan regiments No. 1-2.
*Chevalier regiments No. 1-6.
*Field artillery regiments No. 1-8.
*Foot artillery regiments No. 1-2.
*Foot artillery detachment.
*Engineering battalions No. 1-3.
*Railway battalion.
*Aeronautical detachment
*Transport battalion (3 companies).
*Two squadrons of horse rangers.

From the author. Somewhat anecdotally, but politically the king of Bavaria could emphasize that he was more of an ally of the Kaiser than his vassal. Quite a striking example of the predominance of politics over military expediency.

Saxony:
*Grenadier regiments No. 100 and No. 101,
*Infantry regiments No. 102-107, 133, 134, 139, 179, 181, 182,
*Rifle (aka Fusilier) Regiment No. 108.
*Jäger battalions No. 12 and 13.
*Guards Reitar Regiment.
*Carabinieri regiment (cavalry).
*Uhlan regiments No. 17-18.
*Hussar regiments No. 18-19.
*Field artillery regiments No. 12. 28, 32, 48, 68, 77.
*Foot artillery regiment No. 12
*Engineering battalions No. 12 and 21.
*Transport battalions No. 12 and 19
*Squadron of horse rangers.

Württemberg:
*Grenadier regiments No. 119 and No. 123,
*Infantry regiments No. 120-121, 124-127, 180,
*Fusilier Regiment No. 122.
*Uhlan regiments No. 19 and 20.
*Dragoon regiments No. 25 and 26.
*Field artillery regiments No. 13, 29, 40, 65.
*Engineering battalion No. 13.
*Transport battalion No. 13

Mecklenburg-Schwerin:
* 1st and 3rd battalions of the Grenadier Regiment No. 89,
*Fusilier Regiment No. 90.

Mecklenburg-Strelitz:
*2nd Battalion of Grenadier Regiment No. 89.

Oldenburg:
*Infantry Regiment No. 91.

Saxony-Weimar:
*Infantry Regiment No. 94

Baden:
*Grenadier regiments No. 109 and No. 110,
*Infantry regiments No. 111-114, 142, 169, 170.

Hesse:
*25th Division (infantry regiments Nos. 115-118, 168).

Brunswick:
*Infantry Regiment No. 92.

Anhalt:
*Infantry Regiment No. 93.

Saxony-Meiningen or Saxony-Coburg:
*Infantry Regiment No. 95.

Saxony-Altenburg:
*1st and 2nd battalions of infantry regiment No. 153.

Schwarzburg-Sondershausen:
*1st battalion of infantry regiment No. 71.

Rice Eltere und Unöre Ligneux:
*1st and 2nd battalions of infantry regiment No. 96.

Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt:
* 3rd Battalion Infantry Regiment No. 96.

Lippe:
*3rd battalion of infantry regiment No. 55.

Waldeck-Pumont:
*3rd battalion of infantry regiment No. 83.

Bremen:
*1st and 2nd battalions of infantry regiment No. 75.

Hamburg:
*Infantry Regiment No. 76.

Lubeck:
*Infantry Regiment No. 162.

The regiments of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck were consolidated into the 17th division of the Prussian IX Army Corps. In this division only one regiment was Prussian. The Oldenburg regiment (No.91) was included in the 19th division of the Prussian X Army Corps, and the Brunswick regiment (No.92) in the 20th division of the same corps. The regiments of the Grand Duchy of Hesse formed the 25th Division of the Prussian XVIII Army Corps.

As a rule, the regiment consisted of 3 battalions of 4 companies per battalion. Some regiments had not three battalions, but two. However, by 1913 this weakness was eliminated and thus almost all three-battalion regiments had a strength of 2364 people. (officers and lower ranks).
The regiment consisted of 5 staff officers, 12 chief officers of company commanders, 52 chief officers of assistant company commanders, 12 feldwebels, vicefeldwebels and fenrichs (officer candidates), 61 sergeants, 115 non-commissioned officers, 12 sanitary non-commissioned officers or gefreiters, 45 musicians, 24 conscripts, 144 gefreiters and 1524 soldiers. A total of 69 officers, 1977 lower ranks, 6 military doctors and 6 military officials.

In the grenadier regiments, according to tradition, the third battalion was called not the grenadier, but the fusilier, although there was no difference in staff and purpose with the grenadier or infantry (in infantry regiments) battalions.

The regiment was commanded by an officer with the rank of Oberst or Oberstleutnant. He had a small administrative apparatus, consisting of an adjutant, several staff officers (majors) and support staff (scribes, draftsmen, accountants, etc.).

Medical support was provided by a fairly significant medical staff, headed by an Oberstabsartz (medical rank equal to major). Issues of clothing, food and other types of material supplies were dealt with by regimental military officials.

From the author. Previously, in other articles, I wrote about the so-called “major’s dead end.” Those. the vast majority of officers never rose in rank above major, since a lieutenant colonel (oberstleutant) could only be obtained while serving as a regiment commander and very rarely as a battalion commander (usually at the time of retirement). And usually, having reached the rank of oberst (colonel), the officer left to command a brigade, since the position of brigade commander was a colonel’s. Those. There were only 217 lieutenant colonel positions in the German army (not counting those in higher headquarters, which were also very small in number).
And all non-combatant positions in the army were occupied not by officers, but by military officials. Leaving a combat position, a German officer could not find a job in a business position, even after leaving the army, which cannot be said about Russian officers.
Kaiser Wilhelm did not throw around military ranks like the Russian emperor. In the Russian Army of that period, the regiment commander could receive the rank of general, and the brigade commander was required to be a general. Moreover, even a battalion commander could receive the rank of general in the guard. Even in regular infantry, battalions were commanded by lieutenant colonels. The regiment commander's assistants were also lieutenant colonels (and there were two or three of them in the regiment). The Russian rank of captain corresponded to the German rank of major. But the captain could command a Russian infantry company, but only a Hauptmann (equal to a Russian staff captain) could command a German infantry company.

It is possible that here lies the very high authority and skill of German officers of both world wars. Everyone believed (and this was true) that a man with officer’s shoulder straps could not help but be an excellent specialist in military affairs.

The battalion commanders were majors. The battalion consisted of 4 companies. The battalion was commanded by a major, who had a small headquarters with him. Hauptmann was at the head of the staff. In addition to him, the battalion headquarters included a battalion adjutant (leutnant), a battalion doctor, a soldier-scribe and military officials - the treasurer and junior treasurer. In addition, there was a sub-staff, which included a non-commissioned officer storekeeper, a gunsmith, and a battalion drum major (musician).

The company was considered the smallest tactical unit capable of fighting independently. The company in peacetime numbered from 160 to 180 people. In wartime, its number increased to 260 people. At the head of the company was Hauptmann. However, we can say that he reigned, but did not rule. He was responsible for the combat readiness of the company and for the level of training of the company as a whole. The company sergeant-major was in charge of all matters relating to the organization and performance of internal service, the placement of personnel, the state of clothing and weapons, and food for the soldiers. The company commander did not interfere in his activities.

Figuratively speaking, the sergeant major was responsible for ensuring that the company was like a tuned violin, on which Hauptmann could play the music that the higher command ordered him. The main thing is that the company commander skillfully commands the company in battle and leads it to victory. The rest of the company's life does not concern him. For this, he has a sergeant major and the rest of the non-commissioned officers.

Figuratively speaking, the sergeant major creates the tool that Hauptmann uses in battle.

The company was economically divided into corporals of 12 to 20 people. At the head of each corporal was the chief of the corporal of non-commissioned officer rank (non-commissioned officer or sergeant).
At the same time, the company was divided into three platoons in terms of training and service. Each platoon was divided into two half-platoons. The half-platoon was divided into sections, and each section into two teams.
The platoons were commanded by officers with the rank of Leutnant or Oberleutnant. If there was a shortage of officers, an experienced vice-feldwebel was appointed as a platoon commander. However, everyday and economic concerns about the personnel of the platoons did not concern the officers. This was the prerogative of non-commissioned officers. The officers only supervised the training of soldiers to act as part of a platoon and company. All combat training and individual combat training of soldiers fell on the squad commanders, who were also commanders of corporals.

From the author. The division of the company into units is not entirely clear. In economic terms, the company is immediately divided into corporals, which are also departments. The chief of a corporal is also the squad commander. In economic terms, this non-commissioned officer or sergeant is immediately subordinate to the company sergeant major. But in combat and combat terms, as a squad leader, he is subordinate to the platoon commander. It is obvious that at the squad level, combat, combat, and economic responsibilities, as well as training of soldiers, are in the same hands. But above there is already a sharp division of economic responsibilities and combat and combat responsibilities. From here we get two hierarchical ladders.
The division of a squad into two teams, as well as a platoon into two half-platoons, is a purely combat division associated with the tactics of the German infantry ..

In total, the German army in 1901 consisted of:

*625 infantry battalions (meaning battalions of all types),
*428 cavalry squadrons,

From the author. The cavalry squadron is often considered to be in the cavalry at the battalion level in the infantry, since the cavalry regiment is immediately divided into squadrons and there are few of them in the regiment (about five). However, the author considers a cavalry squadron to be at the same level as an infantry company. Judge for yourself, in the German army there were about 112 ordinary soldiers in an infantry company, and about 102 in a cavalry squadron. The entire cavalry regiment was hardly larger in number than an infantry battalion. It is worth remembering that the names of military formations are given to a greater extent not by their numbers, but by the level of combat missions they solve. And the squadron commander is a Rittmeister, i.e. an officer assigned to the level of captains, i.e. company commanders.

*574 batteries of field artillery (Field artillery is artillery that is part of divisions. 2-3 batteries make up a division),
*38 divisions of foot artillery (Foot artillery is large-caliber artillery, i.e. corps artillery),
*26 sapper battalions,
*23 transport battalions,
*11 labor battalions.

For the combat schedule of the German army, the names and numbering of corps, divisions and regiments, see the following article.

Sources and literature.

1.Das kleine Buch vom Deutsche Heere. Verlag von Lipsins & Tischer. Kiel und Leipzig 1901.
2.C.Woolley. The Kaiser`s Army in color.Schiffer Military History. Atglen. PA. 2000.
3. R. Herrmann, J. Nguyen, R. Bernet. Uniformen deutsche Infanterie 1888 bis 1914 in Farbe. Motor Buch Verlag.2003
4. G. Ortenburg, I Proemper. Preussisch-Deutsche Uniformen von 1640-1918.Orbis Verlag. 1991.
5.K.L. Keubke. Uniformen der preussuschen Armee 1858/59. Militaerverlag der DDR.
6..I.Golyzhenkov, B.Stepanov. European soldier for 300 years. 1618-1918. Isographus. EXMO-PRESS. Moscow. 2001
7.Military encyclopedic dictionary Ripol Classic. Moscow. 2001
8.Bekleidungsvorschrift. Offiziere, Santaetsoffiziere und Veterinaeroffiziere des koeniglich Preussischen Heeres (O.Bkl.V.) vom 15.May 1899. Siegfrid Mittler und Sohn. Berlin. 1911
9.D.S.V.Fosten, R.J.Marrion. The German Army 1914-1918. Osprey. London.1978.
10.W.Churchill. Muscles of the world. EXMO. Moscow. 2003

In the vast expanses of the Eastern European theater of military operations, the German cavalry had many opportunities to prove itself.

She did not always implement them properly. However, during the East Prussian operation of 1914, the 1st Cavalry Division carried out the task of organizing a screen against the army of P.G.K. Rennenkampf - while castling the core of the 8th Army against the troops of A.V. Samsonov.

On the eve of the Lodz operation of 1914, 4 more cavalry divisions operated on the Russian Front - the 5th, 8th (together with the Austrian 7th Cavalry Division they made up the 3rd Cavalry Corps) and the 6th, 9th (1 1st Cavalry Corps). The 3rd Cavalry Corps fought on the right flank of the 9th Army - and was stopped by units of the Russian 5th Army. And the 1st Cavalry acted on the left flank of the 9th Army - delivering a flank attack near Lodz as part of the strike force of R. von Schaeffer-Boyadel. The divisions of the 1st Cavalry Corps found themselves in the Lodz pocket, where they suffered seriously. They covered the movement of the 3rd Guards Infantry Division and the 25th Reserve Corps when leaving the encirclement - operating both on horseback and on foot.

The battle of German lancers and Hungarian hussars with Russian Cossacks near Warsaw. 1914

Winter 1914 - 1915 German cavalry on the Eastern Front operated both on horseback and on foot - in particular, taking part in the trench war between Pilica and the Vistula.

The cavalry group on the Eastern Front continued to strengthen - and in the spring and summer of 1915, 7.5 cavalry divisions (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th and Bavarian cavalry divisions, Guards Cavalry Brigade), which took an active part in maneuverable combat operations. The 5th Cavalry Division operated in the Galician Theater of Operations - as part of the Marshall Group (Austro-Hungarian Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin), and the 9th Cavalry Division - in the Polish Theater of Operations as part of the 9th Army.

In September 1915, a cavalry group of 4 cavalry divisions under the command of General O. von Garnier carried out the Sventsyansky breakthrough. O. von Garnier passed through Smorgon and reached almost Molodechno. In this case, the Germans used both foot combat and horse attacks. The squadrons that penetrated the rear of the Russian army interrupted communications on the Molodechno-Polotsk and Minsk-Smolensk railway sections. But due to the active actions of the Russian troops, O. von Garnier’s group was pushed into the Naroch swamps and partially destroyed.

Unlike the Russian Front, the German cavalry managed to achieve success on another eastern front - the Romanian. The army group of General V. Kühne that invaded Romania included the cavalry corps of E. von Schmettow. On the plains of Wallachia, he showed himself to the due extent - both in terms of reconnaissance and carrying out screening and pursuit.

With the transition to trench warfare on the Western Front, the main reconnaissance functions were transferred to aviation. The planes could see what was happening behind the enemy front. No matter how fruitful the very energetic reconnaissance work of the patrols was, but, as G. Freytag-Loringofen notes, one has to regret the great losses in the best officers, soldiers and horses that the German cavalry suffered in the process.

At the same time, despite the strength of modern fire, large cavalry units retained their importance even in the second half of the war (actions of the German cavalry in the Baltic states and Romania).

During the last two years of the war, the trends for German cavalry on the Western Front were discouraging. Almost all of the German cavalry remaining in this theater of operations (already quite small in number) had their horses taken away. The divisional cavalry was reduced from 3 squadrons to only the 1st. If, taking into account the realities of trench warfare (when cavalry units periodically replaced infantry on the front line), a rifle regiment appeared in the Russian cavalry divisions (in addition to the cavalry ones), then the German cavalry regiments were turned into cavalry rifle regiments (Kavallerie - Schutzenregimenter) and were used as infantry. Thus, from 11 cavalry divisions in 1914, the German cavalry was reduced to 7 cavalry divisions in 1917 and to 3 cavalry divisions by the beginning of 1918 - and all 3 of the latter were on the Eastern Front.

And this was at a time when cavalry divisions were very necessary on the eve of large-scale offensive operations being prepared - as a means of developing success.

At the same time, the French and British in 1915 - 1916. They kept their cavalry divisions in readiness in anticipation of their offensive operations. But since operational breakthroughs during this period were not successful, then, naturally, their cavalry only suffered unjustified losses. The situation changed somewhat in 1917 - 1918, when the Allied cavalry on the Western Front (primarily the British) again managed to prove itself - albeit not as decisively as we would like.

What are the conclusions in relation to the development trends of the German cavalry during the First World War?

During the mobilization, the German cavalry underwent an organizational breakdown. In peacetime, there were no large cavalry formations (with the exception of one cavalry division), as noted. But during mobilization, most of the cavalry was consolidated into very large formations - four cavalry corps and one separate cavalry division, and infantry was also included in the corps in the form of a significant number of Jaeger battalions. During mobilization, other peacetime cavalry brigades were dispersed into squadrons distributed among infantry divisions - 3 for each.

But the fact that such serious organizational changes were carried out in a short time could not but affect the effectiveness of the actions of new large formations (primarily this concerned interaction with other branches of the military).

At the same time, the cavalry acted actively - on the French front during the campaign of 1914, on the Russian front - in the campaigns of 1914 - 1915, on the Romanian front in 1916. Establishment of positional warfare (French front - end of 1914, Russian front - end of 1915) radically influenced the prospects for the use of German cavalry. Speaking about the dismounting of cavalry formations and their concentration on the Eastern Front, German generals and historians point to this as a very serious strategic mistake of the High Command - on the eve of the 1918 campaign, when large enemy offensives on the French Front brought their troops into operational space. Cavalry is a fragile branch of the army. And, having gradually transformed their cavalry into infantry during the period of trench warfare, the Germans could no longer restore it - which, when switching again to maneuver warfare in 1918, deprived them of the opportunity to use their big breakthroughs on the French front. And the active cavalry divisions remained on the Russian Front.

If we characterize the actions of the German cavalry in France and Belgium in 1914, it is worth noting that of the four cavalry corps assigned to operate in front of the front of seven armies, two (1st and 2nd) successfully accomplished this task, advancing ahead of the right wing of the approaching army. front - that is, those who worked for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd armies.

The 4th Cavalry Corps, working on the left wing of the approaching front, i.e., on the 4th and 5th armies, was not able to do much - because “soon came across the deployed masses of the enemy; although he hung over the retreating enemy, he always met strong resistance, forcing him to stop.”

The 3rd Cavalry Corps, assigned to operate with the 6th and 7th armies in Alsace-Lorraine, could not manifest itself widely due to close contact with the enemy and the proximity of enemy fortresses.

But even successfully operating formations were constrained by the following difficulties: rapid exhaustion of horses, the question of the availability of forage, insufficient firepower (despite the addition of Jaeger battalions to the cavalry corps).

The German cavalry corps, for all the success of their actions, did not always rise to the task. Thus, Professor V.F. Novitsky in his work “World War 1914–1918. Campaign of 1918 in Belgium and France,” notes that on August 25 and 26, “the German cavalry did not justify itself: despite its large numbers (a corps of 72 squadrons) and favorable conditions for vigorous pursuit (of the defeated left-flank French army - the 5th ), she achieved very insignificant results." V.F. Novitsky explains this by “exhaustion of the horse force, which was continuously engaged in intense combat work for three weeks, associated with running long distances.” As a result, “the three right-flank armies of the Germans (1st, 2nd and 3rd) lost contact with the enemy from September 2, 1914, why until September 4 the German headquarters had no information about what was happening on the left flank enemy,” as a result of which the appearance of a new French army (General Maunoury) behind the right flank of the German armies was unexpected for her.

The German 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps also proved themselves in the Battle of the Marne - operating in combined formations (mainly on foot). The cavalry filled the gap formed between the 1st and 2nd armies - four cavalry divisions (96 squadrons) participated in this operation, and the infantry (one brigade) only supplemented the cavalry. These two corps acted similarly during the retreat of the German armies after the Marne - in the battle of Bapaume. Cavalry also carried out searches behind enemy lines (for example, the 4th Cavalry Corps).

The Germans began to gradually transfer a significant part of their army cavalry from the Western to the Eastern Front - and in the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes against the Russian 1st Army at the end of August 1914, 2 cavalry divisions were already operating as part of the German 8th Army - the 1st and 8th, by the time the Lodz operation began - 5th, etc.

On the Eastern Front (including the Romanian Front), cavalry was used as an advanced cavalry screen, for communication between operating military groups, directly in battles (both mounted and on foot), for searches behind the flanks and behind enemy lines (Vilna operation) etc.

We wrote about the essence of a positional deadlock and ways to overcome it (see). Positional warfare ended when the enemy’s positional defenses were crushed on a vast front - and the attacker entered operational space. And then a war of maneuver began again - as it happened for the Germans at the end of March 1918, and for the Allies at the beginning of August 1918. And in this situation, cavalry was extremely necessary - as a mobile tool for developing success. The characteristics of armored vehicles (and not all of them had them), the search for organizational forms of their use, and other circumstances have not yet made it possible to actively use young armored forces as a full-fledged tool for developing operational success - and the value of a technically equipped one that had rich combat experience and serious organization the cavalry was beyond competition. And, as noted, the Germans bemoan the dismounting of their cavalry - which deprived them of the opportunity to use their victories of the first Volovin of 1918, while their opponents retained theirs - and used them more or less successfully.

Among German military historians, not everyone, like G. Freytag-Loringhofen, was pessimistic about the prospects for the post-war development of German cavalry. Thus, F. Bernhardi in his work “On the War of the Future” noted that not the tactical (mounted attacks), but the strategic activity of cavalry will come to the fore - when the speed of the horse will no longer be used for attack, but for fast operational movements. It is the latter aspect that will allow the cavalry to achieve great and strategically important successes. Organization of strategic cavalry according to F. Bernhardi: the 10-squadron cavalry regiment is equipped with heavy machine guns (machine gun squadron) and strong artillery (specially designed guns), the division is made up of 3 brigades of 2-3 regiments each. A squadron is a tactical unit for foot combat (2 squadrons minus horse guides and patrols - give about 150 riflemen). To strengthen a cavalry division, it can be given a battalion of scooters or infantry on carts or cars.

At the same time, turning cavalry into riding infantry is a mistake, and cavalrymen must be real.

The Treaty of Versailles, which limited the total strength of the German army to 100,000 people, allowed the deployment of 7 infantry (with 7 separate squadrons) and 3 cavalry divisions. Cavalry division - 6 cavalry regiments (4 active and 1 training squadrons each with a machine gun platoon of 4 heavy machine guns) and a horse artillery division (three horse-drawn 4-gun 77-mm batteries).

Finally, in 1934, the Germans formed 2 more cavalry divisions. 5 cavalry divisions of 6 regiments each allowed to have 30 cavalry regiments. Each cavalry division (except for 6 cavalry regiments) included: a horse artillery regiment consisting of 6 cannon and 3 anti-aircraft batteries, a scooter battalion consisting of 3 rifle and 1 machine gun companies; motorized reconnaissance unit; motorized infantry battalion; anti-tank company (of six 37 mm guns); squadron; platoon of motorcyclists. The Cavalry Division has turned into a modern formation consisting of units of all branches of the military.

As a Soviet source noted in 1934: “in the event of war, the Germans will be able to deploy 10 of the currently existing 5 cavalry divisions. Modern German cavalry is equipped with a good complement of horses. The senior and senior command staff, as well as the junior command staff of long-term service, have rich experience of the war of 1914 - 1918. and solid methodological training in training fighters. A characteristic feature of the tactics of modern German cavalry is the widespread use of maneuver. The Germans are carefully considering all issues of the operational use of strategic cavalry in a difficult situation. The main attention when preparing cavalry formations and units is paid to the work of all issues related to the execution of marches by cavalry under the threat of air attack, and to the technique of conducting mounted and foot combat using modern technical means of combat.”

We see that even for the German cavalry, which went through dismounting during the First World War, this war did not become the last “swan song”, as some modern researchers write: the cavalry was preserved as a powerful and modern branch of the army - in order to take an active part in the next world war.

In early August 1914, Germany entered the First World War. On the eve of the announcement of mobilization, this country had the second largest army in Europe, numbering 808,280 people (the armed forces of France numbered 882,907 people by 1914 and were the most numerous among the armies of European states). Quite quickly, combat operations on significant sections of the front both in the west and in the east took on the character of “trench warfare.”

Already by October 1914, the European armies opposing each other were virtually deprived of the opportunity for free maneuver, which ensured the complete superiority of defense over the offensive. The war promised to be protracted, which inevitably entailed colossal expenses on ammunition and supplying troops. Any attempt at an offensive was extinguished by machine gun and artillery fire. In this situation, the British and French commands relied on the production and active implementation of tanks and armored vehicles - a new type of weapon, which was already promised a great future. But the command of the Kaiser's army decided to take a different path.

For two centuries leading up to the First World War, the Prussian army was famous for its drill and discipline. First of all, this concerned the Prussian infantry - excellently trained and serving as a model for the ground forces of many other European countries. A distinctive feature of the German army, even at the beginning of the twentieth century, was the huge gap between officers and lower ranks and the incredible closeness and casteism of the officer corps. Becoming an officer in the Kaiser's army was not easy - the overwhelming majority were German nobles, coming from officer families. This order of military hierarchy already in the first months of the World War led to rather negative consequences.

As a result of front-line losses, the number of career officers began to decline, but the military aristocracy was very resistant to replenishing the officer corps with people from other strata of society, especially with veteran soldiers and officers. Therefore, the number of personnel in infantry platoons was increased, with up to 80 infantrymen per platoon lieutenant. Accordingly, the infantry companies were also huge in number. At the same time, such a large number of units hampered their mobility during combat operations. If in a frontal attack such a number of platoons could still be considered an advantage, then in conditions of trench warfare it became more of an obstacle.

The most far-sighted officers of the Kaiser's army, at the beginning of the war, abandoned the outdated tactics of close formation and sent units into battle dispersed. This made it possible to minimize troop losses. Compared to companies using close formation, dispersed units suffered far fewer losses. For example, on September 8, 1914, 15 of the 16 companies that took part in the attack of the 43rd Infantry Brigade moved into battle in groups of 30-40 people. As a result, out of 2,250 soldiers and officers, only 25 people died.

In some infantry regiments, in the first months of the war, special assault teams were created, which were tasked with destroying enemy wire barriers in order to prepare the offensive of the main forces of their units. Typically, such teams were created on the basis of reconnaissance teams of regimental headquarters and consisted of 12 people. The soldiers of the assault teams were armed with grenades and rifles. In addition, infantry regiments began to create teams to clear trenches, armed with grenades, carbines and special portable shields.

On March 2, 1915, an order was issued by the Supreme High Command of the Ground Forces, ordering the creation of a special unit within the 8th Army Corps to test breakthrough tactics on the Western Front. The unit included soldiers and non-commissioned officers from sapper units who had experience in handling hand grenades. In order to cope with enemy machine-gun fire, the German command decided to use the 37-mm Krupp assault gun. Its light weight allowed it to be carried by soldiers. The first assault battalion, which consisted of two companies, included a platoon of 37-mm guns. The battalion also included a machine gun company with 6 machine guns, a mortar team with 4 mortars and a flamethrower team. Major Kaslov, who had previously served in the 18th engineer battalion, was appointed battalion commander.

Unlike ordinary infantrymen, Major Kaslov's attack aircraft were equipped with helmets and body armor. The battalion was trained for three months to participate in hostilities, after which it was divided between the infantry battalions of the first front line. But already in the first battles, the battalion lost up to 30% of its personnel, which was associated not only with special tasks, but also with a lack of experience and tactics for such actions.

In August 1915, the new commander of the assault battalion, Hauptmann Wilhelm Rohr (1877-1930, pictured), proposed dividing large platoons of 70-80 soldiers into small assault groups of 3-10 people. At the same time, Rohr put forward an idea that was innovative for that time - such small groups, moving forward, could act completely independently, without maintaining communication with each other and with higher command. This was a major departure from traditional Prussian infantry tactics.

Already in the fall of 1915, the battalion under the command of Hauptmann Rohr showed itself excellently in battles in the Vosges region, and in February 1916 - near Verdun. Inspired by the successes of the first assault battalion, the command of the ground forces ordered from each army operating on the Western Front to send two officers and four non-commissioned officers to the first assault battalion. They had to learn new methods of war in practice and then introduce them to their units. Thus, Rohr's assault battalion became a unique unit that combined participation in battles and training of instructors. It is noteworthy that instead of a 37-mm cannon, Rohr decided to use captured Russian three-inch guns with shortened barrels, which turned out to be a more effective solution.

The ideas of Hauptmann Rohr had a decisive influence on the further tactics of the German troops and changed the position of the command of the ground forces. In August 1916, the post of Quartermaster General - Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces was taken by General Erich Ludendorff (pictured), who on October 23, 1916 ordered the formation of a separate assault battalion in each field army fighting on the Western Front. It was decided to form these units on the basis of sapper, infantry and jäger units of the German army.

By the beginning of December 1916, 16 army assault battalions had been formed. Following the armies, assault battalions appeared as part of army corps, and at the same time the formation of special assault companies within divisions began. Each assault company included three to four platoons, which were distributed among the division's infantry regiments located at the front line. A divisional assault company could consist of up to 225 soldiers, 20 non-commissioned officers and 4 officers, and was armed with 2-3 light mortars, 3 flamethrowers and 2 machine guns. The company was subordinate directly to the division commander, and, if necessary, was transferred to operational subordination to the commander of a specific infantry regiment.

The appearance of assault battalions was a real revolution not only in the combat tactics of the German army, but also in its military structure and hierarchy. Thanks to the emergence of these units, a real revision of the very foundations of the service began. Thus, the attitude towards the soldier as a combat unit of the assault battalion has changed significantly. If the traditional Prussian approach to a soldier implied the latter’s complete lack of any initiative and unquestioning submission to officers, then in assault units the soldier was required to have maximum initiative and ingenuity, the ability to act and make decisions independently.

The importance of non-commissioned officers and sergeant majors increased even more, not as supervisors of personnel, but as experienced specialists who had to solve the most complex combat missions. Given the special nature of the actions of the assault battalions, they were recruited exclusively from volunteers. It was believed that only volunteers who independently decided to serve in assault units were worthy soldiers and had a sufficient level of motivation to fight in the most difficult and dangerous conditions.

At the same time, even among the volunteers, not everyone was suitable for service in assault units due to health and physical fitness. Almost all soldiers and non-commissioned officers were under 25 years of age; unconditional preference was given to either unmarried or childless servicemen - the command understood the risk those who go to serve in assault battalions and companies take. The commander of the assault group in the First World War was the famous German philosopher Ernst Jünger (pictured) - later one of the key theorists of the conservative revolution and German national revolutionaries, and at that time a graduate of the University of Heidelberg, who began his service as an ordinary soldier and managed to obtain an officer rank. Junger was wounded 14 times, received the Iron Cross, and left a memoir book “Steel Helmet” about those terrible battles.

Particular attention was paid to the armament and equipment of assault units. It was the attack aircraft that began to actively use hand grenades, with the help of which it was much easier and safer to clear enemy trenches than to launch a bayonet attack. Each soldier in an assault company or battalion carried dozens of hand grenades, which had to be used during an attack on enemy trenches. Accordingly, the importance of mortars increased, since they were ideal for operations against enemy trenches. Mortars, firstly, were much lighter and more mobile, and secondly, easier to control than field artillery.

The assault companies were also armed with machine guns. Mostly these were MaschinenGewehr 08 - a variation of the Maxim system machine gun. Each assault battalion of the German army included 1-2 machine gun companies, which made its firepower comparable to that of an ordinary infantry regiment. By 1917, the number of machine guns in an assault company was 8-10, then 12 machine guns, and in an assault battalion - up to 24 machine guns.

Instead of traditional rifles, stormtroopers were armed with shorter and more convenient carbines, indispensable in trench battles. In addition, for the first time in the world, submachine guns, the MP18 Bergmann system, entered service with assault troops. The submachine gun could fire 32 rounds in 3.5 seconds. This was truly indispensable for trench fighting. Therefore, after submachine guns entered the army in 1918, all officers and non-commissioned officers and 10 privates in each assault company were armed with them.

As part of the assault units, a new type of weapon was also tested - flamethrowers. The first flamethrower unit was formed back in January 1915 - it was a volunteer sapper unit commanded by Major Bernhard Reddeman (pictured). Then, on the basis of the detachment, the 3rd Guards Engineer Battalion was formed, consisting of 6 and then 12 companies. In February 1915, flamethrowers were tested by the French army near Verdun, and then they were used against British troops.

Finally, the assault units did not forget about bladed weapons. Daggers, six-feathers, clubs and even maces and flails found a new life in assault units, but most stormtroopers preferred to operate with trench knives or sharpened sapper blades, turning this universal tool into a terrible weapon.

However, the command of the ground forces did not intend to create a separate branch of troops from the assault units. Assault battalions and companies were considered as temporary units created exclusively for the period of hostilities. Following the battalions and companies, even the creation of assault platoons began as part of ordinary infantry companies. Such platoons were formed immediately before the battle and included 10-15 of the best fighters of the company, who were called grenadiers. They were given the most difficult tasks - to break through the enemy's defenses and clear enemy positions for the subsequent advance of the main infantry company.

However, the assault units, whose use was pioneered by Germany in the First World War, were ultimately unable to influence the course of hostilities. Germany was defeated, and soon the Kaiser's monarchy fell. In the Weimar Republic that emerged in its place, other stormtroopers soon made themselves known, but they no longer had anything to do with the regular army.