The conquest of Turkestan "Great Russia has only two friends - the army and the navy!" Russian Tsar Alexander III 1584. Russian Cossacks founded the Yaitsky town (since 1775 - Uralsk, since 1991 - the land of "Kazakhstan") on the river. Yaik (since 1775 - Ural). 1587. On the river Irtysh, at the confluence of the river

[M. I. Venyukov]. Historical essays on Russia from the time of the Crimean War to the conclusion of the Berlin Treaty. 1855-1878. Volume 1. - Leipzig, 1878.

Other parts:
. Changes in the composition of the Russian state region:, The conquest of Central Asia (2),.
. .
. Political unification of the outskirts:,.
N. N. Karazin. The entry of Russian troops into Samarkand on June 8, 1868. 1888

Therefore, without dwelling on the Caucasian conquests, let us now turn to the question of expanding our borders in Central Asia. It took place in four directions: firstly, from the side of the Caspian Sea, to the east, to Turkmenistan and Khiva; secondly, from the side of Orenburg to Khiva, Bukhara and Kokan; thirdly, from the side of Siberia - to Kokan and Kashgar; fourthly, from Siberia and the Kirghiz steppes belonging to it - to Dzungaria. The main moments and events of this movement were as follows:

On the east coast Since 1846, the Caspian Sea has existed, at the western tip of Mangyshlak, fortification Tyup-Karagan, or. His goal was to influence; but this goal was not achieved at all until the very end of the 1860s due to the weakness of the Tyup-Karagan detachment, which did not dare to go deeper into the interior of the country and was in need of everything to such an extent that not only food and clothes for people, but materials for buildings, firewood, straw , hay - everything was brought from, which for several months a year was cut off from Mangyshlak by ice in the mouths of the Volga and even in the sea. they were so little accustomed to obey the Russian authorities in fortification that when in 1869 his commandant, Colonel Rukin, went to them with an insufficiently strong escort, they, and some Cossacks, having captured alive, were sold into slavery in. There was almost no Russian trade in Mangyshlak; local hard coal - too. In a word, the influence of Tyup-Karagan was negligible. That is why, as early as 1859, reconnaissance was made in the more southern parts of the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea, from the Krasnovodsk Bay to Ashur-Ade, where, since 1842, we had a marine station that monitored the behavior of the Turkmen at sea. But only ten years later, the government finally decided to establish itself in, as the only place where there is a convenient marina for ships. At the same time, the caution of our diplomats went so far that, without any request from Persia, the director of the Asiatic Department, Stremoukhov, informed the Tehran government that it should not be afraid of the appearance of our troops in the north of its possessions (for 200 miles!), That we would not touch the Persian lands and will not even spread our influence south further than Atrek. Why all this was done is difficult to understand; probably to calm not Persia, which could be ignored, but England, which understands well that from the southeastern corner of the Caspian Sea lies the shortest road from Russia to India. The fact that, under this condition, the Yomud Turkmens necessarily became double-dancers, because they spend the winter to the south of Atrek, and the summer to the north, was little thought in the Asian Department; that in the east of the Yomuds they would eventually have to become in the same false position - they thought even less, but they did not think at all that with the recognition of Atrek as our southern border in the future, the device to the side of Khorasan would be more difficult. That is why, as soon as a proper administration was established in Krasnovodsk in 1874, its head, General Lomakin, began to loudly declare that the border along the Atrek was extremely disadvantageous for us. But so far (1878) no measures have been taken to correct it. Meanwhile, the British military-political agents Goldsmid, Baker, Napier, McGregor and others have been diligently trying in the past six years to turn against us the inhabitants of the southwestern part of the Aral-Caspian lowland, by virtue of the theory that England should "defend India from the north with the help of Turkmen gangs, well-armed and led by skilful officers. However, the evil done to Russia by the short-sightedness of the Asian Department could be immediately corrected by the movement, which serves as the center of the Turkmen tribes hostile to us; but here persistent advice from London, from Count Shuvalov, constantly came to the aid of England, who, having fallen into some disfavor and being demoted from the chiefs of gendarmes to ambassadors, used all measures to regain his position at court and for this he brought benefits to Russia in sacrifice to the family interests of the reigning house, trying, at the cost of concessions, to acquire the location of the latter for the daughter of Emperor Alexander, Mary, married to the son of Queen Victoria. Shuvalov for several years advised not to touch Mervi, not to make military movements in the direction of her, because this would not please England and, consequently, would make his personal position in London unpleasant, and the court goal proposed by him unattainable. Until 1877, we followed this advice. What will be the consequences, of course, very short-term. Now only one thing can be said, namely, that as a result of a false, unpatriotic policy, we still do not have solid borders in the southeast of Krasnovodsk, and we have to make expensive trips to the Turkmen steppe every year to maintain our influence there. That is why it is impossible to say how great our present Trans-Caspian department is. Strelbitsky determined its area at 5.940 sq. miles; but this definition is purely fictitious.

The founding of Krasnovodsk, combined with the transfer of the entire Trans-Caspian Territory from the Orenburg department to the Caucasian one, however, brought its own benefit in the sense of asserting our influence in the space between the Caspian and the Aral. Detachments of the Caucasian troops more than once walked along Ust-Urta and along the valley of the old Oxus, and in 1873 one of them, going there from Kenderly. But these military movements, instilling fear in the inhabitants of the Trans-Caspian steppes, and consequently, in an Asian way, respect for Russia, had their own weak sides. Following the Caucasian official mores, the Armenian colonel Markozov, who was in charge of these movements in 1872-73, did not miss the opportunity to rob the Turkmens, and not only in the sense of extortion, accompanied by the use of whips, but also in the sense of direct robbery of peaceful merchant caravans. Another disadvantage of the dependence of the Trans-Caspian Kirghiz and Turkmens on the Caucasian authorities was that the methods of the Caucasian administration are not quite the same as those of the Turkestan and Orenburg administrations, which are in charge of the majority of the nomads, why some of these nomads, for example. Adaevtsy, was in an ambiguous position, despite the application in 1875 to the Transcaspian department of the general steppe charters. Finally, we note that the discord in the views of the Tiflis and Tashkent authorities was reflected even in our external relations with Khiva. he noticed this without difficulty, and, dependent on the Turkestan governor-general, tried to complain about some actions of the Turkestan administration to the Caucasian governor, as the brother of the emperor. And as the Turkestan authorities, although patronized in St. Petersburg by the Minister of War, could not help but fear the consequences of such complaints, then, for example. in 1876 and 77, they used all measures so that the representatives of the Caucasian administration, Lomakin and Petrusevich, when they were within the Khiva borders, could not have separate meetings with the khan or with his dignitaries.

From the side of Dzungaria, 1855 found the year in the following form. Starting from the upper reaches of the Karkara in the Heavenly Mountains, it went down this river and then along the Charyn to the Ili, crossed this river and then stretched along the tops of the Dzungarian Alatau ridge to the meridian, along which it crossed Tarbagatai and reached the western end of Lake Zaisana. It was difficult to wish for a better state boundary, because for a considerable extent it is marked by natural tracts, sometimes very difficult to cross, which served as a relief in protecting our borders from the invasion of nomadic predators. Almost all of Lake Zaisan lay within Chinese borders, and the border to the north of it went along the Irtysh to the mouth of the Narym, and then along this river and along the peaks. Since our neighbors at these borders were the Chinese, there was neither the need nor the direct opportunity to cross this border, along which a significant trade was already established, reaching, for example, in Chuguchak up to 1,200,000 rubles. in year. But in 1860, a treaty was concluded in Peking, according to which this entire border was subject to alteration, or at least to revision and precise marking on the ground. This circumstance was used by the local authorities in order to demand from the Chinese the cession of all lands on both sides of the Zaisan. Why this was done is difficult to understand, except for the purpose of receiving life-long pensions for border commissars for annexing new lands, because these lands themselves were steppes, and their population were nomads. At that time, in our bureaucratic spheres, they had not yet thought of the simple truth that the possession of the steppes is a burden for the state, and, probably, the annexation of the near-Zaisan region, and their patrons in Omsk and in St. Petersburg itself, believed that 600-700 sq. miles inhabited by the Kirghiz is an important acquisition for Russia. A concession was made to them by the Chinese, and, however, according to the letter of the Peking Treaty, the eastern end of the Zaisan, that is, the only area suitable for extensive fishing, remained with China. In 1864, the newly annexed lands were correctly demarcated, but only between Shabin-Dabag and Khabar-Asu; further south, the demarcation did not continue, on occasion. And our former border in the eastern part of Semirechye was respected by us until 1871, when the hostility of the Muslim state that had arisen forced us to leave it behind us for an indefinite time, declaring, however, to the Chinese that we recognize this land as part of their empire and therefore we will return it to them as soon as they regain their power in other surrounding areas. this, however, has not yet (1878) taken place, and the whole business of Kuldzha was conducted in such a way that dishonored Russia. Namely, already in 1871, Stremoukhov invited the Peking government to send representatives to receive from us the Kuldzha district, and at the same time General Boguslavsky was sent from St. China". Our envoy in Peking, General Vlangali, was placed by this behavior of his own government in such an absurd position that he hid from negotiations with Chinese ministers in the city of Chifu and finally resigned. [This resignation of Vlangali was, however, the goal of all the machinations of Stremoukhov, who saw in the venerable general his soon successor in the rank of director of the Asiatic Department and therefore tried to "drown" him.]. In 1876, the Governor-General of Turkestan, Kaufman, loudly said that “the return of Kulja to the Chinese is a matter of honor for Russia,” and, however, two new years have passed since then, and the matter has not moved forward. Under the influence of the first fear of conquest, the governor of Semirechye managed to collect several addresses from the Kuldzhans, who begged them not to return them to Chinese rule and declared their desire to become Russian subjects: no answer was given to these addresses, but they are stored as if in case to show to Peking authorities that their harassment does not agree with the desire of the most Mohammedan. In a word, the whole thing has been conducted and is being conducted until now in bad faith, and only now, when the Chinese have mastered not only Manas, but also, will it be put on a more direct and honest road. And since we have an important territorial issue with China in another area, not in the Amur, it would be best to satisfy all Chinese harassment in Dzungaria, if only to achieve a correction of the borders in the Usuri region.

Looking now in general terms at our Central Asian acquisitions since 1855, we see that they are very extensive, extending to about 19,000 square meters. miles. But one glance at the map shows that the price of these acquisitions is small, because among them there is hardly 400 square meters. miles suitable for a settled culture, and even those for the most part are occupied by the Mohammedan population, which will hardly ever be sincerely devoted to Russia. Accordingly, it could be recognized that these acquisitions are not at all profitable for Russia, even more so, they are unprofitable for her, since the Turkestan Governor-Generalship alone produces a deficit of 4½ million rubles annually. But the new suburbs have a future, and therein lies the justification for their current unprofitability. Precisely, when they are brought to their natural limits, Alburs and the Hindu Kush, then we will be in a rather threatening position with respect to our main enemy on the globe- England, and this will atone to some extent for the current losses from the conquest of Central Asia. Fearing for the loss of India, the British will become much more accommodating than they are now on all questions of European politics. In addition, having conquered the whole of Turkestan, we will be able to withdraw from it part of the troops kept there and through this we will reduce the current costs for this country. But it is impossible to foresee when all this will happen, because there is no plan of conquest similar to that which was drawn up for the conquest of the Caucasus, but - judging by the events that have taken place so far, and by the stubbornness with which England interferes in our every step on the soil of Turan, - it will not be compiled. Future Russian generations, therefore, will have the right to subject ours to a heavy reproach for his inability to conduct an important historical work. On the Chinese side, in Dzungaria, we have made acquisitions of up to 1,600 sq. miles, but why is unknown. These seizures, which do not bring us significant benefits, can only irritate the Chinese, whose friendship, however, is very important to us, and therefore the sooner the occupied lands - mostly steppes - are returned, the better for us, especially if at the same time we will have time to achieve a solution in our favor of the territorial issue in the South Usuri Territory.

Part (Volume) 2

Chapter XI. Turkestan campaigns

Akhal-Teke campaigns of 1877 - 1881

The Turkmen steppes cut like a huge wedge into our Central Asian possessions, dividing the Trans-Caspian region and Turkestan and crossing all our caravan routes, so that communications between Krasnovodsk and Tashkent had to be maintained through Orenburg. Of all the Turkmen tribes, the Tekins, who lived in the Akhal-Teke and Merv oases, were especially ferocious and militant. The prestige of these Central Asian Chechens was high from Kabul to Tehran.

Immediately after our landing and the laying of Krasnovodsk, the sharp drafts of the Tekins opposed the Russian advance into the Transcaspian region. Their possessions were difficult to reach - the Akhal-Teke oasis was separated from the sea by 500 miles of waterless and desert steppe. The conquest of this "hornet's nest" was urgently needed and was on the line immediately after the establishment in 1874 of the Transcaspian region. However, Russian diplomacy, trembling before England, fearing "what they might think in London", insisted on half measures. It was decided only to establish themselves on the edge of the oasis in the Kizil-Arvat tract - by othersIn other words, a hornet's nest cannot be destroyed, but only disturbed.

A bad idea was even worse executed. General Lomakin, who went to Kizil-Arvat in 1877, did not calculate the means of supply and, having occupied the indicated area, had to hastily retreat due to lack of food. In 1878, the headquarters of the Caucasian District ordered General Lomakin to undertake an "enhanced reconnaissance" of the Akhal-Teke oasis. It was a big psychological blunder: the movement of a large Russian detachment back and forth was interpreted as a failed campaign, and in all the surrounding lands they began to say that "no one can defeat the Tekins - even the Russians."

Then in 1879 in Tiflis they decided to undertake a serious operation. To conquer the Akhal-Teke oasis, a combined detachment was appointed, which included battalions of the glorious regiments of the Caucasian Grenadier, 20th and 21st divisions. This detachment - with a force of up to 10,000 people - was entrusted to the hero of Kars, General Lazarev.

General Lazarev repeated Lomakin's mistake in 1877 - he neglected the organization of the food section and was therefore able to move only half of his detachment on a campaign in August 1879. On the way to the Teke stronghold of Geok-Tepe, Lazarev died, and Senior General Lomakin took command. During the burial of Lazarev, the wheels of the cannon that fired the salute fell apart, which was interpreted by everyone as a bad omen (due to the excessive dryness of the air, such accidents of wooden gun carriages and wagons often occurred in these places). This latter (Lomakin) "added haste to the chaos of imprudence." On August 28, he approached the walls of Geok-Tepe with 3,000 tired people, with frozen camels and 12 guns, did not want to listen to the deputation, who wanted to express humility, stormed the Teke fortress, was repulsed with damage and hastily retreated, almost killing the entire detachment. Our loss in this stubborn work is 27 officers and 418 lower ranks, the most significant in all the Turkestan wars.

This failure greatly undermined the prestige of Russia in the East. The White Shirts have been defeated! The Khivans and Persians gloated (they themselves, however, had salt from the daring raids of the Tekins). The British, who had just suffered defeat from the Afghan troops, rejoiced even more. We began to receive a lot of offensive advice and instructions on how to fightwith the Tekins - from the Emir of Bukhara, from the Khan of Khiva, from the border Persian governors. The Emir of Bukhara advised to go to Geok-Tepe with no less than a hundred thousandth army. The Khan of Khiva offered to abandon further undertakings against Geok-Tepe altogether. The Persians conjured not to converge with the Tekins hand-to-hand, "because there is no one in the world braver and stronger than the Tekins."

General Tergukasov was appointed commander of the Transcaspian detachment. He put the troops in order, encouraged them, but soon gave up his post due to illness. In the winter of 1879, various plans and projects arrived in St. Petersburg. Tergukasov's plan envisaged, for example, the conquest of the Akhal-Teke oasis in 4.5 years at the expense of 40 million rubles. The headquarters of the Caucasian District also presented its plan, insisting on the appointment of one of "their" generals. There were all sorts of candidates.

But the Sovereign did not agree with any of these projects. He had already outlined his candidate - and summoned from Minsk the 37-year-old commander of the IV Army Corps, Lieutenant General Skobelev. The hero of Plevna and Sheinov left the Winter Palace as the plenipotentiary head of the expedition and, getting into the carriage, sent from St. Petersburg to the Trans-Caspian Territory by telegraph his first laconic order: "Catch up!"

* * *

With a feeling of deep sadness, we begin the description of Skobelev's brilliant Teke campaign in 1880-1881, the last campaign of the White General. For the first and, alas, the last time he acted here as an independent military leader. Lovcha was his Kinburn, Sheinovo was Rympik, Geok-Tepe became his Prague, and Trebia was not given to him...

With the eye of a commander, as well as with the instinct of a statesman - a connoisseur of Central Asia, Skobelev was aware of the necessity and inevitability of occupying both the Akhal-Teke and Merv oases. But the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, fearing a "bad impression in England", insisted on limiting the expedition to the Akhal-Teke oasis alone.

On May 7, 1880, Skobelev landed at Chikishlyar. For 4 miles from the shore, he lowered his white war horse into the sea, which sailed safely. Having reconnoiteredwith his closest collaborators - Chief of Staff Colonel Grodekov{245} and captain 2nd rank Makarov{246} - the coast of Mikhailovsky Bay, he chose the place of laying and indicated the direction of the Trans-Caspian railway, ordering to immediately begin work.

The forces of the Tekins numbered up to 50,000 (from small to large they took up weapons), of which up to 10,000 were excellent horsemen. Half of the soldiers had firearms (English rifles, captured Russians and their own, old self-propelled guns of huge caliber, which hit 2000 steps from the coulter). Everyone had sharp checkers and daggers. There was only one cannon for the entire army, which, however, did not bother the brave and intelligent Tykma-serdar, the Teke commander-in-chief. He decided not to give field battles, but to sit out in the Geok-Tepe fortress - a huge square a verst on the side, the walls of which, 3 fathoms thick, were not afraid of the fire of Russian artillery. During sorties and in hand-to-hand fights, the frenzied courage of the Tekins (who pulled hats over their eyes and rushed headlong into the battle) and their masterful ability to wield weapons, along with a huge numerical superiority, should have given them victory, as in the past, 1879. In addition, the Tekins were sure that the Russians, as in previous campaigns, would eventually have to retreat due to lack of food.

Organizing his detachment, Skobelev adopted the well-known "Turkestan proportion" - a Russian company is equal to 1,000 enemies. He had 46 companies, and most importantly - Caucasian troops (regiments of the 19th and 21st divisions) and 11 squadrons and hundreds - a total of 8,000 bayonets and checkers. Throughout the entire campaign, Skobelev kept counting exclusively by companies, and not by battalions, as was usually the case. Skobelev demanded 84 guns for this detachment - 8 guns per thousand fighters, which was twice the usual rate and showed the importance that the White General attached to fire.

Here, in the Transcaspian region, Skobelev demanded all the new military equipment - machine guns{247} , optical and electrical signaling, Decoville narrow-gauge railways, balloons, refrigerators, water makers. He did not neglect any means that could in any way save the strength of a soldier on a campaign and his blood in battle (we can see the whole difference between the open mind of Skobelev and the narrow doctrinairism of Dragomirov - the difference between the commander of God's grace and the routine of military affairs).

The organization of the food section—this hitherto eternal Achilles' heel of ours—is fully summarized by Skobelev's laconic directive: "Feed to satiety and do not regret what spoils." The allowance of the troops immediately became magnificent and remained so throughout the campaign. The dashing grunt of the Khiva campaign, the impetuous head of the cavalry party of the Kokand war, was transformed here into a prudent commander, imbued with a sense of responsibility, a commander - a commander who combines a cold mind with a fiery soul, never taking a second step, without fixing the first, subordinating the speed and onslaught of the first military virtue to the eye.

* * *

First of all, Skobelev decided to take possession of the Kizil-Arvat region and create a base there for operations against Geok-Tepe. On May 23, Skobelev set out from Chikishlyar and on the 31st took you (in the Kizil-Arvat oasis). The operational base was thus one - but superbly calculated - leap forward 400 versts, and only 100 versts separated the Russians from Geok-Tepe. The Russians stood firm in Bami. Just in the oasis, the wheat sown by the Tekins ripened, and a plentiful harvest provided the troops with bread right there, on the spot. Skobelev knew what he was doing and ordered gardens to be planted here. The task of supplying this was extremely simplified, and Skobelev "made the desert feed the expedition."

Having resolved the food issue, having laid a reliable foundation for the expedition building, Skobelev moved on to the next stage - reconnaissance of the enemy, "so as not to be in the dark" (he still did not have to fight with the Tekins). To this end, he decided to launch a reconnaissance raid on Geok-Tepe, deliberately taking a tiny detachment so as not to repeat the psychological mistake made by Lomakin in 1878. On July 1, the detachment set out and on the 8th returned safely to you. The reconnaissance was a brilliant success. Skobelev took with him 700 men with 8 guns and 2 machine guns. Having reached Geok-Tepe, he went around the fortress with music from all sides and repelled the onslaught of the Tekins with the most insignificant damage for us.

In the fall, Skobelev set up an auxiliary base on Persian territory (at the same time rejecting the Persian offer to help us as unworthy of Russia). He was still hopeful in classGok-Tepe to go to Merv and conquer the whole region to Russia up to the Afghan border.

On November 24, when the troops were provided with everything for the winter campaign, a campaign was announced near Geok-Tepe. From the 24th to the 28th, the Russians set off from you in echelons, and by mid-December, 5,000 fighters with 47 guns had already gathered at Yegyan-Batyr-Kala, 10 versts from the Teke stronghold. On December 11, a detachment of Colonel Kuropatkin arrived here from the Turkestan District, consisting of 700 people and 2 guns. The sending of Kuropatkin's detachment was of great moral importance for the tribes of Central Asia, showing that the Tekins were no longer able to prevent communications between Turkestan and the Transcaspian region. The Tekinsky campaign brought Skobelev even closer to Kuropatkin:

“With him, fate made me a brother in arms from the second assault on Andijan, in the trenches of Plevna and on the heights of the Balkans,” Skobelev wrote.

On December 23, the siege of Geok-Tepe began, which lasted 18 days, energetically conducted and accompanied by desperate attacks by the Tekins and a number of hot deeds. On December 23, General Petrusevich was killed in our country{248} . On December 28 at night, the Tekins suddenly hit the checkers, broke into the trenches, cut down 5 officers and 120 lower ranks (almost all were killed, only 30 were wounded), captured the banner of the Apsheron battalion and 1 mountain gun. On December 29, when taking counter-proposals, we lost 61 people, and during the sortie on December 30, we lost 152 people and another 1 cannon. The Tekins took with them bombardier Agafon Nikitin (21st Artillery Brigade) and demanded that he teach them how to handle guns. Despite inhuman torment and torture, this hero refused and died. But his name will never die! The Tekins did not cope with the pipe, and their shooting from the captured guns did not harm us, since the shells did not explode.

On the 29th, after Kuropatkin's occupation of the "Grand Duke's Kala" (the enemy's counterclaim), mine work was carried out, which the Tekins unknowingly did not interfere with. When repulsing the sortie on January 4, we again lost 78 people. The Tekins had no idea about the mine business and even rejoiced when they heard the noise of work. “The Russians are so stupid that they are digging an underground passage,” they said, “when they crawl out of there one by one, we will cut them down one by one!”

On the morning of January 12, 1881, at the signal of Skobelev, a mine was blown up. An explosion of incredible power covered the entirefortress and stunned the Tekins. The troops rushed to the assault and captured the Teke stronghold after a fierce battle. The cavalry followed on the heels of the fleeing crowds, completing their rout. Our damage on the attack - 398 people, the Tekins died in the explosion, stabbed to death in the assault and beaten in the pursuit up to 8000 - the third part of the defenders of Geok-Tepe. The Absheronians recaptured their banner.

Akhal-Teke oasis reconciled. Tykma-serdar and the surviving foremen swore allegiance to Russia and were sent by deputation to the Sovereign, who graciously accepted them. They were treated kindly. “The Tekins are such good fellows,” Skobelev said about them, “that it is not the last thing to bring several hundred of such cavalry near Vienna.” The campaign ended with the occupation of the Askhabad district in February. Skobelev received the St. George star. It didn't take long for him to wear it...

* * *

In 1882 - 1884 under the leadership of General Annenkov{249} was built Transcaspian Railway from Krasnovodsk to Merv. On January 1, 1884, the inhabitants of Merv swore allegiance to Russian citizenship. But our diplomacy, again timid, dragged out the matter of transferring the outskirts of the Merv oasis on the border with Afghanistan to Russian citizenship, “so as not to cause complications with England” (these border khanates, meanwhile, were asking for Russia!). This timidity, as always, brought the opposite results. Seeing the hesitation of Russia, the Afghan emir, incited by England, laid his hand on these lands. This resulted in a sharp and protracted two-year conflict with Afghanistan and England.

Feeling powerful support behind them, the Afghans began to behave more defiantly and boldly every month. This arrogance eventually became unbearable, and on March 18, 1885, the head of the Transcaspian region, General Komarov, inflicted a crushing defeat on the Afghans on the Kushka River near Tash-Kepri and drove them beyond their borders. Komarov had 1800 men and 4 guns. There were 4,700 selected Afghans (the Afghans defeated the British twice - in 1841 and 1879). We lost 9 killed and 45 wounded and shell-shocked, more than 1000 Afghans were killed and all 8 guns and 2 banners they had were taken. This was the only military action during the reign of the Tsar-Peacemaker.

England began to threaten us with war and demanded arbitration. But Gorchakov's times have passed, and Alexander III, who knew how to talk with Europe, abruptly rejected English harassment, showing by this that he was not afraid of war. In London, they immediately lowered their tone, and the matter ended as the Russian Tsar wanted!

From now on, Russia began to be separated by 150 versts of the Afghan mountains ... In the 90s, we undertook a number of reconnaissance and small trips to the Pamirs (the most significant was that of Colonel Ionov). In these expeditions, captains Kornilov first showed themselves{250} and Yudenich {251} .

* * *

This is how the conquest of Central Asia took place. What turned out to be beyond the capacity of the hoplites of Alexander's Macedonian phalanxes was carried out by the steppe linemen of the Orenburg and West Siberian battalions!

Ak-Mosque was a ganja here, Geok-Tepe was Gunib. Tsitsianov is here called Perovsky, Kotlyarevsky - Kolpakovsky, Yermolov - Chernyaev, Vorontsov - Kaufman, Baryatinsky - Skobelev.

The Caucasian war is the work of three generations and a fourth part of the Russian armed forces. The enemy in the Caucasus was more powerful and had outside support. Turkestan campaigns are the work of one generation and much smaller forces. Their ideological similarity is complete: harsh, unusual nature - there are mountains, here are steppes and deserts, a wild, fanatical enemy, dashing commanders, a constant inequality of forces - hence the glorious habit of not counting enemies.

The tactics are basically the same - the superiority of spirit over matter. Methods are somewhat different - they are influenced by nature, and technology also affects.The mountainous terrain and smooth-bore guns make the bayonet the main weapon of the Caucasian infantry. Plains with excellent shelling and rapid-firing rifles put forward volley fire in Turkestan to a place of honor.The battle order of the Caucasian infantry is a column in the attack, the Turkestan one is a company square, invulnerable, bristling in all directions, heaps of "white shirts". “The Russians are directly burning people from afar!”, “The Russian soldier spits fire!” — the people of Kokand and Bukhara, Khivans and Tekins say in despair.But the matter here, as in the Caucasus, is decided and completed by the faceted symbol of the military spirit, whichTurkestan infantry owns no worse than the Caucasian. In the Khiva and Teke campaigns, the military brotherhood of the Turkestan and Caucasian regiments was fastened. From Khiva and Geok-Tepe, it was carried with honor through the fiery storms of Lodz and Warsaw, with glory again imprinted near Sarykamysh and Erzerum.

For some thirty years, from the modest, as if forgotten steppe garrison troops, troops were created in which serving became an enviable honor. Troops hardened in a thirty-year military school, where each company, each platoon solved the Russian great-power task. There were few -twenty line battalions, holding their banners high in the land they conquered for Russia, accustomed to always meeting these banners with a thunderous “Hurrah!”. And this is their "Hurrah!" rushed over the mountains and seas, for many thousands of milesmade the world power — the British Empire — tremble, forced it to keep the 200,000-strong Anglo-Indian army in full combat readiness all the time out of fear of those twenty battalionswho proved that nothing is impossible for them.

Central Asian campaigns: participation of the Orenburg Cossacks. S. p. were part of the east. policy of the Russian Empire to master the territory. Middle Asian. state-in.

Khiva campaign 1839-40 . Undertaken with the aim of conquering the Khiva Khanate. Organizer and hands. was Adjutant General V. A. Perovsky, at the beginning. in the summer of 1839, he sent topographers to set up 2 strongholds, on the site of which fortifications were laid: on the river. Embe (500 miles from Orenburg) and near Lake. Chuchka-Kul (170 versts from the Emba fortification). The expeditionary detachment included 3.5 infantry battalions (half of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Orenb. line battalions), 2 regiments The detachment produced a topographer. surveying the area, determined the route of the future movement, stormed the Kokand crape. Kumysh-Kurgan and Shim-Kurgan; having lost 15 killed and 57 wounded, he was forced to retreat. In the 2nd floor. May 1853, under the command of Perovsky, a detachment of 2170 people marched. with 12 guns, which had a sapper team and several. pontoon boats. The fortress was taken on July 22, 1853. During the assault, VK Demenev, Cossacks of the 2nd military, distinguished themselves. district (esauls A. N. Silnov and I. Pechenkin, promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel; officers P. Kruchinin and V. Skrypnikov, awarded the rank of cornet). Lower ranks were granted 50 military insignia. orders for Christians and 12 for Muslims. Detachment of 200 orenb. Cossacks under the command of I. V. Padurov participated in the capture of the fortress. Julek (near Ak-Mechet). By the Highest order, the Ak-Mosque was renamed. to Fort Perovsky (Aug. 31, 1835). Perovsky's detachment founded a number of fortifications along the banks of the Syr Darya and its tributaries: fort No. 1 on the Kazaly branch, fort No. 2 in the Kapmakchi tract. Kumysh-Kurgan was turned into fort No. Z. Leaving the garrison in the fort, Perovsky's detachment returned to Orenburg. Dec. In 1853 the fortress was besieged by the Kokand people. The defense of the fort was led by the commandant lieutenant colonel. M. V. Ogarev and the captain of the 4th Orenb. line battalion V.I. camps and by setting 4 art. guns and a rocket launcher, opened fire on the enemy. artillery and camp. With the participation of the garrison of the fortress, the enemy was defeated and put to flight. Ogarev out of turn received the rank of major general, captain Shkup was promoted to lieutenant colonel. New fortifications marked the beginning of the Syrdarya line, which played an important role in stabilizing the situation on the steppe territory. and promotion of Russian troops in the Middle Asian. possession.

Capture of Tashkent and Samarkand (1865-68). In 1864, to connect Sib. and the Orenburg military border lines were sent towards each other 2 detachments (from Orenburg and Siberia): Orenb. - up the Syr Darya to Turkestan, Western-Sib. - along the Alexander Mt. Zap.-Sib. detachment (2.5 thousand people; commander of the regiment. M. G. Chernyaev) in June stormed the fortress. Aulie-Ata; Orenb. (1.2 thousand people; colonel N. A. Verevkin) - Turkestan. Having united, the detachments captured Chimkent on July 20. Then a 114-verst rush to Tashkent was made, which ended in failure. In 1865 the second campaign against Tashkent was organized. After the assault (May 15-17), the city was taken (Russian losses amounted to 25 people killed and 117 wounded). In 1866 Khujand was occupied. Oct 12 1866 Russian troops consisting of 16 companies, 5 hundreds with a missile team approached the fortress. Jizzakh (the only obstacle on the way to Samarkand). Beginning Turkestan region gen.-m. D. I. Romanovsky 13 Oct. reconnaissance was made. By the morning of 18 Oct. artillery punched 2 gaps: one - in the south. wall at the Samarkand gates, others - in the southeast. Two columns of 4 companies each, with the support of sappers and Cossacks, stormed the fortress: 1st (Captain Mikhailovsky) - from the southeast. side, 2nd (lieutenant colonel Grigoriev) - from the south. Three hundred Cossacks under the command of Lieutenant Colonel. E. A. Pistolkorsa carried out a diversionary maneuver with S.-Z. Part of the garrison took refuge in the interior. citadels, etc. were intercepted while trying to escape. The rest, including 16 beks and commandant Allayar, died in hand-to-hand combat. Enemy losses were approx. 6 thousand people, Russian losses - 98 people. the wounded and the dead. In the spring of 1868, he lived. Samarkand was surrendered without a fight.

Capture of Kitab (1870). A detachment from the troops of the Samarkand garrison under the command of Gen.-M. A. K. Abramova spoke on August 7. 1870 in the direction of the Alai Range, August 8. reached the fortress. Jama. Followed by 2 columns: 1st (commander Colonel Mikhailovsky) - 3rd Turkestan linear battalion, 6 guns of the foot battery of the Turkestan brigade, 1st division of the 3rd battery of connoart. brigade OKV (esaul D. A. Topornin), 6 rocket launchers, 2 orenb. kaz. hundreds (No. 6 - Yesaul P. I. Vaulin and No. 15 - Yesaul N. I. Batyrev); 2nd (colonel Sokovnin) - 3 companies of the 9th Turkestan linear battalion, 2 mountain guns, 2 rocket launchers and fifty Cossacks from Sib. kaz. troops under the command of the headquarters captain Bizhevich. In the reserve of the 1st column were 2 companies of the 6th Turkestan linear battalion, the 2nd - a company of the 9th Turkestan battalion; early the headquarters of the detachment was the regiment. V. N. Trotsky. Squad leader Gen. Abramov Aug 13 conducted reconnaissance, taking the 15th Orenb into the convoy. a hundred. Volunteers from orenb took part in the assault on the fortress. Cossacks. Orenb. a hundred covered art. battery from enemy cavalry. Aug 14 1870 Kitab was taken.

Khiva campaign 1873 . Under the general direction of the gene. K. P. Kaufman, 4 detachments were formed: Turkestan, Mangyshlak, Krasnovodsk and Orenb. (total about 13 thousand people). At the end of Feb. - early. March they came out in 3 columns - from Dzhizak, Kazalinsk and from the shores of the Caspian Sea. 3 hundred Urals participated in the campaign. and 6 hundred orenb. Cossacks. In Orenb. detachment (chief. general-l. Verevkin) included: 3 platoons of the 2nd Orenb. kaz. batteries (142 people); 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6th Orenb. kaz. hundreds. From Orenburg 14 Feb. 1873 200 OKV with 6 guns of the 2nd cavalry battery set out; from Orsk on Feb. 20 and 23—4 hundred more. On March 26, movement began from the Emba along the banks of the Amu Darya. The Turkestan detachment (Adjutant General Kaufman) included: 1st Battery Connoart. brigades; 3, 8, 12, 17th Orenb. hundreds; half of the 1st hundred. From zap. sides approached Khiva Orenb. and Mangyshlak detachments; from the east - Turkestan. Squad of Gen. Verevkina approached Khiva on 28 May. Kaufman ordered Verevkin to cease fire, if the Khivans "keep calm", to join the Turkestan detachment. Verevkin sent 2 companies of infantry and 4 hundred Cossacks with 2 guns to connect with Kaufman's detachment, and left the other part of the troops in combat positions. After the refusal of the khan to surrender the Orenb fortress. the detachment occupied the city before the arrival of Gen. Kaufman. Khan fled from Khiva to Khazavat to the Turkmens, with the help of whom he intended to continue the fight against the Russians; On June 2, he returned "with an expression of humility." The settled population of the khanate offered no resistance. The unwillingness of the Turkmens to obey Kaufman's demand and make an indemnity in the amount of 300 thousand rubles. forced the Russian troops resort to force. On June 7, Kaufman's detachment moved to the center of the Turkmen nomad camps. 17th Orenb. a hundred as part of a detachment under the command of Gen.-m. N. N. Golovacheva went on a campaign to conquer the Turkmen tribe of the Yomuds. Of all the hundreds of the detachment, divisions of 2 hundreds each were formed; 17th Orenb. and the 5th Semirechenskaya hundreds made up the 3rd division (commander of His Imperial Highness Prince Evgeny Maximilianovich Romanovsky Duke of Leuchtenberg). On June 17, the 1st and 2nd Urals, the 8th and 12th Orenb., the 5th Semirechensk hundreds participated in the pursuit of the retreating Turkmens. Aug 12 1873 peace was signed in Khiva. Russian losses amounted to: in the Turkestan detachment - 8 people. killed and 50 wounded; in Orenb. - 6 and 14; in Mangyshlak - 7 and 52; on the squadron of the Aral flotilla - 12 and 8. Cossacks 17th Det. Orenb. hundreds for distinction in battles on June 15 and 16 were awarded badges on headdresses with the inscription: "For the Khiva campaign in 1873."

Kokand campaign 1875-76 . In 1875, the Kipchaks (see Kypchaks) invaded Russian. limits, occupied the upper reaches of the Zeravshan and the environs of Khujand. Abdurakhman-Avtobachi, who headed the circles of the Kokand Khanate dissatisfied with Russian policy, made the center of the military. operations strengthening Mahram on the left bank of the Syr Darya. After the report of M. D. Skobelev on the situation in the Khanate, Gen. Kaufman decided to send a detachment to pacify the Kypchaks. 12 companies of riflemen, 2nd line battalion, Sib. kaz. a regiment of 4 hundred, the Third Orenburg Cossack battery, a missile semi-battery of the Cossacks of the 1st Sib. a shelf. Simultaneously from Samarkand they set out from the combined Orenb.-Ural. regiment 1st Orenb. and 2nd Ural. hundreds and half a rocket battery. Detachment under the command of Col. Efimovich, after passing 200 miles, arrived in Khujand. Aug 18 1875 united. detachment (head of the cavalry Skobelev) under the command of Gen.-m. V. N. Golovacheva went to the fortress. Mahram consisting of 12 companies of shooters. brigade, 2nd linear battalion with 2 foot and 1 kaz. batteries, 8 hundred Cossacks, a consolidated missile battery. Skobelev, having received an order to stay on the east. side of Mahram and cover the rear, left his pom. regiment. Aderkas with 4 hundred Cossacks in the decree. place, he himself with 4 other hundreds (1 Ural and 3 Orenb.) and a rocket battery headed for Kokand. After passing approx. 4 versts, hundreds overcame a deep canal with steep banks. At the crossing, Skobelev left 2 orenbs. kaz. hundreds and a battery under the command of Col. Shubin, from the 1st Orenb. and 2nd Ural. Hundreds overtook the 5 thousand column of Kokand infantry retreating from Makhram. For this fight 1st Orenb. and 2nd Ural. hundreds were awarded silver trumpets with the inscription: "For distinction in the case on August 22, 1875", the division commander, military foreman Rogozhnikov, and the commander of the hundred Urals. kaz. the troops of the Yesaul L. I. Zhigalin were awarded the Order. St. George 4th step. Aug 22 1875 Kaufman's detachment took the crepe. Mahram. The losses of the Kokand people amounted to St. 2 thousand people killed; among Russians 5 people. were killed, 8 were wounded. Kaufman's troops 29 Aug. occupied Kokand without a fight, 8 Sept. - Margelan. 22 Sept. an agreement was concluded with Nasr-Eddin, in which he recognized Rus. citizenship and was obliged to pay an annual tribute of 500 thousand rubles. After the departure of the Russian detachments from the khanate, an uprising broke out there. Abdurakhman-Avtobachi, who had previously fled, overthrew Nasr-Eddin, who had fled to Khujand, and proclaimed Pulat-bek Khan. Lives. Namangan, taking advantage of the absence of Skobelev, attacked the garrison remaining in the city. Returning Skobelev subjected the city to art. shelling, then with a detachment of 2.8 thousand. people (to-ry, among others, included the 1st, 2nd and 5th Orenb. hundreds, a rocket battery division and a division of the 3rd battery of horse artillery brigade OKV) moved to Andijan, dividing his troops into columns: 1st (Baron Meller-Zakomelsky) made up the sapper team, shooter. and the 1st company of the 2nd Turkestan linear battalion, equestrian rifleman. division on foot and 1 gun of the 3rd Orenb. connoart. batteries; 2nd (Captain Ionov) - 1st company of the 1st Turkestan Rifleman. battalion, 1st, 2nd and 5th dismounted orenb. kaz. hundreds and missile platoon; The 3rd (lieutenant colonel Androsov) was a reserve, consisted of the 3rd company of the 2nd Turkestan linear battalion, the 2nd and 3rd companies of the 2nd Turkestan riflemen. battalion, dismounted hundreds of Semirechye, 6 cavalry guns of the 3rd orenb. art. batteries and 3 guns of mobile platoons. Jan 8 1876 ​​artillery detachment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel. I. F. Obrampolsky went to a position half a verst from the village of Eskil-Lik. From the units that made up the artillery cover, an assault column was formed (the commander of the Yesaul of the Semirechensk Kazakh troops, Baron Shtakelberg), who took possession of the fortification. Ionov's column (1st, 2nd and 5th Orenb. Kazakh hundreds) went to the center. part of the city, the 2nd hundred Yesaul Dubrovin broke into the mosque. Jan 10 1876 ​​the city was completely occupied. To pursue the escaped Pulat Khan, a detachment was formed under the command of Meller-Zakomelsky: 1, 2 and 5 Orenb. hundreds, 2nd fifty of the 2nd Semirechensk hundreds, 1, 2 and 5th Sib. hundreds, the 2nd squadron of mounted riflemen, a rocket battery and a division of the 3rd battery of connoarts. OKW brigade. Jan 27 the detachment set out from Andijan. In the village of Uch-Kurgan, he defeated the army of Pulat Khan, who stopped for the night. The capture of Kokand passed without a fight on February 7. 1876. At the same time, the 1st, 2nd and 5th Orenb distinguished themselves. kaz. hundreds and the 3rd Orenburg Cossack battery. Lives. Margelan, Kokand, Osh sent their deputies. to Andijan to express obedience to Gen. Skobelev and with a request to accept the citizenship of the "White Tsar". Decree 19 Feb. 1876 ​​The Kokand Khanate was annexed to Russia, forming the Fergana region.

Alai campaign 1876 . In 1876, the Alai Kara-Kyrgyz revolted. Adjutant General Kaufman ordered Skobelev to form an expeditionary detachment, to make a trip to the mountains to take action against the crowd. subjugation of the Karakirghiz. The detachment included 1 company from the 2nd, 4th and 15th Turkestan linear battalions, 2 companies from the 1st Turkestan riflemen. battalion, sapper team, equestrian rifleman. division, 3 hundred Orenb. and 2 hundred Urals. kaz. troops, missile battery. On July 17, the detachment began moving into the mountains. Captain A.N. Kuropatkin (later Minister of War of Russia) took part in the campaign. Skobelev with a part of the detachment conducted a survey of the Kashgar border, the rest of the troops until September 15. dispersed the surviving detachments of the rebels and brought them into obedience.

Akhal-Teke military expedition (1878-81). In 1878, a detachment (7,310 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and 34 guns) under the command of Gen. N. P. Lomakina, who in June 1879 occupied the fortifications of Duz-Olum, Kary-Kala, Tersakan, August 8 - Bendesen. Aug 28 It was decided to storm the fortress. Geok-Tepe, in a swarm. according to intelligence, there were up to 15 thousand defenders. Against the Tekins, Lomakin could put up only 6 battalions of soldiers and 8 squadrons and hundreds of cavalry (due to illness and exhaustion, the number of soldiers decreased by more than half, food was available in a limited amount). After art. shelling Lomakin moved to the attack all the forces. It was not possible to seize the fortification, the losses amounted to 453 people. killed (damage of the Tekins - up to 2 thousand people). On the morning of 29 Aug. the squad retreated. The government decided to undertake the 2nd campaign under the command of Skobelev. At the end of May 1880, three hundred of the 5th Orenb. kaz. The regiment was sent to the Nizhne-Embensky fortification, from where they were supposed to be escorted to the Trans-Caspian region. camel caravans for exp. Skobelev. Except orenb. Cossacks for this purpose to strengthen the profits of 2 hundred Urals. Cossacks. Orenb. On July 29, 1880, hundreds set out with a caravan of camels through the desert in the direction of the active military. detachment of the Transcaspian region, 30 September. Arrived in Kinderlin Bay. Ural. kaz. hundreds, having completed their task, were sent to their homeland on steamboats. Orenb. hundreds 3 Oct. with the headquarters of the 5th regiment set out from Kinderlinsky Bay, 16 Oct. arrived in Krasnovodsk, then were sent on ships to Mikhailovsky Bay. Nov 18 entered Kizil-Arvat. Protected the military. transport from the attacks of the Tekins, were used by Skobelev in reconnaissance. sorties. Nov 21 1880 war began. part of the exp., several combat reconnaissance. The number of defenders of the fortress. Geok-Tepe was up to 10 thousand cavalry and up to 20 thousand people. infantry. Jan 12 1881 the fortress was taken. At the same time, a detachment distinguished itself (Orenb. and Ural. Kazakh hundreds, 2 infantry companies and a mountain battery) from the Turkestan military. district under the command of Col. Kuropatkin. Russian losses amounted to 398 people. To pursue the Tekins, a detachment from the Armenian army was sent. cavalry and Cossacks. Jan 18 the village of Askhabad (Ashgabat) is occupied. On May 6, the Akhal-Teke oasis was annexed to Russia. In Apr. 1881 orenb. hundreds set out on the return trip, in Mikhailovsky Bay they were sent by sea, then along the Volga to Samara; in the 2nd floor. May 1881 arrived in Ufa. Orenb. kaz. a hundred, which was part of the Turkestan detachment, went with him to serve in the Turkestan military. district.